Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

PORT OF LONDON BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday next.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

Farms, Lincolnshire (Flooding)

Mr. Osborne: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he has considered the petition sent to him, signed by over eighty farmers in the Marsh-chapel area, Lincolnshire, protesting against the inadequate protection afforded them against flooding; and if he will make a statement.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. J. B. Godber): My right hon. Friend has received this petition, and understands that the Lincolnshire River Board is about to undertake a survey of the area, after which it will be for the river board and the Louth Internal Drainage Board to decide what action is appropriate. My engineers will, of course, be ready to help in whatever way they can, if they are requested to do so.

Mr. Osborne: Whilst the Lincolnshire farmers are grateful to my hon. Friend for what he has done for them recently, they are wondering whether there are any financial reasons for this work not being done. If not, will my hon. Friend put the maximum pressure on the river boards to get the work started and completed, because the farmers feel that they could produce more food if the land were safe from flooding?

Mr. Godber: I have a good deal of sympathy with the difficulties of the

farmers, but I think that the important thing is to get the survey done and to see just what the facts are.

Sheep, Cleveland Moors

Mr. Palmer: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he is aware of the large numbers of sheep killed by traffic on roads crossing the Cleveland moors; and whether he will take steps, in co-operation with the local highway authorities, to reduce this loss of valuable livestock.

Mr. Godber: My right hon. Friend is aware of this problem, and it is now being investigated by a panel appointed by the County Agricultural Executive Committee with a view to further discussion with the county council and other authorities before the next holiday season.

Mr. Palmer: I thank the Parliamentary Secretary for that reply, but in this case is not it possible to have warning notices, of attractive design—to be read by the motorists, of course, and not by the sheep?

Mr. Godber: I think that that is a very sound suggestion; and exactly the sort of thing that the panel will be considering.

Sir A. Baldwin: Is my hon. Friend aware that the best way of dealing with the problem is to proceed with legislation, based on the Report of the Royal Commission on Common Land, in which fencing will take a very prominent place?

Mr. Godber: I note my hon. Friend's interest in this subject, and I hope that we shall have his support in tomorrow's debate.

Heneage Report

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether he is yet in a position to make a statement on the Heneage Committee's Report of 1951.

Mr. Godber: I have nothing to add to the reply given to the hon. Member on 2nd February.

Mr. Jeger: Does not the hon. Gentleman recollect that only a week or so before that he was very anxious and eager to conduct discussions on the Heneage Report and, in fact, threw out three challenges to my right hon. Friend the


Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown)? Is there any conflict between himself and the Minister over the Heneage Report which prevents him making a statement to the House about it?

Mr. Godber: I can assure the House, and the hon. Member, that there is no conflict whatever between my right hon. Friend and myself over this or any other matter. I would welcome an opportunity to debate all the problems associated with the Heneage Report, but it is difficult to go into details in Question and Answer.

Mr. Willey: Will the Parliamentary Secretary have a word with his right hon. Friend the Leader of the House, and ensure that we have a debate? Quite frankly, however, we want more than a debate. After all these years, we want action from the Government.

Mr. Godber: I quite realise that action on this is called for, and I am still hopeful that we shall be able to get it. However, this is a very difficult problem, and it is not one that would be helped by trying to bring in legislation which would not be made use of after being put on the Statute Book. That is one of the difficulties of some parts of the existing drainage legislation, and it must be taken into account.

Spanish Carnations

Mr. Gresham Cooke: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food the landed price of imported Spanish carnations per lb. as compared with the price of the British produced product.

Mr. Godber: The average c.i.f. value of carnations imported from Spain during 1958 was 4s. 1d. a lb. before payment of the duty of 1s. 8d. a lb. There are no official returns of flower prices but trade reports indicate that Co-vent Garden Market prices for English carnations during that period ranged from 4s. to 36s. a lb. for glasshouse varieties.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: As the imports of foreign carnations have risen very rapidly in the last two or three years, and as the prices my hon. Friend has given indicate that Spanish carnations are coming in very cheaply, will he bear these facts in mind in the discussions going on about tariffs for the protection of cut flowers?

Mr. Godber: Yes, this is just the sort of thing which is being borne in mind in relation to this particular point. I am sure that my hon. Friend will realise that I cannot make any further statement on that today.

Colonel Beamish: Is my hon. Friend aware that there has been an increase of something like 50 per cent. in the imports of cut carnations in the last two or three years? Will he, therefore, look very carefully into this question to see that the industry is not being seriously damaged?

Mr. Godber: I have indicated that we are looking at these things, and the figure which my hon. and gallant Friend quotes is something which we shall certainly keep in mind.

Cheshire Cheese

Mr. Gresham Cooke: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will use his powers under the Food and Drugs Act to prevent imported foreign cheese being described as Cheshire; and whether, in view of the recent increase of this practice, he will take steps to ensure that the term Cheshire is in future only applied to cheese of British origin.

Mr. Godber: No, Sir. This description has, for many years, ceased to be an indication of the origin of a type of cheese widely produced abroad as well as in the United Kingdom. However, under the provisions of Section 1 (1) of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926, imported goods to which there is applied the name of any place or district in the United Kingdom must bear an indication of origin.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my hon. Friend aware that on an imported Cheshire chease the word "imported" is in very small letters at the bottom of the cheese, and, as a result, the housewife can be deceived very easily when purchasing this kind of cheese? Does he not think it right to take some steps to prevent the housewife being "cheesed off"?

Mr. Godber: The Merchandise Marks Act provides powers in relation to this matter. It may be that the word is not very large, but I should have thought that


there is a general realisation that, whether it be Cheshire or Cheddar cheese, a lot of it is imported and has been for many years.

Potatoes

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what steps he is taking to ensure that there is a sufficient importation of potatoes in augmentation of home supplies to permit a reduction in prices to the consumer.

Mr. Godber: The Government are allowing imports of maincrop potatoes from all sources acceptable under the Plant Health Regulations, and I am sure that the trade will continue to bring in the supplies needed to supplement the home crop. It is estimated that over 250,000 tons of imported main crop potatoes have already arrived this season compared with imports of about 45,000 tons by the same date last year.

Mr. Willey: But looking forward, can the hon. Gentleman assure us that we shall have adequate imports? Does he realise that, unlike last year, our bad crop has not been shared by Continental countries, and we should have expected imports to hold the price? Further, is he aware that, complementary to the guarantee, there is a responsibility on the Government in times of shortage to hold the price and see that it remains reasonable?

Mr. Godber: As regards the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, obviously the only way in which supplies can be attracted to this country is by a price level sufficient to induce those supplies. As regards the first part, the wholesale price in this country has eased slightly over the last week or two, and I think it is clear that there are adequate supplies on the Continent and they should come in.

Pigs

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food the total number of sows and gilts for breeding at the latest available date and the corresponding figure twelve months earlier.

Mr. Godber: According to the December, 1958, Census Returns for England and Wales, there were 610,000 sows and gilts on agricultural holdings. The corresponding figure for December, 1957, was 673,000.

Mr. Willey: Does not this indicate that the Government's policy is knocking the confidence out of the pig industry? Are we to assume that Government policy is now to lower the sights for the industry?

Mr. Godber: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman read at the time the Annual Review last year, when we stated quite clearly what our view was in relation to pigs. We said:
Production is expanding rapidly … market prices are lower. … The trend of output must be reversed".
We said that in the last Review, and these figures show that what we anticipated and hoped for has been brought about, and we hope it will result in better stability in the pig market.

Mr. Willey: But to what level do the Government intend to reduce the pig industry?

Mr. Godber: The Government are not seeking to bring about any strict level. It is a matter of attaining an economic balance, which is what we seek to do in all these matters.

Beef

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food the consumption of beef in the United Kingdom for the last six months and the figure for the corresponding period twelve months ago.

Mr. Godber: Supplies of beef and veal moving into consumption during July-December, 1958 are estimated at 584,000 tons. This compares with 646,000 tons for the same period in 1957.

Mr. Willey: May we assume that at the next General Election we shall not hear the cry, "More red meat"?

Mr. Godber: I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman would have hung his head in shame before he dared to question any matter of beef supplies under this Government as compared with his own.

Farmland, Wigan (Opencast Coal Operations)

Mr. Fitch: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if, in view of the unsatisfactory state of the land returned to several farmers at Goose


Green, Wigan, after opencast coal operations, he will oppose all further applications to use agricultural land for this purpose.

Mr. Godber: Before this land was returned to the farmers it was given a full course of agricultural after-treatment. My right hon. Friend has arranged for the farmers concerned to be given further technical advice.
Decisions on proposals of the National Coal Board to work land for opencast coal are not a matter for my right hon. Friend but are taken by my noble Friend, the Minister of Power, after consideration of all the relevant factors. Applications are now dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Opencast Coal Act, 1958, and, under the procedures of the Act, opportunities are provided for objections and, in appropriate cases, for local public inquiry.

Mr. Fitch: But surely the hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend can object to good agricultural land being used for opencast mining operations, particularly in a period such as the present when there is a surplus of coal?

Mr. Godber: Yes, there are opportunities for my right hon. Friend to make representations in regard to these matters, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that they are made in appropriate cases.

Mr. Fitch: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if, in the interests of good husbandry, he will consider giving financial aid to those farmers at Goose Green, Wigan, whose land was left in an unsatisfactory state after opencast coalmining operations, in view of the inadequacy of the compensation which they have received from the National Coal Board.

Mr. Godber: Provided that they satisfy the conditions of the relevant schemes, owners and occupiers of opencast coal land may obtain various forms of help, for example, by way of ploughing grants, field drainage grants, grants under the Farm Improvement Scheme or lime and fertilizer subsidies.

Mr. Fitch: I should like to thank the Parliamentary Secretary for the courteous way in which he has dealt with my correspondence, but does not he feel that something more tangible than advice is needed in this case?

Mr. Godber: I accept that there have been difficult problems in relation to this case. Some of the land has been difficult to put back into good heart, but my officers are doing all they can to assist in this respect. I am afraid that I cannot hold out any further hope beyond what we are trying to do now.

Charollais Bulls

Sir W. Anstruther-Gray: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, when considering whether to permit the importation of Charollais bulls, if he will give due consideration to the official policy of the Australian Government regarding risks of disease among cattle exported from this country.

Mr. Godber: I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that before reaching a decision in this matter my right hon. Friend will take full account of all disease risks.

Sir W. Anstruther-Gray: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that the Australian ban against British cattle is very vexatious, and that we shall reduce our chances of having the ban removed if we allow Charollais cattle from a disease-ridden country to come into this country?

Mr. Godber: I think that we must keep the matter in proportion. I quite agree that it is very important that we should try to have the Australian ban relaxed, but I do not think the position is likely to be affected materially by any decision which may be taken—and none has yet been taken—about Charollais bulls. After all, there is no blue tongue disease in France, so far as I am aware, any more than there is in England.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOME DEPARTMENT

Clubs (Children)

Mr. Simmons: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the lack of evidence in his Department concerning children in clubs, he will take steps to check the evidence provided to him by the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons), and if he will make a statement.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Renton): The information which the hon. Member sent my right hon. Friend, contains no evidence that children in clubs


consume intoxicants and appears to reflect the division of opinion shown in this House in the debate on the hon. Member's Bill on this subject last Session.

Mr. Simmons: Is not the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that his right hon. Friend has set up a committee to inquire into juvenile drunkenness? Will he reinforce that committee by including in its membership leaders of youth clubs and Nonconformist and other social workers, because his Department appears to be very lax in obtaining the necessary information on which to come to a conclusion on the subject?

Mr. Renton: The proposed committee is to inquire into drunkenness as a whole. As I told the hon. Gentleman on previous occasions, we have no evidence of any general or serious drunkenness among children. I certainly could not, without notice, answer questions about the composition of the committee.

Mr. Simmons: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that strip-tease acts are being performed in clubs in the Midlands and elsewhere and that children and young persons are allowed to attend these performances; and, in view of the moral objections to such attendance, if he will take steps to make it illegal.

Mr. Renton: My right hon. Friend has read the newspaper article which the hon. Member was good enough to send him, but he is not at present persuaded of the need for legislation.

Mr. Simmons: Is the Minister aware that these children and young persons can go without let or hindrance into clubs, whereas they are excluded from "pubs" and that this type of entertainment is a moral danger to these children and young persons? It is no good our condemning juvenile delinquency if we do not take steps to remove temptation out of the way of these young people.

Mr. Renton: The evidence which the hon. Member has put before us and, indeed, the evidence at our disposal does not show that children are admitted to these strip-tease clubs, with the exception of one unidentified club in the Midlands. Certainly, on the evidence we now have, it would not be right to suggest that there should be legislation in this matter.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman's information

allow him to tell us where these clubs are?

Mr. Renton: I could not say that without notice.

Cremation Certificates

Mr. Reeves: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that doctors are still charging more than is recommended by the British Medical Association for the signing of cremation certificates B and C, and that the hon. Member for Greenwich has in his possession a receipt of two doctors charging £8 8s. 0d. for certificates B and C for one cremation of one whose relatives could ill afford such a sum; if he is aware that such excessive charges are detrimental to this hygenic method of disposing of the dead, and are becoming a public scandal; and what steps he is now taking to check this tendency.

Mr. Renton: The Home Office has recently embarked upon a review of the Cremation Regulations and this matter will be included in the review.

Mr. Reeves: I hope the Minister will realise that all the efforts which have been made towards a voluntary agreement have been quite unsuccessful and that time after time these voluntary arrangements have been violated. It is becoming a very serious matter these days. It is a crime against the method of disposal. I hope that the working party will take seriously into consideration the information which is now available.

Mr. Renton: No doubt the working party will wish to bear in mind what the hon. Member has said.

Prison Service

Mr. C. Pannell: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will give the numbers of men who applied to enrol in the prison service in each year over the past five years, stating the number of those who were in terviewed, the number who were rejected during a probationary period, and the numbers finally accepted, in England and Wales, and for Her Majesty's Prison, Armley, Leeds, separately.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): As the Answer involves a number of figures I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Pannell: Does the Home Secretary appreciate that that reply is rather unsatisfactory? I have waited a long time for these figures and it would have been much more convenient to question the right hon. Gentleman on the Floor of the House about the high number of entrants and the relatively low number who get through. Is he aware that I have pursued this matter over a large number of years, that it has been raised in debate and that no one, least of all the right hon. Gentleman, could be satisfied with that sort of figures?

Mr. Butler: I do not know what the hon. Member means by "that sort of figures". The table would take at least five minutes to assimilate and about a

RECRUITMENT FIGURES OF PRISON OFFICERS (MEN) FOR THE YEARS 1954–1958 FOR APPLICANTS FROM THE WHOLE OF ENGLAND AND WALES AND FROM THE LEEDS AREA



1
2



Total for England and Wales
Leeds



1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958


Applications received
4,062
2,664
2,404
4,490
5,630
(all applications are addressed to the Prison Commissioners).


Interviewed
3,766
2,497
2,316
4,294
5,255
179
132
124
236
299


Rejected on interview
1,402
839
645
1,366
1,754
86
62
52
119
159


Medically unfit
541
363
316
513
592
19
14
15
16
21


Rejected on references, and further check on height, etc
692
418
358
626
697
20
12
6
22
12


Failed training
262
152
58
123
215
15
3
1
4
10


Passed training
218
233
201
490
506
11
15
24
33
28


(1) The figures on the chart are not self-contained since there is a carrying over from one year to another of applications at intermediate stages of consideration.


(2) The figures of applicants interviewed and rejected do not include persons who withdrew, resigned, failed to join for training, or who were advised to apply later.

Child-Care Officers

Mr. Swingler: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many child-care officers are employed in the United Kingdom; and what proportion of them have received special training for the work.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Miss Patricia Hornsby-Smith): Of the 1,200 child-care officers estimated to be employed by local authorities in England and Wales, it is believed that about a quarter have received special training leading to the award of the Certificate in Child Care and that about half the remainder have other social science qualifications.

Mr. Swingler: Is not this a rather unsatisfactory position after ten years of the

minute and a half to read. I thought that it would be fair both to the hon. Member and to the House if they were to see it; then, when the hon. Member has seen it, he might either care to pursue the matter with me or to put down a further Question. I am only too keen to encourage recruitment to the prison service.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: Has the Home Secretary discussed the whole question of recruitment and the standard that he requires with representatives of the prison officers?

Mr. Butler: I have not personally discussed it, but it has been discussed by my representatives.

Following is the Answer:

operation of the Children Act? Cannot the hon. Lady do something further to recruit more people to this work and should not special steps be taken to raise the proportion of those who receive proper training and have qualifications for it?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: As the hon. Member pointed out, it is ten years since these courses were instituted. There are many officers who have been with their local authorities more than ten years. One should not assume that they are unqualified because at the time they entered the services these precise qualifications and examinations were not available to them.

Mr. Swingler: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many child-care officers are employed in


Staffordshire and what proportion of (hem are unqualified; what is the ratio per 10,000 of the child population; and how these figures compare with those for the counties of Derby, Nottingham, Leicester, and Warwick.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: The Answer involves a table of figures which, with permission, I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Swingler: While thanking the hon. Lady for the table, which, I guess, will show a fairly high proportion of unqualified officers in these counties, may I ask this question? Whilst, clearly, a large number of the unqualified officers are valuable and highly experienced people, nevertheless should not her Department now take more urgent steps to offer the opportunity of modern training and qualification to the high proportion of those in child-care service who do not at the moment have the training?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: Every encouragement is given to officers to avail themselves of the training. Generally speaking, however, there is a tremendous demand on people with an inclination for this type of work and in many of the areas we are, in consultation with the local authorities, endeavouring to get more people into the service. There is certainly no lack of willingness on our part that, where suitable, the officers should gain the qualifications.

Following is the table:


County Council

Number of child-care officers employed on 31st December, 1958
Number of child-care officers per 10,000 of the population under the age of 18


Staffordshire
…
17
0·7


Derbyshire
…
10
0·5


Nottinghamshire
…
20
1·3


Leicestershire
…
8
0·8


Warwickshire
…
8
0·5

The figures do not include children's officers their deputies or assistants who are employed mainly on administrative or supervisory duties.

There is no prescribed qualification for child-care officers. It is for the local authority concerned to appoint staff with suitable training and experience, and comparisons between the position in different areas cannot usefully be made.

Television Programmes (Crime and Detection)

Mr. Edelman: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what representations he has had from police forces under his control concerning the undesirable influence of television programmes which illustrate the detailed methods of criminals engaged in crime, and of the police in securing their detection.

Mr. R. A. Butler: While I have received no formal representations on this subject, I am aware that it has given rise to concern in the minds of some police officers. If the hon. Member has some specific case in mind, he might like to bring it to my attention.

Mr. Edelman: Is it not the experience of all who watch commercial television that crime and criminals are constantly being presented in a glamorised form? Is it not the case that this embellishment of crime without any genuine artistic or moral purpose can be as corrupting to immature minds as pornography? In these circumstances, and in view of the complaint in particular of the Police Gazette, will not the right hon. Gentleman bring the matter to the attention of the Independent Television Authority to ascertain whether the provisions of the Television Act have been complied with?

Mr. Butler: Certainly, because this is a powerful medium. We must also remember that both the B.B.C. and the I.T.A. have been of great assistance to us with publicity for the detection of crime. Therefore, what I should like to do is to obtain examples of particular instances. I have ascertained that no particular case has been brought to our attention. If, however, there were any instance and I could isolate it, we would certainly take it up with the authorities concerned.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: My hon. Friend's Question refers to police forces under the control of the Home Secretary. Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us which police forces in the provinces outside the Metropolitan area he regards as strictly under his control?

Mr. Butler: I always preserve an entirely constitutional attitude to all matters. I am solely concerned in regard to control in relation to the Metropolitan


Police and not in relation to other police forces. My relations are, I think, well known.

Mr. Greenwood: So we may take it that the right hon. Gentleman's Answer referred only to the Metropolitan area?

Mr. Edelman: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department in how many cases television companies have sought the advice either of his Department or of police authorities under his control in connection with programmes dealing with methods employed by the police or by criminals; which were the companies; and with relation to which programmes the inquiries were made.

Mr. R. A. Butler: Both the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police receive requests for technical advice from time to time from the British Broadcasting Corporation and independent television companies; but there is no complete record of these requests.

Mr. Edelman: Will the Home Secretary say whether the advisers from the police force advise in their capacity as Government officials, or as private fee-receiving consultants?

Mr. Butler: No; I could not give an immediate answer to that supplementary question without consideration.

State-managed Public Houses, Carlisle

Dr. Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that no review of the Carlisle experiment in State-owned public houses has been made for over twenty-five years; and when he proposes to make his next review of the working of the experiment.

Mr. R. A. Butler: With the assistance of the Local Advisory Committee and the State Management Districts Council I keep the working of the experiment under constant review.

Dr. Johnson: In addition to all the other factors in connection with this experiment, is my right hon. Friend aware of the recent comments of the chairmen of the city magistrates and the chairman of the county magistrates about the invidious position which they feel their benches are in on licensing matters and the extremely false position which they

are in when they grant a licence which is not confirmed by the Advisory Committee? Does not my right hon. Friend think that it is only by a review such as I suggest that a matter of this nature can be considered?

Mr. Butler: It is true that the last review was in 1929–31 by the Royal Commission on Licensing. I feel that it is quite reasonable to say that it is the sort of experiment which needs review, but at the moment it is under my own personal review in the Home Office and I do not think that I can be helped at the moment by an outside body. If my hon. Friend, who knows the district well, chooses to tell me anything about the matter, I shall be only too glad to hear what he has to say.

All-night Clubs, London

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what action he is proposing to take, following the deputation from the London County Council, to look into the position of all- night clubs.

Mr. Renton: I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer which my right hon. Friend gave on 27th January to the hon. Member for Clapham (Mr. Gibson).

Mr. Janner: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that there is still concern about this matter, and is he taking any steps to deal with it?

Mr. Renton: I am not sure what the hon. Gentleman has in mind when he refers to "steps to deal with it", but, if be is referring to the possibility of further legislation, I certainly cannot offer him any hope of this in the near future.

Probation Officers, London (Press Statements)

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what are his grounds for extending to the London probation officers combined together in their professional association the rule requiring individual officers to obtain prior sanction before publishing any matter touching on the business of the courts; and to what extent this rule applies to statements made to the Press, whether by individual officers in London or on the authority of the London Branch


of the National Association of Probation Officers, about matters not touching on the business of the courts but arising from his relations with the London probation officers.

Mr. Renton: The rule is designed to protect the interests of the probation service, the courts it serves, and the people with whom it deals. The second part of the Question does not arise, because my right hon. Friend's relations with the London probation officers necessarily touch upon the business of the courts.

Mr. Janner: Is not this a very serious position from the point of view of the interests of the probation officers? Does not the hon. and learned Gentleman realise that by putting this kind of imposition upon a body which deals with the interests of probation officers he is limiting their rights, and will he say what he considers comes within the business of the courts? Is the hon. and learned Gentleman referring to everything which probation officers discuss at their own meetings?

Mr. Renton: It would be better to wait until we have an application to publish matter in the Press. We have had no application so far, but my right hon. Friend is always prepared to consider any application on its merits.

Mr. Janner: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman go into the matter again? Was it not at the instigation of the Home Office that this particular branch was prevented from giving information to the Press? Does he realise that that is just as bad as refusing an application?

Mr. Renton: I am not aware of the case to which the hon. Gentleman refers, but I should point out that the National Association of Probation Officers communicates freely with the Press through its general secretary, and that is the proper channel.

Air-raid Shelters, Hanley

Dr. Stross: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will state his reasons for not authorising the removal of the air-raid shelters in Etruria Park, Hanley; and how these differ from those in Burslem, to whose removal he has assented.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: It has been the policy of successive Governments to

retain shelters unless there are compelling grounds for their removal. The demolition of the shelters in Chapel Lane, Burslem, was necessary to allow building development. This is not the case with the shelters in Etruria Park.

Dr. Stross: Is the hon. Lady aware that the reasons for asking for the abolition of these shelters in Etruria Park were, first, that they are very insanitary and decrepit, and, secondly, that the space is urgently required as a recreation ground for children to play upon? I beg her to reconsider the whole matter, because the local authority finds that it badly needs this ground for the children.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: Permission is normally given if they are structurally unsound, which these shelters are not considered to be, but, if the hon. Member feels that there are other points which should be taken into consideration, my right hon. Friend would be prepared to consider them.

Hairdressers

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that there is anxiety about the use of unqualified hairdressers, and that in every other major country there are compulsory standards of attainment for hairdressers; and whether he will now consider introducing or encouraging legislation to ensure that similar provisions shall prevail here.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: My right hon. Friend has received no representations on this subject and the Government do not contemplate introducing legislation. My right hon. Friend cannot say in advance what the Government's attitude would be towards a Bill introduced by a private Member.

Mr. Janner: Is not the hon. Lady mistaken? Was not a Question asked a few days ago about the provision of properly qualified hairdressers in mental hospitals? Also, is she not aware that there is a considerable amount of feeling that nowadays it is highly essential that this trade should be in the hands of fully qualified people?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: The hon. Member will be aware that efforts to introduce legislation on this matter have failed in the past, and I cannot hold out any hope


that the Government will introduce legislation.

Mrs. Hill: Will my hon. Friend consult with her right hon. Friend about the representations which I made to him by letter in January this year on this subject? There is grave anxiety that in this very large industry, which uses chemicals and electricity these days, people should be properly qualified and duly authorised.

Mrs. Castle: Is the Under-Secretary aware that she is now receiving representations from the women Members of the House to do something in the matter? Will she take steps to give help and statutory encouragement to the Hairdressers' Registration Council in its efforts to raise the professional standards in this important industry?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: In view of the intense competition in this industry, I should have thought that any hon. Lady, or anyone else, is perfectly free to ensure that she goes to a satisfactory and adequate hairdresser.

Telephone Tapping

Mr. Grimond: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) if he has given further consideration to the reservation of the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), in Command Paper No. 283, to the effect that telephone tapping should cease to be used for the detection of crime; and if he will make a statement;
(2) if he will make a statement on the working of the new regulations concerning telephone tapping brought into force as a result of the report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors, Command Paper No. 283.

Mr. R. A. Butler: As I indicated in reply to a Question by the hon. Gentleman on 27th March, 1958, the Government accepted the Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors and the necessary steps were taken to give effect to the recommendations on procedure summarised in paragraphs 159–163. I have no further statement to make.

Mr. Grimond: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the whole business of telephone tapping is pretty repugnant and that this House should be regularly informed of what is being

done and have reports of the number of cases which have been used for the detection of crime? Will he consider this matter in relation to the detection of crime, because, according to the figures of the right hon. Member for Smethwick, only ·13 per cent. of the cases were successful? I should inform the hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood) that this figure refers to the Metropolitan area. Surely for the sake of that very small number of cases it is unnecessary to keep this repulsive method of detection.

Mr. Butler: The Government accepted the recommendation of the majority, and, while we have the utmost respect for the observations of the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), we are not prepared to accept the minority Report. We have been administering the matter on the lines suggested by the majority Report, with many points of which the right hon. Member for Smethwick agrees, with the exception to which the hon. Member referred. I think that that is the best policy to pursue at present.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: In view of the very widespread public concern in this matter and the views expressed in the Press about the reservation of my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick, could not the Home Secretary come a little bit further to meet us and agree to reconsider accepting my right hon. Friend's reservation?

Mr. Butler: I do not think that there is a very widespread feeling on this subject. It is administered with the utmost care and the onus of it now falls almost entirely upon the Secretary of State, who takes great care about it. I do not think that I would like to alter the policy at the present time.

Mr. Ede: Would the right hon. Gentleman consider whether it would be possible to issue an annual return, showing the number of permissions that have been given, the number that have been withdrawn, and the number outstanding at the date of making the return?

Mr. Butler: In paragraphs 119 to 121, the Committee stated unanimously that it would be against the public interest to give figures of the extent of the interception. Therefore, we had better accept its advice.

Penal Practice in a Changing Society (Command Paper)

Mrs. Braddock: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make available, in the prison libraries, copies of Command Paper No. 645, Penal Practice in a Changing Society, in order that any prisoner who desires to study it may be able to do so.

Mr. R. A. Butler: Yes, I shall be pleased to arrange this.

Mrs. Braddock: Is the Home Secretary aware that quite a number of hon. Members have received requests from prisoners with reference to this Command Paper? In view of the fact that very few of them will have the opportunity of discussing it anywhere else, is it not very necessary to have the consumers' point of view on it?

Mr. Butler: I think that we ought to be able to arrange the distribution to which the hon. Lady refers within a week.

Mr. Hector Hughes: In view of the valuable experience which these prisoners may be able to draw upon, will the right hon. Gentleman invite their comments on the White Paper?

Mr. Butler: If we could obtain any reactions in this experimental period, especially on those questions which affect future legislation, I should, of course, like comments from any quarter.

Oral Answers to Questions — POLICE

Pensions

Mr. Osborne: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what would be the annual cost of granting uniform pensions to police constables and sergeants, irrespective of their date of retirement; and if he will consider taking this action for the relatively small number of older police pensioners.

Mr. Renton: As regards the first part of the Question, I would refer my hon. Friend to the Answer my right hon. Friend gave him on 13th November last.
In answer to the second part, my right hon. Friend would not feel justified in singling out police pensioners from among other public service pensioners for special treatment.

Mr. Osborne: Is not my hon. And learned Friend aware that this relatively

small number of junior policemen who are retired feel that they were born forty years too soon and that they are not getting a fair share of what is going by way of pensions? Since it would cost so little and they have been very good public servants, will the hon. and learned Gentleman consider the matter and be generous to them?

Mr. Renton: What my hon. Friend is suggesting is a departure from the general principles on which public service pensions are awarded. Such a question should be directed to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Widows (Pensions)

Mrs. Castle: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will reconsider the rates of pension payable to the widows of police officers who die as the result of an attack.

Mr. R. A. Butler: We must all feel sympathy with the widows of policemen killed in the execution of their duty. Regulations were made in 1953 to provide improved pensions in certain cases and I think the formula contained in these regulations is a reasonable one.

Mrs. Castle: Is the right hon. Gentle man aware that two members of the Blackburn Police Force recently con ducted themselves with great gallantry in trying to apprehend an armed man who had run amok and was terrorising his family, that one of the policemen, Detective Inspector O'Donnell, died as a result of injuries received and the other, P.C. Covill, was fortunate to escape with his life, and that the people of Blackburn are proud of these men and the high standards of service which they observed in the course of duty? Will the right hon. Gentleman not—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Lady is going on too long for a supplementary question.

Mrs. Castle: I am sorry, Mr. Speaker. I should have thought that this House would be proud of these men and proud of an opportunity to place this on record, in view of the attacks which are made on the police forces from time to time. Would not the Home Secretary agree that if men are to go unarmed into danger, they must have the peace of mind of


knowing that their families will be adequately compensated if they lose their lives as a result of doing their duty?

Mr. Butler: I am, of course, aware of the tragic case to which the hon. Lady refers and which occurred in Blackburn. I understand, however, that no award has yet been made by the watch committee. We should not, therefore, prejudice it by any statement made in this House. In regard to the 1953 Regulations in general, credit for which should go to the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede), the rate then fixed for the pension was proportionate to the husband's pay and I should have thought that that was still a good basis However, in this case, I am sure that we should not say more except to express our sympathy.

Oral Answers to Questions — RHODESIA

University College (Grants)

Mr. Albu: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what grants have been made to the University College of Rhodesia from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds; and what grants it is proposed to make in the future.

The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. C. J. M. Alport): The total to date is £1,475,000 No applications from the University College are under consideration at present.

Mr. Albu: When future applications for grant are under consideration, will the hon. Gentleman ask his noble Friend to draw the attention of the authorities of the college in Salisbury to the undesirability of refusing a post to an African scholar solely on the ground that he married a white woman, as happened recently?

Mr. Alport: When further applications are made, these applications will be considered in the light of the advice and recommendations which will be given by the Inter-University Council. That body will provide the advice upon which an application will be judged.

Mr. J. Griffiths: Whilst we all welcome very much the establishment of this university, which we have regarded as a great venture in inter-racial education in the heart of Central Africa, may I ask whether the hon. Gentleman will comment on what my hon. Friend the Member for

Edmonton (Mr. Albu) said? Is it true that this man was refused the appointment on that ground?

Mr. Alport: Decisions on these matters are entirely for the university authorities, and it would be most improper for me to make a comment on them.

Mr. Griffiths: We have given £1 million, which is a large sum but not more than it deserves, for the purpose for which we thought the university was established, but if it engages in racial practices of this kind surely we are entitled to make a protest and to ask the hon. Gentleman to comment.

Mr. Alport: Whatever comment is made, I think it is that the money spent on this university is a fine investment in the future of the Federation.

Mr. Wall: Would not it have been wiser of the university authorities not to have made a Press statement on this matter?

Oral Answers to Questions — BASUTOLAND

Mission Schools (Government Grants)

Mr. Wall: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations the number of schools in Basutoland belonging to the Paris Evangelical Mission Society and the Roman Catholic Mission Societies, respectively, that are in receipt of Government educational grants.

Mr. Alport: Four hundred and twenty-seven and 305 respectively.

Mr. Wall: Is my hon. Friend aware that there is considerable dissatisfaction in the Territory over the alleged disparity of grant between the Mission Societies? Would he look into the matter to ensure that there is a grant to satisfy schools of both societies?

Mr. Alport: I will certainly go into the matter again but, as my hon. Friend knows, the present basis of grant is such as to ensure for the moment that those schools which were in existence at the time that the decision was made receive a grant. Schools which have recently been opened were opened by the mission concerned, knowing that grants were not available. At the same time, the Basutoland Administration is anxious to ensure


that more money, when it is available, may be forthcoming for educational purposes.

Oral Answers to Questions — BECHUANALAND

Constitution

Mr. Wall: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations whether he will now make proposals for a constitutional advance in Bechuanaland similar to those recently announced for Basutoland.

Mr. Alport: My noble Friend is studying the comments and recommendations of the High Commissioner on a resolution of the Joint Advisory Council for the Bechuanaland Protectorate. He hopes to reply to the Council at its next meeting in April.

Mr. Wall: Can my hon. Friend say whether the District Council is operating satisfactorily in all the arrangements at the present time?

Mr. Alport: That is a different matter, but the District Council established in the Bamangwato Reserve is operating satisfactorily.

Oral Answers to Questions — EDUCATION

School Milk

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: asked the Minister of Education whether it is intended to review the scale on which school milk is at present supplied in the light of the recent report by his Chief Medical Officer on the health of school children.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Sir Edward Boyle): My right hon. Friend does not feel justified at present in reviewing current policy for the provision of school milk. He is, however, proposing to refer the question of the effect of the nutrition of children on their physical development to the Committee on Medical and Nutritional Aspects of Food Policy.

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: While thanking my hon. Friend for that assurance, may I ask whether he would agree that there is a growing weight of scientific evidence which indicates that if we unduly hasten the growth of children by

special diets we may very well shorten their lives afterwards? Is not this a serious matter which calls for careful inquiry?

Sir E. Boyle: I am told that experiments with animals provide the only evidence so far for the theory that fast growth may mean shorter life. I do not think that we should too rapidly assume that the same is necessarily true of human beings.

Dr. King: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that it is better for Britain to have a few more Billy Bunters and not have the malnutrition with the kind of hunger that existed among children before there were school meals?

Sir E. Boyle: It is too early to draw any conclusion on this subject. I am grateful to the House for not being too personal upon it.

Schools, Newcastle-under-Lyme

Mr. Swingler: asked the Minister of Education what proposals and schemes for schools in Newcastle-under-Lyme he has under consideration in his Department which could be quickly started; and if, in view of the unemployment in the area, he will give them urgent attention.

Sir E. Boyle: My right hon. Friend has authorised three projects for starting in 1959–60. No action on these rests with him at present. As soon as plans are submitted for his approval, he will give all possible help towards an early start.

Mr. Swingler: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that does not answer my Question and merely deals with the current programme? Is not it a fact that in the Ministry there are many proposals, which have been turned down or deferred in previous years, that could now be brought into operation in Newcastle-under-Lyme, where there is more than 5 per cent. unemployment and where the labour and materials are available? Why does not the Ministry now give its approval?

Sir E. Boyle: There are several sides to this matter. Of the three projects to which I have referred, my right hon. Friend's Department has agreed to sketch plans for the first, it has not received sketch plans for the second, and I am


told that the local education authority is at the moment revising its earlier plans for the third. If the hon. Member has any particular project to which he wishes to draw my attention, I should, of course, be glad to hear from him.

Agriculture (Further Education)

Mr. Wilkins: asked the Minister of Education whether he has now considered the Report of the Committee on Further Education for Agriculture provided by local authorities; and if he will now make a statement.

Sir E. Boyle: My right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, on behalf of both our Departments, has sought the views of the interested organisations on the proposals contained in the Report. My right hon. Friend will not be in a position to make a statement until these views have been received and considered.

Mr. Wilkins: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for that reply, and appreciating that not much time has elapsed since the Report was presented, may I ask whether, to allay the fears in the minds of certain interested people, he can give an assurance that this matter has not been shelved?

Sir E. Boyle: No, Sir, it has not. The difficulty is that only a few of the interested organisations have submitted their views so far, but we certainly recognise that this is important.

Teachers (Superannuation Regulations)

Dr. King: asked the Minister of Education if he will amend the pensions regulations so as to offer a superannuated teacher who, in the present emergency, goes back to teaching greater financial inducements than at present obtain.

Sir E. Boyle: No, Sir. It is a principle of public service superannuation schemes generally that the income of a pensioner re-employed in his previous employment should not be greater than the salary he was receiving on retirement. It would not be right to treat teachers differently.

Dr. King: Will the Minister give serious consideration to the representations already made to him by one education authority that there are old teachers who

are willing to do part-time work in the present critical shortage of teachers, but that the amount of work they can do is limited by the factor he has just mentioned?

Sir E. Boyle: Yes, Sir. The trouble there is that the change suggested could mean that teachers would do less teaching service after 60 years of age than they do now. I will write to the hon. Gentleman explaining the difficulties that arise here.

Mr. M. Stewart: Would the Minister agree, however, that the shortage of teachers is our biggest single problem in education at present and that he ought, therefore, to look at this with a fresh mind?

Sir E. Boyle: I think we should look at every question bearing on the shortage of teachers with as fresh a mind as possible, and we devoted some time to this point in the recent debate.

Oral Answers to Questions — CYPRUS

Mr. Patrick Maitland: asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement about Cyprus.

Brigadier Clarke: asked the Prime Minister why it has been decided to negotiate with Archbishop Makarios, whereas in the past it has been clearly stated that no negotiations with him would be opened until he denounced violence.

Mr. R. A. Butler: I have been asked to reply.
My right hon. Friend hopes to intervene in the debate this evening and to deal then with the position on Cyprus.

Mr. Maitland: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask, Mr. Speaker, whether I shall have an opportunity of a supplementary question this evening?

Mr. Butler: The answer rather depends on you, Mr. Speaker.

Brigadier Clarke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many people in this country regard Archbishop Makarios as a murderer and wonder why British Ministers negotiate with him? Does my right hon. Friend realise that Archbishop


Makarios is a British subject, who should be taken back to Cyprus, tried and, if found guilty, shot?

Mr. Butler: These are questions of opinion, but I think that my hon. and gallant Friend, in his supplementary question, should refer back to the statements made by my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary on 28th March, 1957, and by the Prime Minister on 19th June, 1958, in which he will see exact statements made in relation to the future and position of the Archbishop.

Mr. Gaitskell: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Prime Minister is likely to be able to make this statement?

Mr. Butler: I left it open because I thought that if it were possible to make a statement early in the debate the Prime Minister would come in at some hour about 7 p.m., but if we are not ready to do so, as the conference is now proceeding, it would be later. What my right hon. Friend wishes to do is to intervene on the subject during the debate and give the House the latest information.

Oral Answers to Questions — GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware, that in spite of the need to increase production and reduce costs, the action, examples of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Tynemouth, of Government Departments such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Board of Trade, and the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, nullifies individual efforts; and if he will call an inter-departmental conference of the Departments concerned with a view to eliminating these delays.

Mr. R. A. Butler: I have been asked to reply.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has brought to the notice of the appropriate Ministers the matters raised by my hon. Friend. I do not think that an inter-departmental conference on matters so diverse would really help.

Dame Irene Ward: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that Answer, may I ask whether he agrees that the general public are getting frightfully bored about constantly being encouraged to greater

productive efforts when it is impossible to make appointments with the nationalised industries—gas, electricity or any of the others—when there are less and less buses, slower and slower trains, and when all their efforts to comply with the requests made, quite rightly, by the Government are vitiated? Will my right hon. Friend try to ensure that things are improved?

Mr. Butler: There are two main parts of my hon. Friend's Question. One relates to Government Departments, in respect of which inquiries have already been put into effect as regards waiting lists at hospitals, outpatients and other difficulties. Certain of my hon. Friend's complaints were directed to the General Post Office. The questions about telephones and the opening hours of post offices have already been taken up. In regard to the nationalised industries, some of the things to which my hon. Friend has referred are day-to-day matters of administration by the industries concerned, so it would be as well if she could take them up with those industries. For the rest, I can assure my hon. Friend that I have read all the correspondence and that the Prime Minister wishes the matters to be energetically pursued on my hon. Friend's representations.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL DEFENCE (POLICY)

Mr. S. Silverman: asked the Prime Minister what steps he has taken to coordinate the civil defence policies of the Home Department with those of the Ministry of Defence, so as to obviate the selection, as evacuation areas, of counties containing bomber and rocket sites.

Mr. Baird: asked the Prime Minister what steps he has taken to correlate the civil defence policy of the Home Department with that of the Ministry of Defence, in view of the latter's policy of concentrating active defence measures on air and rocket bases.

Mr. R. A. Butler: I have been asked to reply.
I would refer the hon. Members to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) and the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Mikardo) on Tuesday last.

Mr. Silverman: I have read that Answer, but has the attention of the right hon. Gentleman been called to the reply given to me by the Minister of Defence on 11th February? I will quote one sentence only from it—
Therefore we could not honestly say to the people of this country that in the present state of scientific knowledge there is any effective means of defending the country as a whole."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 1174.]
Does this mean, therefore, that it is the policy of both Departments to transfer as many of the civil population of this country as they can to the immediate neighbourhood of the sites, which must necessarily be the prime object of the enemy's attack?

Mr. Butler: No, Sir. There was a Question down to me by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mr. Baird) which I was going to answer verbally but which will be published in the OFFICIAL REPORT. In that Answer I shall state that a re-examination of the question of evacuation is taking place with the local authorities. That would be some consolation to the hon. Gentleman if he thought we were going to adopt a policy such as he suggested, because such consultation would undoubtedly result in a more commonsense solution than that which he suggests.

Oral Answers to Questions — PUBLIC SERVICE PENSIONERS

Dr. King: asked the Prime Minister what reply he has given to the Public Service Pensioners Council to its request for improvements in the pensions of public service pensioners.

Mr. R. A. Butler: I have been asked to reply.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has had no recent representations from the Public Service Pensioners Council. I understand, however, that it has made an approach to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and that arrangements are being made for my hon. and learned Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to receive a deputation.

Dr. King: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that sympathetic

reply, may I ask him if he is aware that there are pensioners in the country who are too old to qualify for full National Insurance benefits and that old superannuated public servants today draw superannuation which is fantastically different from that earned by people in the same occupation who are much younger? Will he, therefore, give sympathetic consideration to the representations made by the Public Service Pensioners Council?

Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir, and I hope that the Council will bring out points such as this when it meets my hon. and learned Friend.

Sir G. Nicholson: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that there is already accord amongst all Members of this House that there should be some measure of justice for these elderly people, and that this would be the barest justice, because the pensions they are drawing now have very much smaller purchasing power than they had at the time when they were originally planned?

Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir. That is why my hon. and learned Friend is to receive a deputation.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND COMMERCE

Dutch Bulbs

Captain Orr: asked the President of the Board of Trade to what extent it is possible, under the present regulations, for the import quota on Dutch bulbs to be avoided by the device of importing them by way of the Irish Republic.

The President of the Board of Trade (Sir David Eccles): The present regulations do not permit imports of Dutch bulbs in excess of the quota, and I have no evidence that these regulations are being evaded by shipment via the Irish Republic.

Fish (Exports)

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will specify the weight, value and kind of fish landed in British ports which were exported to Commonwealth and foreign countries, respectively, during each of the last ten years, indicating from which parts of Great Britain they were exported.

Sir D. Eccles: Detailed statistics of the kinds of fish exported from the United Kingdom and the countries to which they are exported are published in Volume III of the "Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom with Commonwealth Countries and Foreign Countries" for 1950, 1954 and 1956 to which I would refer the hon. and learned Member. Summary figures for 1957 and 1958 will be found in the Trade and Navigation Accounts for December, 1958.
The main centres for the white fish trade are Aberdeen and the Humber ports and for herrings the ports of Eastern Scotland and East Anglia but considerable exports of fish and fish products take place through London, Glasgow and Liverpool.

Mr. Hughes: Does the Minister admit that this is a valuable export trade, and will he, therefore, say what steps he is taking to expand it?

Sir D. Eccles: I am glad to say that last year was a record for the last ten years. We try through our usual commercial channels to do everything we can to promote the export of fish.

Oral Answers to Questions — SCOTLAND

Road Programme

Sir T. Moore: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now make a further statement on the progress of, and future expenditure on, the road programme in Scotland.

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. John Maclay): On 30th July, 1957, I announced that the Scottish road programme for the four years 1958–62 would provide for the authorisation of schemes involving Government expenditure of £40 million. By 31st March, 1959, I shall have authorised about half of this amount, including £15½ million in respect of the Forth Road Bridge. Schemes which I hope to authorise during the remaining three years of this programme are in various stages of preparation. I cannot yet make any announcement as to the level of expenditure from 1962–63 onwards.

Sir T. Moore: Is my right hon. Friend aware that that is a most satisfactory statement?

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business for next week?

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 23RD FEBRUARY—Second Reading of the Rating and Valuation Bill.
Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution.
Committee and remaining stages of the International Bank and Monetary Fund Bill.
TUESDAY, 24TH FEBRUARY—Supply [3rd Allotted Day]:
Report stage of the Civil Vote on Account, which it is proposed to take formally.
We shall then debate two Opposition Motions, the first relating to Legal Aid, until about 7 o'clock, and then a Motion relating to Prison Camp Conditions in Kenya.
WEDNESDAY, 25TH FEBRUARY—Debate on Defence, which will take place on a Government Motion inviting the House to approve the White Paper.
THURSDAY, 26TH FEBRUARY—Conclusion of the debate on Defence.
FRIDAY, 27TH FEBRUARY—Consideration of Private Members' Bills.

Mr. Gaitskell: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that we shall certainly wish to debate Cyprus as soon as possible after the return of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary from Moscow? Will he find time for that, and not expect the Opposition to provide it?

Mr. Butler: I think that we had better first await my right hon. Friend's statement arising out of this conference this afternoon, and then I will certainly agree that we should discuss through the usual channels the proposal made by the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Bellenger: Does not the Leader of the House think that he is being somewhat over-generous in allotting two days to a debate on the Defence White Paper,


in view of the paucity of information made available to this House by the Minister of Defence?

Mr. Butler: Whether there is a paucity of information or not, the magnitude of the achievement will require at least two days' discussion.

Mr. Strauss: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he can tell us when we are likely to get the White Paper on the Bowes Committee Report on Inland Waterways, which has been rather a long time in coming forward?

Mr. Butler: I have been in touch with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, and I think the expression often used in this case is "shortly". It really will not be very far away now.

Mr. Hamilton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the House has already spent about nine hours discussing 100,000 red deer in Scotland, and that we cannot even get half a day to discuss more than 100,000 unemployed in Scotland? Will he take notice of the Motion on the Order Paper in the names of my right hon. Friend and hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, myself and several others of my hon. Friends, on the need for extending public works in Scotland to relieve unemployment? Will he not undertake that we will at least get half a day on which to discuss this and related matters of vital importance to employment in our country?

[That this House, in view of the latest grave rise in Scottish unemployment, and in view of the fact that there is now a surplus of steel and the Scottish steel industry is operating seriously below capacity, urges Her Majesty's Government to extend immediately the provision of major public works and, in particular, to name an early date for a start to the building of the proposed Tay Road Bridge, believing that this project is now essential both for alleviating local unemployment and for providing the east of Scotland with a modern system of transportation necessary to attract new industry to the area.]

Mr. Butler: I think that the Opposition might have chosen these various matters for the time devoted to Supply. I have the Motion of the hon. Member

in front of me, and I can certainly assure him that the matter is of first-class importance and that any discussion which we may have on the use of Parliamentary time must have relation to the situation both here and in Scotland.

Mr. Ross: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, when he is making the arrangements with his right hon. and hon. Friends about Government representation in the debate on legal aid, on Tuesday, he will remember that there is a Committee sitting upstairs and see that we are not deprived of the services of at least one Law Officer of the Crown?

Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir. The hon. Member was disappointed the last time he put the point to me about overlapping difficulties, and on this occasion I will try to see that he is not disappointed.

Mr. Osborne: Since the Budget is likely to be early this year—[HON. MEMBERS: "How do you know?"] because Easter is early, that is why—may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he will see that the Economic Survey, and other economic papers, are made available to us before the Budget debates take place?

Mr. Butler: I will certainly discuss that point with my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Meanwhile, I must leave my hon. Friend's observations about the almanack until such time as I am able to announce the right date for the Budget.

Mr. Mellish: In view of the fact that the Prime Minister is making a statement tonight about Cyprus, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he can confirm or deny the rumour that Archbishop Makarios is the prospective Tory candidate for East Bournemouth and Christ-church?

JOHN WATERS (TRIBUNAL)

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. John Maclay): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a short statement on the case of John Waters.
Now that both Houses of Parliament have passed the necessary Resolutions for the setting up of a Tribunal under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act,


1921, I have appointed the Tribunal and I am informing the House of its composition at the earliest opportunity.
The House will be glad to know that Lord Sorn has consented to act as Chairman, and that Sir James Robertson, Rector of Aberdeen Grammar School, and Mr. J. N. Dandie, President of the Law Society of Scotland, have consented to serve as members of the Tribunal.
Any communication on the subject of the inquiry which is being undertaken should be addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, c/o the Principal Clerk of Session, Court of Session, 11, Parliament Square, Edinburgh.

Mr. S. Silverman: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us anything about the arrangements that may have been made or are contemplated for legal representation? There has been a statement in the newspapers that the police officers concerned will have counsel assigned to them, without any expense to them, and I am sure that the whole House would not complain about that in any way. May I ask him whether the representatives of the boy will be given equal facilities at the public expense?

Mr. Maclay: I understand that the police authority is prepared to arrange for representation of the two police officers before the Tribunal. As far as the Waters family is concerned, if this question is raised by them I will most certainly consider it sympathetically.

MR. SPEAKER (PERSONAL STATEMENT)

Mr. Speaker: I desire to make a short personal statement on a matter which concerns the House.
I have decided, with regret, that I should not offer myself as a candidate at the next General Election. I have recently undergone a very thorough medical examination, and my advisers, in whom I have full confidence, tell me that I would be unwise to undertake the work of another Parliament. From what they say, however, I appear to be as sound in wind and limb as a man of my age has any right to expect. I am very thankful to recall that I have not hitherto missed a day in your service through illness since I was first elected Speaker.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Speaker: The infirmity of which I am personally conscious is a slight difficulty in hearing. I am aware that a certain degree of judicious deafness is not an unmixed evil in the occupant of this Chair, but I could wish that mine were sometimes more selective and less fortuitous. It adds somewhat, as hon. Members will appreciate, to the strain of performing my duties to the House.
This is not the time for speeches of farewell, or for me to try to express my gratitude to hon. Members on both sides of the House, and to the Officers and staff of the House. If the House will bear with me for the remainder of this Parliament, I hope that there may be a proper occasion for these things later. I intrude now upon the time of the House only because I thought it right that I should myself tell hon. Members of my decision before they learned of it from any other source.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I am sure that, as Leader of the House, I shall be voicing the views of the House in expressing great regret that you, Mr. Speaker, have found it necessary, for the reasons you have given, to make this statement. I am sure that I am expressing the views of the House generally in saying that we are very sorry to hear it, but are equally relieved that you will be able to continue your duties in the House until the end of this Parliament.
This is not an occasion for voicing farewells. You and I have had a word about this, and have examined the precedents, and it would appear that it would be wiser to leave that to a stage at the end of this Parliament. Therefore, it would be positively out of order for me to say more, but I should like you to know that your eye is as keen as ever, whatever your ear may be feeling. We greatly value your presence in the Chair and your continuance as our Speaker for the rest of this Parliament. With that I will leave to a later date the formal business of farewell and the other Motions which may be moved then, and thank you for your services to the House.

Mr. Gaitskell: As the Leader of the House has said, there will be another opportunity for us to express more formally our appreciation of your great services to the House, Mr. Speaker. But I


would like to say, on behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself, how deeply we regret your decision not to stand for Parliament again, and particularly the reasons for it. We hope that, relieved of the heavy burden of your office, you will have many happy years of retirement, and we particularly appreciate your courtesy in informing us and the manner in which you did so.

Mr. Speaker: I am greatly obliged to the House, and to the two right hon. Gentlemen for what they have said.

BILL PRESENTED

COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE

Bill to make further provision with respect to the development and welfare of colonies and other territories; presented by Mr. Lennox-Boyd; supported by Mr. Julian Amery and Mr. Simon; read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next and to be printed. [Bill 68.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[2ND ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

Orders of the Day — CIVIL ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, TOGETHER WITH ESTIMATE FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 1959–60.

(VOTE ON ACCOUNT)

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £1,272,018,000, be granted to Her Majesty, on account, for or towards defraying the charges for the following Civil and Revenue Departments and for the Ministry of Defence for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1960. viz.:—

CIVIL ESTIMATES


CLASS I




£


1.
House of Lords
69,000


2.
House of Commons
510,000


3.
Registration of Electors
260,000


4.
Treasury and Subordinate Departments
1,500,000


5.
Privy Council Office
14,000


6.
Charity Commission
41,000


7.
Civil Service Commission
169,000


8.
Crown Estate Office
48,000


9.
Exchequer and Audit Department
210,000


10.
Friendly Societies Registry
32,000


11.
Government Actuary
18,000


12.
Government Chemist
126,000


13.
Government Hospitality
30,000


14.
The Royal Mint
10


15.
National Debt Office
10


16.
National Savings Committee
430,000


17.
Public Record Office
46,000


18.
Public Works Loan Commission
10


19.
Royal Commissions, etc.
100,000


20.
Secret Service
2,400,000


21.
Tithe Redemption Commission
10


22.
Miscellaneous Expenses
120,000



Scotland:—



23.
Scottish Home Department
654,000


24.
Scottish Record Office
19,000

CLASS II


1.
Foreign Service
7,300,000


2.
Foreign Office Grants and Services
7,110,000


3.
British Council
1,090,000


4.
Commonwealth Relations Office
1,250,000


5.
Commonwealth Services
3,300,000


6.
Oversea Settlement
50,000


7.
Colonial Office
570,000


8.
Colonial Services
9,200,000

CLASS IV


1.
Ministry of Education
34,800,000


2.
British Museum
289,000


3.
British Museum (Natural History)
160,000


4.
Imperial War Museum
17,000


5.
London Museum
12,700


6.
National Gallery
65,000


7.
Tate Gallery
60,000


8.
National Maritime Museum
22,000


9.
National Portrait Gallery
13,000


10.
Wallace Collection
14,000


11.
Grants for Science and the Arts
1,150,000


12.
Universities and Colleges, etc., Great Britain
25,000,000


13.
Broadcasting
10,000,000



Scotland:—



14.
Scottish Education Department
6,660,000


15.
National Galleries
30,000


16.
National Museum of Antiquities
12,000


17.
National Library
29,000

CLASS V




£


1.
Ministry of Housing and Local Government
4,800,000


2.
Housing, England and Wales
24,200,000


3.
Exchequer Grants to Local Revenues, England and Wales
149,400,000


4.
Ministry of Health
9,800,000


5.
National Health Service, England and Wales
164,710,000


6.
Medical Research Council
1,400,000


7.
Registrar General's Office
155,000


8.
War Damage Commission
150,000



Scotland:—



9.
Department of Health
1,700,000


10.
National Health Service
19,500,000


11.
Housing
8,000,000


12.
Exchequer Grants to Local Revenues
18,260,000


13.
Registrar General's Office
19,500

CLASS VI


1.
Board of Trade
1,744,000


2.
Board of Trade (Assistance to Industry and Trading Services)
681,000


3.
Board of Trade (Former Strategic Stocks)
378,000


4.
Services in Development Areas
2,500,000


5.
Financial Assistance in Development and Other Areas
800,000


6.
Export Credits
10


7.
Export Credits (Special Guarantees)
200,000


8.
Registration of Restrictive Trading Agreements
65,000


9.
Ministry of Labour and National Service
7,176,000


10.
Ministry of Supply
75,000,000


11.
Ministry of Supply (Purchasing (Repayment) Services)
10


12.
Royal Ordnance Factories
3,000,000

CLASS VII


1.
Ministry of Works
2,640,000


2.
Houses of Parliament Buildings
115,000


3.
Public Buildings, etc., United Kingdom
10,209,000


4.
Public Buildings Overseas
1,188,000


5.
Royal Palaces
202,000


6.
Royal Parks and Pleasure Gardens
300,000


7.
Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments
360,000


8.
Rates on Government Property
9,400,000


9.
Stationery and Printing
6,000,000


10.
Central Office of Information
1,000,000

CLASS VIII


1.
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
6,225,000


2.
Agricultural and Food Grants and Subsidies
90,000,000


3.
Agricultural and Food Services
3,100,000


4.
Food (Strategic Reserves)
1,200,000


5.
Fishery Grants and Services
2,000,000


6.
Surveys of Great Britain, etc.
1,130,000


7.
Agricultural Research Council
1,700,000


8.
Nature Conservancy
150,000


9.
Development Fund
400,000


10.
Forestry Commission
3,800,000

£



Scotland:—



11.
Department of Agriculture
10,000,000


12.
Fisheries (Scotland) and Herring Industry
1,080,000

CLASS IX


1.
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation
3,800,000


2.
Roads, etc., England and Wales
32,000,000


3.
Transport (Shipping and Special Services)
190,000


4.
Civil Aviation
2,000,000


5.
Ministry of Power
900,000


6.
Ministry of Power (Special Services)
2,000,000


7.
Atomic Energy
50,000,000


8.
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
3,800,000



Scotland:—



9.
Roads, etc
4,452,000

CLASS X


1.
Superannuation and Retired Allowances
7,700,000


2.
Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
1,800,000


3.
War Pensions, etc
34,750,000


4.
National Insurance and Family Allowances
104,800,000


5.
National Assistance Board
49,000,000


6.
Pensions, etc. (India, Pakistan and Burma)
2,750,000


7.
Roval Irish Constabulary Pensions, etc.
400,000



Total for Civil Estimates
1,098,865,000

REVENUE DEPARTMENTS


1.
Customs and Excise
5,975,000


2.
Inland Revenue
15,350,000


3.
Post Office
146,000,000



Total for Revenue Departments
167,325,000



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
5,828,000



Total for Civil Estimates and Estimates for Revenue Departments together with Estimate for the Ministry of Defence
1,272,018,000

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3.42 p.m.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: The combination of the negotiations on Cyprus and the ravages of influenza have changed the day and, to some extent, altered the character of this debate. I am sure that all right hon. and hon. Members appreciate the reasons why the Foreign Secretary could not be here to speak first for the Government. We agree that, in the circumstances, it was his duty to try to conclude the negotiations on Cyprus, even though that meant that he could not be with us this afternoon.
I understand that the Prime Minister will be here before long and that he will be winding up the debate on behalf of the Government. I am sure, too, that all hon. Members regret the absence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) on account of influenza. He was to have opened the debate for our side.
Nevertheless, despite these important absences, it is most desirable that the House of Commons should have an opportunity of discussing foreign affairs before the important visit of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to Moscow. The Prime Minister has, perhaps, played down the significance of this visit, and I can well understand his desire that hope should not be unduly raised, in view of past disappointments.
The fact remains, however, that this is the first time that either he or any other Prime Minister in office has visited Moscow. He is not going entirely unaccompanied. I believe that he will have 30 officials or other persons with him, and I cannot suppose that all his time will be taken up by bear hunting and sight seeing. There is no doubt that the Press is taking the greatest interest in this visit and I think that he himself would agree that however much he may try to depreciate its importance, people as a whole in this country will certainly hope that out of it some improvement will come.
The right hon. Gentleman has not revealed very clearly to us the reasons why he chose this moment to go to Moscow. He was invited, following the invitation to Sir Anthony Eden, at least two years ago. Naturally, we accept his


statement that he did not have in mind any possible internal considerations. We know that he was thinking entirely in terms of the benefits to the international situation which might result, but if we then ask ourselves why he chose this moment to go to Moscow, I would suppose that the only possible reason would be the situation which has arisen as the result of Mr. Khrushchev's statements on Berlin and the decision of the West to agree, indeed to propose, a four-Power conference on Germany. It is for that reason that we thought it well that the debate today should be confined to the problem of Germany and Europe rather than range over the Whole scope of world affairs.
However, that does not mean, in my opinion at least, that the question of Berlin and Germany is the only or necessarily the most dangerous problem facing the world today. It may well be that the situation in the Middle East, tolerably quiet as it is for the moment, will prove to be rather more dangerous before many months have elapsed. Certainly, the exchange of Notes between the Soviet Union and Persia is not entirely reassuring, quite apart from the problems which confront us, particularly in our concern with the sheikhdoms on the Persian Gulf.
Moreover, there is still unsettled the difficult question of the Far East and particularly the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu. There is always the possibility that trouble may flare up again there. As the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs knows only too well, we are far from through with the Geneva talks on tests. The other day he denied that there was any deadlock, and I hope that he is right, but, certainly, it is of immense importance that an agreement on that issue should be reached.
Quite apart from these political questions, we on this side of the Committee attach great importance to the two other matters to which the Prime Minister specifically referred in his statement— trade on the one side and information and cultural relations on the other. We very much hope that as a result of the Prime Ministers visit there will be a substantial expansion of trade between the Soviet Union and this country. We hope that the Prime Minister will not only press for additional Russian orders, but will be

willing, if he is asked so to do, to look at the list of strategic or so-called strategic commodities which are banned, if this is genuinely an obstacle to further trade.
On the cultural side, I am sure that all hon. Members will welcome any steps which increase the amount of cultural exchanges which take place between Russia and Great Britain. Nothing but good can come of throwing open the frontiers and allowing more people from Russia to come here and having more people from here go to Russia. We hope that on these matters progress will be made.
Today, I shall concentrate on Berlin and Germany. It is worth debating this subject, because, although the Prime Minister has been careful to explain that he is not going to Moscow to negotiate on behalf of the West, I can hardly imagine that he will spend so much time with Mr. Khrushchev and confine himself simply to asking questions. Of course, it is possible that Mr. Khrushchev might be able to occupy the whole of the time by making speeches, but I do not believe that the time would be so profitably spent as it would be if there was a genuine interchange of views between the two Governments. Indeed, the Prime Minister said, in his announcement:
… we hope that our conversations with the Soviet leaders will give them a better knowledge of our point of view and make it easier for us to understand what is in their minds."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 578.]
At that time I asked what "our point of view" was, and I did not get a very clear answer. I am not sure whether, in using that phrase, the Prime Minister was speaking of the British Government's point of view or the point of view of the West as a whole. That point can be clarified later. But it is worth while anyhow discussing what our point of view should be before the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary leave on Saturday.
I begin with the question of Berlin. It is not necessary to spend a great deal of time on it, because there does not appear to be any great disagreement between the two sides of the Committee. We on this side have rejected—as have the Government—Mr. Khrushchev's proposal to make West Berlin an open city and the withdrawal of the Allied forces from it. We have done so because we believe that


if that were to happen it would be extremely probable, to put it no higher, that within a fairly short time West Berlin would be swallowed in East Germany— and that we are not prepared for. That would be to sacrifice our friends in West Berlin, and hon. Members on this side have a particular concern in the matter because of the Socialist majority in Berlin and its Socialist Lord Mayor, that fine man, Willi Brandt.
This issue has been posed by some people as being a question either of
accepting what Mr. Khrushchev has proposed or going to war. I totally disagree that those are the alternatives. I do not believe that we need look at the matter in such stark terms. Let us remind ourselves at the outset that nobody has threatened armed aggression. Some rather fiery statements have been made on both sides, but these have always been on the presumption that somebody else starts the aggression. So far as that goes, any intention of going to war over Berlin was specifically denied by Mr. Khrushchev in November.
Nor, so far, has there been even any threat of a blockade. There has been much talk and some anxiety about it in the West, but nobody has said that there is to be a blockade. If it were attempted deliberately and by force to interfere with our communications with Berlin and, in effect, to try to starve West Berlin, as in 1948, we have our rights, arising out of the unconditional surrender of Germany, and we are entitled to maintain them as we did in 1948. Not only have we rights; we also have obligations to the people of West Berlin. I am convinced that the leaders of the Soviet Union fully appreciate this. It would be very surprising if men as intelligent as they are on issues of this kind—and no one will deny that— failed to realise the clear point of view of the West in this matter.
What has been threatened is not a blockade—still less a war—but the handing over, six months from the date when the announcement was made, which, I believe, will be 27th May, by the Soviet Government to the East German Government of the responsibility for maintaining and handling the communications between the West and Berlin. I would emphasise that if that were to happen— and it is by no means certain—it would

not of itself involve either the use of force or any attempt at a blockade. To be sure, it would present us with a difficult and delicate diplomatic problem. It would certainly be a breach of the wartime agreement. But Mr. Dulles was perfectly right when he hinted that if this were to happen it might be possible to regard the East German representatives as representing the Soviet Union.
This is such an important matter that I venture to read what Mr. Dulles said at the Press conference when he made this statement. Mr. Dulles was asked,
… if the Soviets go ahead and turn over to the East German authorities the check points on the autobahn and control to the land, sea and air routes, … the question would arise: would we deal with the East German officials who would man the check-points?
Mr. Dulles answered:
Well, we would certainly not deal with them in any way which involved our acceptance of the East German regime as a substitute for the Soviet Union in discharging the obligation of the Soviet Union and the responsibility of the Soviet Union.
The next question was:
Does that mean that we might deal with them as agents of the Soviet Union?
Mr. Dulles answered:
We might yes. There are certain respects now in which minor functionaries of the so-called German Democratic Republic are being dealt with by both the Western Powers, the three Allied Powers and also by the Federal Republic of Germany.
A very similar statement was made by the Foreign Secretary in answer to a Question in the House.
If this should happen I hope that every possible effort will be made to handle this matter in the diplomatic fashion indicated by Mr. Dulles, and that no provocative action will be taken by us any more than by the Soviet Union or the East Germans. At the same time, we must realise that the present situation in Berlin is, as it always has been, not without its dangers. In standing firm on the issue of Mr. Khrushchev's proposals and contending, as we do, that Berlin cannot be dealt with in isolation, we have a special obligation to make a serious effort to reach agreement on the whole problem of Berlin, Germany and European security.
What can be done? So far as I am aware only one specific solution has been proposed to the Berlin problem, though it also impinges upon the other problems. This is a proposal put forward


by a group of Germans belonging to a society or association called "Indivisible Germany", in which it is suggested that a zone should be created composed equally from East and West Germany and covering, in effect, the whole of that area of Germany which includes the approaches to West Berlin. They suggest that such a zone should be placed under United Nations administration, so that United Nations officials would be responsible for the communications.
I do not propose to discuss this plan in any detail. I would simply say that it is something which should not be entirely ruled out. There are difficulties about it. That the United Nations might not be able to do the job may be an argument against it, and it is open to doubt, to put it no higher, whether the Russians themselves would be likely to agree to it. But I do not think that it should be ruled out altogether as something that might come up during the course of the discussions.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: It would make three Germanys.

Mr. Gaitskell: For the time being it would make three Germanys, but this group of people say—though I have no reason to speak for them—that out of this particular little disengagement may come a wider disengagement.
I now move to the major question of Germany as a whole, and I repeat the axiom that, in our opinion, the problem of Berlin cannot be solved except through the problem of Germany, because only with a reunified Germany can we get rid of the problem—and the problem of Germany cannot be solved without tackling the problem of European security.
This may be acceptable in theory to all of us, but I must say so far as the practical propositions advanced by the West are concerned they never seem to me to have taken it fully into account. After all, what is the attitude so far of the Western Powers on this vital issue of Germany? They have stood pat in demanding German reunification with free elections—I shall make one reservation on that later, but until recently they have been standing pat on German reunification and free elections—and certainly have given the impression that free elections must be one of the very first steps to be taken before reunification becomes at all possible.
Secondly, and even more important, they have again and again emphasised that a reunified Germany must be free, if it desires, to remain in or to join N.A.T.O. Thirdly, so far as disengagement is concerned, the plans they have put forward, running from those advanced by Sir Anthony Eden in 1954 and 1955 to the later proposals mentioned by the Foreign Secretary for a demilitarised zone in East Germany, have all been extremely limited and certainly very much to the advantage of the West and to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, the real weakness of the point of view of the West in this matter is that they have failed to observe what must be —and I repeat it—a cardinal principle for both sides if they are serious about negotiations in this matter, namely, that the balance of security must not be upset. It is useless to deny that if we say to the Russians, "We want a reunified Germany which is free to join N.A.T.O.," if we know—as we do know—that there is every prospect it would, in fact, join N.A.T.O., the inevitable result of reunification is to strengthen the West at the cost of the East. It means, in effect, that East Germany comes into the N.A.T.O. orbit.
Nor is it enough to couple this with an offer that we will demilitarise East Germany. That is still demilitarising something which, at the moment, is in the Soviet orbit. It is not, therefore, a balanced proposal. That is why even the disengagement suggestions of Sir Anthony Eden are from this point of view unsatisfactory, because all of them insisted that the thinning out, the disengagement, the demilitarised zone, started from the German Eastern frontier instead of taking both sides in at the same time.
I must admit straight away that the Soviet proposals suffer from the same disadvantage. They equally upset the balance of power, the balance of security to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The proposal, for instance, in the peace treaty recently put forward by Mr. Khrushchev that Germany should be neutralised although there is no assurance of reunification, is a proposal which is to the advantage of the East because Western Germany is far larger and far stronger than East Germany. If, therefore, we simply take out that area and even do not concede reunification in


exchange it is bound, I think, to be rejected by the West.
Equally, on procedure, I must confess that their attitude so far in insisting that Berlin is a separate issue, of insisting that reunification is for the Germans alone and not for the four major Powers, is not particularly helpful. I do not necessarily take a pessimistic view about this, because experience has shown that the Russians very often do change their ground. I think that a lot of this is a bargaining counter and does not mean at all that it is their last word, but nevertheless, the fact is that their proposals as well as ours are in breach of this fundamental principle which must be observed if there is to be any chance of progress.
Time and again from this Box we have asked the Government to work out and put forward positive proposals which, as far as they can see, leave the balance of security unimpaired. Time and again we have put forward our own constructive proposals to this end. I must say that we have had very little satisfaction indeed from these exchanges, now going back over the past two years. Again and again the Government have simply rejected our suggestions, with more or less discourtesy, according to the speaker.
The furthest they have gone is to say that they will try to work out a common policy. This is not a recent statement. This is a statement made by the Foreign Secretary as long ago as February, 1958, that we shall try to work out a common policy. Yet there has been no advance whatever. On the Rapacki Plan, orginally rejected out of hand by the United States, all we now have is a statement— and this was made some months ago— that the Government will consider it, but nothing positive has emerged.
There is a preliminary question one must ask at this stage. Do the Government regard a plan which leaves the balance of security unimpaired and yet does create some relaxation of tension, some advance towards settlement, as a complete impossibility? I know that there are people who think that it is not only inconceivable that there can be a plan equally to the advantage or disadvantage of both sides and yet which would make for peace, but that any such thing is positively dangerous because in

the last resort it would mean putting the West, putting our side, off our guard. It would mean that we relaxed and, therefore, were less inclined to take defence seriously, and so on.
I must say that at times, from the Foreign Secretary's statements, one has feared that this was the Government's view—when, for instance, some time ago, he informed us that our proposals either meant the break-up of N.A.T.O. and, when I intervened to say that they meant no such thing, added, "Well, then, the Russians will not have them." That implies, of course, that there is no possible solution that the Russians will agree to, no change which does not involve the break-up of N.A.T.O.
This attitude, and I very much hope that it is no longer the view of Her Majesty's Government, presumes two things which I do not believe to be true. It assumes, first, that the status quo is such that we need not worry so long as we stand where we are now and maintain our defences. If there were any doubt about the unwisdom of that view, what has happened over Berlin is a sufficient answer.
It assumes, secondly, that the Russians never make agreements. Patently, that is not true. They made an agreement on Austria. Admittedly, it is much less important than the German question, but they made it, although it took them a long time. They also made an agreement on Indo-china. Six Anthony Eden played a notable part in negotiating it. Indeed, in that case the Russians might reasonably have complained that certain parts of the agreement were not really carried out by the West, but they did not, in fact, follow the point up.

Mr. S. Silverman: There was the question of free elections.

Mr. Gaitskell: That is what I had in mind. It is wrong, therefore, to assume that the Russians are absolutely unwilling to make agreements. For these reasons, I think that that extreme point of view is a wrong and a dangerous one. I can only say that if the Prime Minister goes to Moscow in anything like that state of mind there really is no hope of any successful outcome to these talks.
Fortunately, in the last few weeks there have been signs of change in the point of view of the West, not so much


in this country but—perhaps it is more important—in the United States of America. We now have two very influential Democrat Senators, Senator Fulbright and Senator Mansfield—Senator Fulbright is now the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Mansfield is a prominent member of that Committee—giving their support to disengagement and including in disengagement, not only the Eden Plan, not only the Rapacki Plan, but other similar plans, with even a mention of the name of Mr. Kennan—whose disengagement plan, I may say, goes a great deal further even than our proposals. Then, also, one has Mr. Dulles' notable remarks about free elections in connection with German reunification, in which he said that perhaps there were other methods as well as free elections.
Therefore, with this support from across the Atlantic for a more flexible attitude, I suggest that we might now take another look at the problem. The first question that I want to ask the Government in this new look is this. Would they agree that the Russians are most unlikely to accept a solution to the problem of Germany that involves a lack of balance from their point of view and, in fact, makes them less secure? If the Government agree with that, are they not bound to recognise that, if we continue to insist that Germany must be free to remain a member of N.A.T.O. after reunification, there is really no hope of making any progress with reunification?
If the Government agree with that—and I find it difficult to see how they can escape the logic of the argument—I ask: what, then, have the Government in mind? What are their proposals, alternative to ours and other people's, for trying to achieve reunification? Is it not better at this point to ask under what conditions the West could agree to this possible sacrifice, namely, the withdrawal of Germany from N.A.T.O.? That it is a sacrifice I have never denied for a moment, but, as I think that only some sacrifice of this kind is likely to lead to, or be consistent with, reunification, it is better to ask the further question: under what conditions might we agree to it?
Certainly, we should not agree to it for nothing. If we were simply to say, "We do not mind. We will let Germany go", as I have already said that would,

in my opinion, be to the disadvantage of the West and would be a very heavy price to pay. That was one of the reasons why, in our plan, we brought into the picture, as well as East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This is a balancing factor. It is for this reason that we developed the Five Point Plan, which hon. Members will be familiar with. It was a plan for the withdrawal of foreign forces from this area, including the three satellite States, a plan for the reunification of Germany, a plan for the establishment of a specific disarmament zone covering these five territories, with full controls, a plan for a mutual security pact, underwritten by the great Powers, and a plan for the withdrawal—if, as I think, this was a necessary price to pay—of Germany from N.A.T.O. and of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Warsaw Pact.
We put forward this plan in all seriousness, because we believed that it was a balanced proposal which did not leave the West or the East better or worse off. That is the essence of it, and that is why it is a serious proposal. I think that the case for it is clear enough. It has been stated many times. It would surely be an enormous advantage if we could have a local disarmament zone, under full control, covering this very dangerous area of Europe. It would be an advantage if we had reunification and not only the gain thereby which is obvious to the Germans, at any rate, but also the removal of the dangers which will continue to exist so long as Germany is divided. It is an advantage because of this balance. We lose Germany from N.A.T.O. We pay that price. The Russian troops withdraw to Russia. They withdraw from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
There are arguments the other way which have been frequently put forward, but I would plead once again that the Committee and the Government should ask seriously whether they are very powerful arguments. It is said for instance—and it was said again at Question Time only recently—that one could not have any agreement by which Germany in advance announced that she would withdraw from N.A.T.O.; she must be free to decide. If a country desires, of its own free will, to withdraw


from a particular alliance in order to achieve another object, namely, the reunification of the country, surely there is no juridical or moral objection to that. If it were to be imposed on Germany, that would be another matter, but we have always said and recognised that it has to be discussed.
What we want the British Government to do is to argue in favour of it in the circles of the West, to begin with, and to try and persuade them that this is the best way of dealing with the problem.

Mr. S. Silverman: I must apologise to my right hon. Friend for interrupting him, but is it not worth while, in this connection, to point out that every nation in the world that accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter to that extent voluntarily imposes limits on its freedom of action in international affairs?

Mr. Gaitskell: Certainly. I fully agree with my hon. Friend.
Then it is said—the Foreign Secretary said this, amazing as it may seem—that we cannot have controls to keep Germany down. That kind of statement makes one despair. First, it is quite inconsistent with certain parts of the Eden Plan which involved a demilitarised zone in part of what is now Germany. Secondly, to say that we cannot have controls to keep Germany down is surely either to give up the whole idea of controlled disarmament, or to say that it must be universal. Why? This is a specifically dangerous area. What is wrong with a local disarmament scheme with controls? Indeed, is it feasible or sensible to think in terms of the Russians conceding reunification unless they are absolutely sure that there is no danger of aggression from Germany? How can they be sure of it without disarmament under control?
Then, more closely, it is said that this would involve the break-up of N.A.T.O., and the withdrawal of United States, and perhaps British, troops from the Continent of Europe. Frankly, that is just not true, unless the Americans insist that it is true. If the American Government do not accept this proposal, the proposal will not be put forward on behalf of the West. Our object is to try to persuade the American Government to accept this proposal. We are very happy, as I have said, at the progress that is being made, at least so far as the Senate is concerned.
Provided that the American Government thought the plan worth while, there is no reason on earth why this should involve the withdrawal of all American troops from Europe.
That it would involve some extra expense is true. The transfer of divisions to the Low Countries, to France and to this country which might be involved certainly would be an expensive matter, but I do not envisage, and I have never envisaged, that this would happen quickly. Moreover, if we were to get an agreement of this kind, the implication is that there would be such a relaxation of tension that I would hope that, while there should be —and I have always said this—some American troops in Europe, the numbers involved could be, at this point reduced.
Then it is argued that it would be very dangerous, because once one had this great area, this neutralised area, this area of disengagement, the Russians would march in again if there was any trouble in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary. I cannot see that they are any more likely to do that than to make trouble now. It is quite true that, if one had a treaty of this kind, one would have to lay down quite specifically the conditions in which re-entry was, if at all, possible. Even if one assumes the worst, the Russians would be 550 miles back from where they are today, and they would have to advance a very considerable distance. Presumbably, at that point the West would be free to advance as well. Once the Russians agreed to a proposal of this kind they would hesitate just as much to advance again into these countries as they would hesitate—and do hesitate now, I am sure—to commit any act of aggression.
Finally, there is the argument that it is dangerous if we do not have these forces face to face, machine gun against machine gun, more or less in sight of each other. Must we really take that point of view? It is not really consistent with the Government's own proposal for the demilitarisation of Germany. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale pointed out, the Government have proposed a demilitarised zone which goes further in that respect than our particular plan, and yet apparently that is permitted, but there must not be a larger zone of disengagement.
It just does not make sense. It does not make sense when we look around the


world. It is not true that all over the world Russian, or for that matter Chinese, troops are face to face with American troops. It is not true in the Middle East or in Scandinavia, but only in this very small part of Central Europe. I understand the anxiety, but, really, when one thinks it out I cannot see that there is any substance in it.
I admit that this proposal of ours, a comprehensive proposal which is called "disengagement", though it is really a proposal for political settlement, is a long-term proposal. I freely admit it, having argued about it in a great many places over the last two years. I think that there has been a move towards it, but the suspicions on both sides at present are still very great. I think it unlikely that at present either the Russians or the Americans would agree to withdraw their forces from the zone in question. Time will be needed, but it does not mean that we should not put it forward and try it out, and see the Russian reaction to it, or the Polish reaction, for that matter.
Meanwhile, we come back to what the short-term solution should be. Is there not something we can do, short of the more elaborate plan which might emerge from the Moscow talks? I believe that there is one particular proposal which offers a real chance of agreement between East and West. That is the part of our proposals which deals with controlled disarmament in the area in question. This proposal is in some respects similar to that which was put forward by Sir Anthony Eden, in 1954, although the area covered is different. It is also similar in some respects to the revised version of the Rapacki Plan, so similar, that we would have a basis for discussion out of which a fruitful agreement might emerge.
Of course, Sir Anthony Eden's proposals for disengagement were conditional upon reunifications. We have to face the question whether we should be prepared for a disarmament zone short of reunification. I have thought a great deal about this. I asked myself in what way should we be disadvantaged if we could get a local disarmament plan of this kind. Unless we take the view that reunification will be achieved by force, I cannot see that we suffer any disadvantage, and we have the advantage, first, that there would then be in existence an actual disarmament plan, in operation. It might

well be—there is no harm in saying it— that both Russians and Americans would be more ready to agree to the establishment of international controls over armaments in this area than they would in their own countries. This may be called unfair, but we should not be persuaded to reject or neglect any chance of reducing tension on the basis that it is some kind of discrimination.
The Foreign Secretary's objections to this were that, first, it involved discrimination against Germany. My right hon. Friend pointed out at the time that this was a ridiculous argument. There is already discrimination against Germany as between different members of the Atlantic alliance. The Americans have the key to the cupboard but we have not. We British have a cupboard of our own to a certain limited extent.

Mr. S. Silverman: There is nothing in it, though.

Mr. Gaitskell: That is a point for the defence debate and my hon. Friend can pursue it there.
My point is that there is, on the face of it, discrimination here. One must take account of geographical factors. I discussed this point with Dr. Adenauer when he was here and his only answer was, "Why pick on Germany?" The answer is "Because of history and geography." That is a perfectly legitimate thing to do. Moreover, we include Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well.
The other argument of the Foreign Secretary was that if there were no nuclear weapons the United States would have to leave Europe. I cannot take that argument seriously. The number of nuclear weapons on German soil now is not very large; if missiles are included, certainly not very large. If it is desired to have missiles and nuclear weapons in Europe, there are other places as well as Germany where they can exist. I do not want to pursue here the details of this argument. We have always taken the view that, until a Summit Conference has taken place, we should not proceed with nuclear rearmament of Germany, and we still hold that view. Suppose we get an agreement; is it really so fatal if Germany does not have nuclear weapons?
The second advance that might be made as well as controlled local disarmament is possibly towards reunifica-


tion. I put this point forward with much greater diffidence and doubt, because I still think that the Russians are most unlikely to go any distance at all in this direction unless and until Germany is outside N.A.T.O. There are certainly things that are worth trying for two reasons. First, if we have our arms control, and if the zone were under control, some of the objections from the East, from the Poles, for instance, to reunification would be modified. Secondly, we have this new statement of Mr. Dulles that other methods could be considered.
Let me say straight away that I cannot see how one can depart from free elections as an ultimate object. I would not be prepared to abandon them. I do not think that reunification of Germany would, in the last resort, be effective unless and until we had free elections. But we need not start with them and insist upon them as a basis. We can see whether there is any other form of advance. I do not think that it would be wise for me to try to speculate here. This is a difficult matter, on which we all, and the Germans, in particular, ought to be thinking a good deal.
But I will say just this: The test of whether any advance in this direction would be possible will probably come on how far the present frontier between East and West Germany can be open. If it can be open, one ought to be prepared to go quite a long way for a time in regional autonomy. If the frontier is to remain closed it is difficult to see that there is much of an advance towards reunification. That is the only comment I make on the subject.
Nobody will deny the difficulties which confront us in this field. But I think that we can say that today, because of the ideas of greater flexibility which have been put out in different places, particularly in the United States, the prospect is somewhat brighter than it has been for a long time. We all deeply regret the illness of Mr. Dulles. Whatever we may have felt from time to time about his policies, no one could withhold admiration for the staunch and courageous manner in which he has discharged his duties in the way he thought was best. In his absence, the Prime Minister has a great opportunity and a great responsibility. He may not be negotiating in Moscow, but he may be

doing something else; he may be breaking the ice. Some time ago I suggested that there was a case for a Summit Conference for ice-breaking purposes alone. Well, this is a sort of Summit Conference, and I think that the prospects for a thaw, as I have said, are a good deal better than they have been.
It is with the sincere hope that these talks will yield positive results in the form of a real advance towards a solution of the German problem, and to the building up of a greater mutual confidence and understanding between the Soviet Union and ourselves—because that is vital—that we wish the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary God-speed in this important mission.

4.31 p.m.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. D. Ormsby-Gore): My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary has asked me to apologise for his absence from this debate. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said he well understood the reasons for his absence. Very important discussions on the Cyprus question are now taking place. Of course, my right hon. and learned Friend hopes to be able to arrive in the Committee later on this evening. I should also like to express from this side of the Committee our sorrow that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) is not with us this afternoon. He always enlivens these debates and I think that we shall miss him during our discussions.
My right hon. and hon. Friends are, indeed, grateful to the Opposition for making this debate possible today, and they welcome the opportunity of hearing the views of the Committee about Germany and about European security before the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary leave on their visit to the Soviet Union. We shall not, of course, be expected to accept all the views which we shall hear this afternoon. But it will be useful to know what different sections of the Committee are thinking about these vitally important matters.
As has already been stated, my right hon. Friends are not going to Moscow to conduct negotiations. But they do hope that their conversations with the Soviet leaders will improve the prospects of the negotiations which must certainly follow.
The Committee will have noted the terms of the Note of 16th February suggesting that there should be a conference to deal with the problem of Germany in all its aspects and implications as raised in the recent correspondence between the East and West. I think that these proposals of ours should be particularly welcome to those hon. Members opposite who signed the most popular of the original Motions on the Order Paper. We do not require that any pre-conditions should be satisfied before the conference takes place. We therefore hope that the proposal will be accepted. I do not think that anyone in his senses could take exception to the terms in which our proposal has been put forward.
It may help the work of this conference if, during the forthcoming visit to Moscow, the Soviet leaders are able to explain why they have rejected all the proposals for a settlement in Europe which have been made by the West and in which we believe—though the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition apparently does not—that full account was taken of their legitimate security consideration. On the other hand, it will also be possible to tell them why their proposals, which have not taken account of our legitimate requirements, have not been acceptable to us. Perhaps they will also be able to explain why they have chosen this particular moment to precipitate what is—we must face it—a crisis about Berlin, in spite of the dangers which they themselevs admit to be inherent in the situation surrounding that city.
I would now like to say a word about Berlin itself. Yesterday, Mr. Khrushchev made a somewhat bellicose speech and it has been answered in the most restrained manner by the President of the United States. The Soviet leaders should, however, be in no doubt on one point. We are determined, as the right hon. Gentleman said, to remain in Berlin and to preserve our right to have free access to the city and to continue to discharge our duty towards its 2¼ million inhabitants. The Soviet Government have contracted to make sure that we continue to enjoy the right that I have mentioned, and the future course of events will depend very largely on their own actions.
Her Majesty's Government have been pressed in the House of Commons during

the last few weeks, and, indeed, on many occasions in the past, to state what precise proposals they intend to put to the Soviet Government when a conference is eventually convened. I do not think that anyone who wishes these negotiations to be a success can expect us to reveal these. That is not because our consultations with our Allies have not made considerable progress. In fact, they have proceeded very far and very satisfactorily. But it would not be wise for us to make a statement in advance of the conference which would indicate the way in which we propose to play our hand. I do not think that the negotiations would be helped if we did that.
But it is right, of course, that we should set out the general considerations which govern our thinking. We inherited, to some extent, and intend to carry forward, the policy first formed by Mr. Ernest Bevin and later developed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison). The essence of this policy is that Germany should share the burden of defending Western Europe against Russia. It is designed to avoid the mistakes made between the wars which had the effect of creating the Nazi movement. The Versailles Treaty made Germany into a pariah, and as her grievances festered so Europe became doomed to the advent of Hitler. Hitler then overthrew the restrictions which we had thought to impose on Germany, and nearly succeeded in destroying us all.
For eleven years now we have sought to integrate Germany into the institutions of the West. We have also sought to bring about German reunification in freedom and to restore to her the full attributes of sovereignty, without which there is always the risk that the old grievances will begin to develop again. This policy has kept the peace for eleven years. It would seem to us to be folly to destroy it simply for the sake of doing something new.
So far from the policy I have described being inconsistent with Russia's legitimate security requirements, it is our view that the reunification of Germany in freedom should be accompanied by all sorts of arrangements, about which we would negotiate with the Russians to make sure that the balance of advantage was not upset in the event of Germany


choosing to remain in N.A.T.O. We shall continue to strive for the reunification of Germany in view of the great contribution that this would make to European security. It should be as much in the Russian interest as in that of the West that it should be accomplished.
We have never insisted that a reunited Germany should join N.A.T.O. All that we have ever said is that a free nation should be free to decide its foreign policy. It is not our position that free elections throughout Germany must be the first step in any process leading to reunification and that acceptance of this is a pre-condition for progress of any kind. Naturally, as the right hon. Gentleman said, there must be free elections at some point, but there is room for negotiation about the exact point at which they should have to take place.
We therefore entirely accept that part of the Motion now on the Order Paper which calls for
… German reunification within a framework to be agreed and guaranteed by the four Powers … including free elections …
The authors of the Motion have added that in their view ways and means could be settled by the Germans themselves. In our Note of 16th February we proposed that German advisers should be called to the conference from both sides to be consulted. I have no doubt that the method of reunification could be one of the topics upon which their views would be listened to.

Mr. S. Silverman: The right hon. Gentleman has quoted part of the Motion for which some of us are responsible. I did not quite follow his point on this and I should like to understand it. He says that he accepts that part of the Motion which says that, including free elections, the reunification of Germany must be worked out by Germany itself within the framework of conditions agreed to by the four great Powers, including the U.S.S.R. It is known—and my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell) has made it abundantly clear again—that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to agree any such framework except on the basis that Germany is not allowed to become part of a political and military alliance which might be directed against the Soviet Union.
Is the right hon. Gentleman therefore saying, or not saying, that the Government would be prepared to agree to a reunification of Germany in a framework agreed by the four Powers one of whose terms would be non-alignment on a unified Germany?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: I think that my statement was a great deal clearer than the hon. Gentleman's. What I said was that we accepted these words on the Order Paper:
… German reunification within a framework to be agreed and guaranteed by the four Powers … including free elections …
I then went on to point out that some other parts of the Motion are not so agreeable to us, and I also pointed out that to some extent we had met their point about having consultations with the Germans themselves.
I can appreciate that the hon. Gentleman feels that the kind of proposals that we are putting forward will never be agreed by the Soviet Union and, therefore, it is not worth putting them forward; but, as I shall try to show in the course of my remarks, we do not take such a gloomy view of the prospects and we think that if we can give the Soviet Union sufficiently good security guarantees the kind of proposals we shall put forward will be acceptable to them.
As to the other parts of the Motion, 1 find no reference in it to the three criteria which were laid down in the statement issued by the Labour Party and Trades Union Congress on 23rd April last. We have repeatedly stated that we accepted these criteria and I would like to remind the Committee what they are. The first is that the balance of military security should not be changed to the disadvantage of either side; the second is that any proposals for the withdrawal of N.A.T.O. forces from part of their present area should be consistent with the retention of N.A.T.O. itself; and the third is that nothing should be done which would be inconsistent with the continued presence of United States forces on the Continent.
The proposals in the Motion for what is called "disengagement" are not qualified by any suggestion that they must be consistent with these criteria. In the naked form in which they now appear, they would, I believe, be totally unacceptable to other Western Governments, and


they are certainly totally unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government. Any policy that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to support in Europe must pass these three essential tests that I have mentioned. If there were any suspicion on the part of our Allies that we might be thinking of doing otherwise the effect would be to split the Alliance.
The main features of our policy in Europe can be set out very simply. These main features are not likely to change. First, we intend to uphold our rights in Berlin, but we are prepared to discuss the whole problem of Berlin with the Russians in the context of a discussion about Germany as a whole. Secondly, we believe that Germany should be reunited, that free elections must have a place in the process of reunification, and that the united Germany should have the right to decide its own policies, both internal and foreign, in accordance with the democratic principles that are supported by all parties in this House. Thirdly, we should negotiate with the Russians about measures of security that would allay any fears they might have about the effect on their security if a reunited Germany chose to remain in N.A.T.O.
We reject the view that peace and safety are to be sought by working for the neutrality of Germany. We believe that the idea of German neutrality is a serious delusion, for to so-called "neutralise" Germany might well increase the tensions that exist in Europe. One of the elements in a system of security that would offer the Soviet Government relief from their apprehensions could be a control system to guard against surprise attack. The larger the area covered, the better it would be. There could also be a system of agreed numbers and agreed levels of armaments—again, over as wide an area as possible. Both these systems, one to provide against surprise attack and the other to provide for a controlled limitation of armaments, could be established before there was a general European political settlement—

Mr. Gaitskell: Does that mean that the right hon. Gentleman would be prepared to support the proposals for controlled disarmament of East and West Germany—and Czechoslovakia and Hungary—without any agreement on German reunification?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: I have said that a proposal for a zone of limited and controlled armaments is something that we can see as forming part of a process of reducing tension in Europe, and it would be part of a process for improving the present situation with regard to European security. I think that it would be a mistake for me to try to say this afternoon precisely at what stage this zone of limited armaments would be set up, but this, together with, perhaps, a much wider zone guarding against surprise attack, would, we believe, make a very definite contribution to allaying the perhaps reasonable apprehensions of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Gaitskell: But the right hon. Gentleman does not rule out agreement on this particular point, supposing we could not reach agreement on the wider issues?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: I think that it would be a mistake to say where one would go if one did not get exactly what one would wish to get at any conference, but I have stated in fairly precise terms that we do favour a zone of controlled limitation of armaments such as I have described. Special measures could also be subscribed to by the West to ensure that if Germany joined N.A.T.O. after reunification the West did not take military advantage of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Soviet Zone. All these matters were dealt with, I know, in some detail by my right hon. and learned Friend during the debate of 4th December, and I would only add two points which I think we should ponder very deeply.
I have tried to indicate why disengagement in the sense of a far-reaching settlement involving political reorientation of a number of countries in Central Europe, and of Germany in particular, is unacceptable. Apart from the fact that there is no prospect, in practice, of such a major political development, since none of the Governments primarily concerned intends to become neutral and it is also a policy rejected by all our Western Allies, I believe that, viewed in the context of recent history, it could be highly dangerous.
What are the two most significant features in the history of post-war Europe? I suggest that they are these.
First, the United States, after a century and a half of isolation, has become intimately involved in world politics, and has, in particular, identified herself closely with the fate of Europe. Any policy that ran the risk of reversing this process might put us all in the gravest peril. Secondly, after generations of strife and jealousy between the countries of Western Europe, a new path towards unity and co-operation has been charted. Old rivalries have been laid aside, and Germany has been welded into the community of Western Europe. We must ask ourselves whether it would really be wise to reverse this process. Would it be wise to prise Germany apart from her present friends and Allies, and so begin a new and unpredictable chapter in our history?
I cannot feel that this would be a hopeful development and, above all, I would have the most fundamental doubts about a policy that involved the prospect both of American withdrawal from Europe and German isolation from her Western European partners. I would, therefore, suggest that we would be making a grave mistake if we sought for a short cut to German reunification and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe by means fraught with such tremendous risks.
Finally, I would say that it seems to me axiomatic that our course of action in the months ahead should largely depend on an assessment or Soviet motives and intentions. Put in its simplest form, there are, I submit, two schools of thought on the matter. There are those who base themselves on the Communist scriptures and much subsequent history. They suggest that the Soviet leaders have not given up, and will not give up, their objective of world revolution and their belief in the inevitability of a war between the Communist world and what they choose to call the capitalist world; that internal and external events have had little or no effect on the Kremlin's philosophy. If one accepts this view wholeheartedly it is not likely that any of us would be able to obtain any agreement with the Russians except one that they felt was disadvantageous to the West.
Then there is what might be broadly described as the other school of thought that suggests that the Kremlin leaders, who are very clever people, are certainly

clever enough to understand that a world nuclear war would not bring victory to the Communists or anyone else. The so-called victor would preside over nothing more than the scattered remnants of humanity ekeing out a miserable existence on a largely radioactive dustbowl.
If this is accepted by the Soviet leaders, they may well be genuine about desiring some agreement to coexist. If victory for Communism can no longer be had by force, it must be achieved by stealth, and its leaders will be as anxious to avoid a head-on clash as we are. The first school of thought feels that the Communists have taken little account of the changes in the world over the last forty years; the second school feels that this is a most unlikely supposition. The first school is frankly pessimistic; the second is more optimistic.
Putting aside, so far as I can, all wishful thinking, I am very much inclined to the second school, but I am convinced that the more hopeful prospect such a conviction opens up for us all is not just the result of mere chance. I believe that in great measure it has been brought about by the policies of the West, and these policies have, of course, been consistently pursued over the last ten or eleven years.
The opportunity that we now have presented to us for negotiations which may lead to a more stable order in Europe is in no small measure due to the support for the conception and the policies of N.A.T.O., sustained and encouraged by successive Governments in this country. If the Soviet Government will now agree to the conference that we have proposed, a new and brighter chapter may open in the history of Europe and in the relations between East and West.

4.57 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: I am sure that those of us on this side would at least agree with the desire of the Minister of State that the Soviet Union will participate in the proposed Foreign Ministers' meeting, but I thought that the right hon. Gentleman did less than justice to the powerful case made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. Indeed, I hope that our representatives in Moscow will be more convincing in their presentation of the Government's policy than the Minister has been today.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to my right hon. Friend's proposal in support of the policy of disengagement and drew from that the possibility of the United States being driven away from Europe as a result of that policy being put into operation. The Minister of State knows perfectly well that the Leader of the Opposition made it abundantly clear that there could be no question of a policy of disengagement being adopted except with the approval and agreement of our Allies, including the United States.
The Minister also talked about Germany being isolated. He ignored the proposal for a European system of security that would include a reunified Germany. Surely Germany would not be driven into isolation if she were a full and equal member of any system of security for the whole of Europe.
I want now to deal for a few minutes with the visit of our Ministers to Moscow. My right hon. Friend commented on the great importance of this visit. No one can suppose that the Prime Minister will secure anything in the nature of a settlement with the Russians. He himself has categorically stated that he is not going to Moscow to negotiate, but merely to express the views of our own Government on international questions, and also to return the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to this country. None the less, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are going at a critical time, and their visit will be profitable if it throws some light on Soviet intentions, and, indeed, if the Prime Minister can convey to the Russian leaders some clear exposition of the policy for which the three Western Governments stand. It seems to me that this is an essential step towards the opening of effective negotiations between East and West, first, at the proposed Foreign Ministers' Conference, and then, I hope, at a Summit Conference later on.
I wish to draw attention to the speech made yesterday by Mr. Khrushchev. According to The Times, he is reported as saying,
An airlift could not be tolerated, if the Russians hand over to the East Germans control of access to Berlin.
It is becoming increasingly evident that, failing an agreement with the West, the Soviet Government will withdraw from Berlin and hand over their responsibilities 10 the East German authorities This

would undoubtedly create a dangerous situation. Would the situation be eased if the Western Governments were to hand over their responsibilities for West Berlin to the Federal German Government as their agents? What would the Soviet reaction be to that proposal? It might be a good thing if the Prime Minister were to endeavour to find out during his visit to Moscow whether it would be regarded by the Soviet leaders as a first step towards peace. Moreover, as the German problem will have to be settled in the last resort between the two parts of Germany, might not this be a good starting point?
I make the suggestion because Mr. Khrushchev has made it quite clear that, in certain circumstances, the Soviet Government will hand over their responsibilities to the East German authorities. There can be no justification for such unilateral action on the part of the Soviet Government. It would constitute a breach of the international agreement entered into in 1945, and certainly could not terminate the responsibilities imposed not only upon the three Western Governments but also on the Soviet Government itself by that agreement.
Mr. Khrushchev goes further. He now issues his warning that an airlift to Berlin could not be tolerated. This is an astonishing attitude for him to take. The Soviet Prime Minister claims the right to interfere with the lawful responsibilities of the three Western Governments to take peaceful action in discharge of their international obligations. Surely, this is something which the Western Governments cannot possibly accept without surrendering completely to Soviet pressure. Presumably, Mr. Khrushchev seeks to deny to the West the right to send in food supplies for the people of Berlin. Surely, he would not expect the people of the West and their Governments to stand by and leave the 2½ million people of West Berlin to starve unless they bow the knee to Soviet pressure.
I hope that the Prime Minister, when he goes to Moscow next week will tell Mr. Khrushchev that the British people want peace, that they want good relations with the Soviet people, and they want a just settlement of the German problem, but they are not prepared to sacrifice the people of Berlin to placate the Soviet Government.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: On what basis has my right hon. and learned Friend said that there is any question of starving the people of Berlin? There is no question of cutting off communications but merely of having East German officials stamp the official documents instead of Soviet officials. Is that worth a world war?

Mr. Henderson: No, I am not suggesting that there should be a world war. What I say is that there is no reason why the Western Governments should not be allowed to exercise their responsibilities towards the people of West Berlin, just as Russia claims the right to look after the people of East Berlin.
In 1948, when the Soviet Government blocked all land communications into West Berlin, the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force, for which I then had Ministerial responsibility, organised the greatest and most successful airlift in history. The 1948 airlift did not infringe any part of the 1945 quadripartite agreement to which Russia was, and is, a party. The Western Governments would equally be within their rights if they were compelled by the Soviet Government to organise an airlift. I do not suggest that the Soviet Government will push things to the point where an airlift is essential, but, in view of what the Soviet Prime Minister said yesterday, we ought to make it quite clear that we consider that we should be entitled, if circumstances justified it, in organising an airlift to go to the help of the people of Western Berlin once more.

Mr. John Hynd: At least.

Mr. Henderson: At least. But something more than an airlift is required. Berlin is only one aspect of the German problem. Sooner or later, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will have to meet with the East German authorities round the conference table to negotiate a settlement. We should not be realistic if we took any other view and still hoped to see a settlement of the problem. They will have to meet at the conference table. To my mind, questions of de jure or de facto recognition are not of overriding importance or even a necessary preliminary.
The United States Government negotiated with representatives of the Chinese

People's Republic in Korea, yet neither then nor today have they afforded either de jure or de facto recognition to that Republic. If agreement were reached at the conference between the West German Government and the East German authorities to hold free elections and to establish an all-German Republic, both the Government of Western Germany and the Government of Eastern Germany would disappear and be replaced by a freely elected all-German Government, which surely would be in the best interests of the German people as a whole, and indeed, of Europe also.
There remain the wider aspects of the problem. As my right hon. Friend made quite clear, Berlin is only part of the wider problem of Germany. The problem of Germany, in my opinion, is only part of the wider problem of European security. There remain, therefore, certain vital problems which call for an agreement sooner or later between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Western Governments on the other, if we are ever to secure stable conditions in Europe.
My right hon. Friend made out a very powerful case, I thought, for disengagement, the separation of the forces of East and West. He made a very powerful case for a system of security for the whole of Europe which would guarantee the independence of a reunified Germany. I should like it to be much wider. I should like to see a system of security for the whole of Europe covering every nation of Europe, whether it belonged to N.A.T.O., to the Warsaw Pact, or to neither. I believe that the problem of Germany would take on an entirely different complexion if it were a question of a reunified Germany being fitted into a system of collective security for the whole of Europe. I believe that the question of a demilitarised zone in Central Europe, the Rapacki Plan—all these concepts-would take on an entirely different complexion if we could build up this system of security covering the whole of Europe. I hope that in spite of what has been said this afternoon the Prime Minister will discuss fully and freely with the Soviet leaders the possibilities of working out this new concept for Europe, which would mean that instead of talking about N.A.T.O., on the one hand, and of the Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, all the nations concerned in Europe would be


bound together in this organisation to safeguard peace for Europe.
I know that that is not likely to emerge from the Prime Minister's visit. What I am saying is that many of us consider that to be the way in which we should make progress towards a stable Europe. Like my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, I would equally attach great importance to a successful outcome of the conferences now taking place in Geneva. I have no doubt that the Minister of State has come back somewhat frustrated by his experiences at Geneva. I was glad to hear him say that he did not regard the present situation as a deadlock. A great deal turns upon it.
The Minister of State would, I believe, agree that if we could secure success at both conferences at Geneva we would open the door to much wider agreement on disarmament covering both nuclear and conventional weapons. If we can get agreement on disarmament, we can create greater trust and confidence between East and West, the lack of which is at present a great obstacle to making any advance.
I therefore hope that the Prime Minister will go to Moscow to seek the co-operation of Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues in the achievement of these objects. It is along these lines that, I believe, the peace of Europe will be secured.

5.12 p.m.

Mr. F. M. Bennett: I trust that the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) will forgive me if I do not comment specifically upon the points he has raised other than generally in the course of my remarks. One thing on which I should have thought we were all agreed in the great issues of peace and war in this twentieth century, with all the horrors that the latter would mean, is that we should so regard the subject and respect the integrity of hon. Members on both sides, as above the playing of party politics.
I was glad that the Leader of the Opposition, contrary to certain suggestions made elsewhere in the country, conceded at the outset of his remarks that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in his latest initiative was not activated by any

pre-electoral considerations. Equally, just as no responsible person should contemplate that possibility, it would be quite wrong for those opposed politically to the Government to try to play up what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is likely to achieve in Moscow and then try to make capital subsequently out of the extent to which he had failed to obtain the objectives they have attributed to him. Like my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, I do not think we should imagine that very much immediately effective will come out of the meeting. As my right hon. Friend has said, it is a reconnaissance.
Moreover, there is at least one hon. Member opposite—the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget)— with whose views on one matter I know I am in agreement. The hon. and learned Member has said that he distrusts summit meetings. I also have considerable historical suspicions of supposed advantages that flow from these much-vaunted occasions. However, I should be as delighted as no doubt would be the hon. and learned Member were we both to be proved wrong on this occasion.
The only further point about the impending visit to Moscow which I should like to make is that I have some slight apprehension in the interpretation of its timing by the Soviet Union. The fact remains that some little time ago the Russians issued what was, in effect, an ultimatum and threat about what would happen if we did not take a certain course by the end of May. I hope that the Soviet Union will not be so misguided as to believe that because our Prime Minister is now going to Moscow he goes consequent upon that threat. If the Russians were to believe that, it would be a dangerous precedent for the future, for they might quite wrongly imagine that if they wanted to get their way with the West they had only to make threats. In 1939 we learnt to the immense cost of the world and its peoples how dictators are misled to behave when they bully democracies and continue to do so until one day unexpectedly the democracies stand up to them. By then, however, it is too late and there is war. I hope that the Soviet Union will not be as misguided as that on this or any future occasion.

Mr. R. T. Paget: In the light of what the hon. Member says,


is it not much better that everybody should realise that the Prime Minister's visit is purely a matter of internal politics here? In that case, it will not alarm our Allies, as it would do otherwise, and it will not cause the Soviet Union to be under the delusion feared by the hon. Member.

Mr. Bennett: I am sorry that after the compliment I have just paid the hon. and learned Member he should now say something which is not worthy of him. Hon. and right hon. Members opposite generally have for months past pressed my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to take the initiative. Therefore, if my right hon. Friend is now guided by the considerations which he now declares, all I can say is that he has had considerable support in doing so from a large number of hon. Members opposite. Not for the first time in his political career, therefore, the hon. and learned Member again stands rather alone.
I turn now to Berlin. Like the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton, I was distressed to read the terms, if they were correctly reported, of Mr. Khrushchev's speech yesterday. They appear to go a great deal further by way of threat than anything we have yet heard. The right hon. and learned Member was interrupted by the hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus), who now seems to have left the Chamber, having made a rapid entry and exit. Clearly, the hon. Member had not heard the earlier part of his right hon. and learned Friend's speech or he would have realised that he was talking about the threat that if we resorted to an airlift it would not be tolerated by the Soviet Union in alliance with Eastern Germany. This certainly develops a dangerous situation if Mr. Khrushchev has been correctly reported.
Some people in this country and among our Allies have suggested that if the threat to try to cut off Berlin is implemented, it may be wiser to use an airlift than to try to use force on the ground. If we are now to be told by the Soviet Union in advance even that an airlift simply will not be tolerated and military action will be taken to prevent it, it seems to me that the Soviet Union has gone a great deal further than hitherto. This hardly portends a favourable atmosphere for the

Prime Minister's conversations in Moscow. In those circumstances, I was particularly glad to hear the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon reaffirm the determination of the party for which he was speaking that we are not prepared to tolerate the cutting off of Berlin. This point was reiterated in forthright fashion by the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton.
The remarks attributed to Mr. Khrushchev are particularly interesting since the Leader of the Opposition, on his recent visit to Germany, was reported as saying that there were considerable advantages in the use of an airlift to break a blockade. Only a matter of days afterwards, the leader of the Soviet people warns that even this moderate approach will be treated with military force. We can only hope that Mr. Khrushchev was not conveying a real determination. For one must again repeat the warning, which, I believe, has had more or less unanimous support in the country, that we are not bluffing and that we and our Allies are determined not to be robbed of our rights and obligations in Berlin.
If we gave way in this matter, or if there is any suggestion that we should give way, I believe it would be as fatal to peace in the course of history as when we gave way when Hitler went into the Rhineland, which started the first drift towards the last World War. If we give way on this occasion to just as unjustifiable a military threat and do not stand up to our rights and obligations, it will not be long before fresh demands and ultimata are issued and we shall once again be on the steep decline towards war which we had to endure in the 'thirties.
Apart from Berlin, much talk today has been rightly concentrated on reuniting Germany. I always find myself a little diffident about pushing this matter too far, because, although it is obviously desirable for European security and only right that the Germans should be reunited, we could play up this matter in a way which could lead to too big a price being paid for it. The Germans are always among the most ready to realise that, much as reunification of their country is desired, this could be achieved at too great a cost.
Thus suggestions have been made that something short of free elections, some


kind of federal or confederal relationship, should be established between the two countries and those who support such a policy in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, insist that there should be equality of representation on both sides. In the first place, of course, it is ludicrous to contemplate that a nation of 55 million, which is growing every day through fresh refugees coming across the border from East Germany, where there are between 15 and 16 million left, should be treated in a federal structure with precisely similar rights as those of East Germany compared with the Federal Republic.

Mr. S. Silverman: The hon. Member should go and tell them that in Wales.

Mr. Bennett: I do not think the hon. Gentleman has made a very pertinent interruption. Incidentally, I should certainly be prepared to give a much wider degree of freedom to Wales if it meant that some of the hon. Gentleman's hon. Friends would stay in Cardiff rather than come to Westminster.
If the federal solution were adopted and one were to contemplate equal representation between a free democracy and an authoritarian State, one could obviously see a situation arising in which all the delegates of an authoritarian East Germany would be Communists, all following one line, whereas the West Germans would all be elected freely. Under those circumstances, it is possible to envisage that one, two, three or four West German Communist or extreme Left M.P.s might be elected to the Federal Parliament. There would be then an even more ludicrous and a very dangerous situation in that under a federal legislature as proposed the views of East Germany would be more strongly represented than those of West Germany, which could lead to serious implications for the latter's free future.
Hence, from the Germans' point of view, I should have thought they would be well advised, before following too violently the idea of federalism, to ensure that the price which they might pay is not too great and that it would be better to be patient for a little longer, however difficult it may be.
On disengagement, there has been a good deal of discussion about the balance of advantages of any particular method. There have been rival Motions

on the Order Paper which have lately become reunited—I do not know whether by a system of free elections or otherwise among hon. Members opposite— into one composite whole in the last day or two. I find it impossible to understand how the sponsors of the Motion or the Leader of the Opposition can believe that there is an equality of balance or sacrifice of advantages by what is proposed in the resultant compromise Motion. It proposes that we should give up our military alliance with Federal Germany and in return the Russians should give up their so-called allies in the Warsaw Pact, every one of which is unreliable and could make no contribution in time of war and would only be real nuisances and sources of trouble.
The proposal is that we on the one hand should give up an effective and loyal ally and in return the Russians should move their troops from countries which it is difficult and expensive for them to occupy. How can that be regarded as an equality of balance of sacrifice and advantage between the parties concerned? To reiterate, as it now stands on the Order Paper the Opposition proposal is that West Germany should be demilitarised and forced to leave N.A.T.O. and in return the great sacrifice which is made by the U.S.S.R. is that Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia should go out of the Warsaw Pact, which their people have not wanted to be in anyway and would be delighted if they were relieved of their obligations. So, regarding any deterioration of respective strengths of East and West, it is nonsense to suggest that the proposals would mean anything in the way of a weakening of the Russian position, which could compare with what the loss of Germany would represent to the West.
I fully agree with my hon. Friend the Minister of State on the caution with which we must approach any suggestions for disengagement. As far as one can see, nearly every one of them is fraught with worse potential dangers than the present position. It is all very well to talk about the need for change and flexibility, but I do not see very much advantage in change just for the sake of change, and being flexible for the sake of flexibility if the end result is worse than the present-day position. And


I have not seen one proposal likely to be accepted by the U.S.S.R. which, looked at calmly, would not represent a serious disadvantage for the West in future.
Finally, to revert to the earlier part of my speech, and, in particular, to the discreditable remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, a letter was published in The Times of 9th February from hon. Members opposite, including the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), in which a most astonishing proposition was put forward. It sets out certain things which the signatories demand the Prime Minister should do while he is in Moscow, and lines of policy are set out which he should and must adopt because, as the five authors of the letter say, if he does not do what they want him to do he must, ipso facto, be guilty of pre-electoral trickery. The effect of the letter is that unless the Prime Minister obeys the dictates of a small section of the Opposition he must be playing party politics.
There is only one other point in that silly contemptible letter which is worth mentioning, and that is to note the masterly degree of logic shown by the authors when they point out that, if only we give way to all the demands of the Russians which they have made in their various Notes about disengagement in Europe, agreement with the Soviet Union should readily become attainable. I should have thought that that was a self-evident proposition.
In contrast I am confident that when he goes to Moscow the Prime Minister will content himself with the purposes which he has already announced in the House, namely, that he will treat his visit as a reconnaissance, and, although he will on every occasion utilise the opportunity of talking to the Russian leaders to try to get them to understand that we in the West want peace in security and nothing else, he will not convey any impression that there is any weakening by the West in its determination to defend, not only our interests in Berlin, but the freedom and security of Western Europe and the whole free world as well.

5.30 p.m.

Mr. Reginald Paget: The other day Vicky had a cartoon in the Evening Standard which showed Mr.

Dulles, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and behind them on the wall the Gallup Poll chart which showed Labour support overtaking Conservative support. The caption underneath was, "How can you ask us whether our journey is really necessary?" I am no supporter of summit meetings, but if we are to have them they are probably far best held in circumstances in which they can be ascribed to domestic needs. If they were not so ascribed by our Allies, our Allies would be very much more disturbed than they are now. If they were not also so ascribed by our enemies, our enemies might be rather more triumphant at having brought the meeting off.
My feelings about a summit conference are these. Firstly, it is said, and I think that my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell) to some extent indicated this in opening the debate, that it is a sort of ice-breaking process, that if the great men meet they will find that they are nice, friendly, peaceable chaps and have no occasion to be frightened of each other. I feel always that there is a certain element of dichotomy when I hear people who also support our policy of the deterrent putting forward that argument. After all, our policy of the deterrent is based on making other people believe that we are the sort of people who would use the bomb.
Which impression do we want our leaders to make? Do we want them to convince Mr. Khrushchev and his friends, as Sir Anthony Eden and President Eisenhower were so successful in doing at Geneva? Do we want the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to convince Mr. Khrushchev that he is such a peace-loving chap that he is no danger to anybody except perhaps some poor bear? That is what happened at Geneva. What was the result? Sir Anthony and President Eisenhower were tremendously successful. They so convinced the Russians that they were very harmless people indeed that the Russians went home and decided to do something which they had never thought it was safe to do before, and that was to play hell in the Middle East. I am doubtful which of these two impressions—the lamb or the bombardier—we are desiring to put across. Whilst we are in doubt about


these two impressions, perhaps there is a case for staying at home.
The second objection I have is that it is said that when there is a summit meeting it is, after all, a meeting of people who are in a position to agree. But, of course, they are not. The President of the United States cannot agree. His Constitution does not enable him to do so. Mr. Khrushchev cannot. He has to go back to his Praesidium. The only unfortunate person who can agree is our Prime Minister, and that causes me considerable anxiety, because when there is the question of prestige which these great meetings involve then, as happened at Yalta, there is apt to be agreement for the sake of agreement on things which ought never to be agreed to. Either prestige is committed to agreement or, if we do not have agreement, prestige has been committed to disagreement and, as circumstances change—because the great men disagreed—it is infinitely more difficult later on, in circumstances that arise to make it desirable, to come to a teal agreement.
Finally, there is a greater objection than all these to this summit idea. This summit idea is based upon the conception of peace as being something normal, something simple, something natural, something which will arise if only misunderstandings can be swept away. That is not what peace is like. Peace is the most complicated, the most unnatural and the most unstable of all human relations. Its price is infinite patience and eternal compromise.
There can never be such a thing as final peace. Peace is an eternal adjustment of relations. One can only achieve peace as long as one realises that there is no finality in these relations and that only by eternal willingness to negotiate and agree and move by small things can one adjust in the unnatural way by peaceful means, instead of in the natural and simple way by bloody means. It is that which we have to realise if we are to achieve peace.
The process should be thought of as eternal negotiation working towards agreement, and only letting the big men meet, if they have to meet at all, when negotiation and agreement have been fully reached and it is simply a matter of ratification. Do not let us try to work from the top. We shall not get the right results

that way. I urge this very much because, in the long term, I take a very optimistic view indeed, and the real "bull" and fundamental reason why I am profoundly optimistic in the long term is because the Russians are getting rich. The richer they get the better I am pleased, and the more we should co-operate and trade in every kind of way to get them rich.
The one lesson which all history teaches us is that faith never survives riches, and I do not think that the Communist faith will survive them either. I think that this is a good thing, for faith is the bane of humanity. I look forward to the time when the Russians will be as Communist as we are Christian, that is to say, when they will recognise that it is something not worth fighting about, and that that is a very good thing. We have only to allow time and patience and not do something silly meanwhile for that to happen.
How should we conduct ourselves in this middle period, foreseeing in the future a very rosy prospect indeed? The first lesson about the Russians—and this is not only true of Communist Russia, it has been true right through Russian history—is that the most dangerous manoeuvre one can make in front of a Russian is to step backwards. The whole policy of the Russians, all through their history, has been to push on into weakness and stop when they meet resistance. The last thing one should do with the Russians is to negotiate under threat. I do not believe for one moment that the East Berlin proposals have been put forward by the Russians with any serious idea that we will accept them. They were put forward in order to force negotiations. I feel very strongly that we should make it clear to the Russians that we are not going to negotiate under those terms and under threats. I do not think that we shall have satisfactory negotiations on those terms.
After having cleared that out of the way, surely all the case is for disengagement. If we take an optimistic long-term view, then the advantages are in drawing aside, leaving the Russians with hands pretty free and getting rich as quickly as possible, and relieving them of what is a considerable burden, their position in their satellites. But remember, when it is said, "Ah, we are asking the Russians to leave something that hates them, whereas we are leaving something that loves us," that is not a sole disadvantage,


because that which hates the Russians is apt to join that which loves us and become a total area which, even if it is prevented from taking an active part in alliances, will pursue its natural inclination to look and turn our way.
I feel that all the advantage is in disengagement, because this is not a situation in which two sides, longing to get at each other, have only to step back to enjoy a bigger jump at each other's throats. That is not the reality of the situation. There are two persons nervously hanging on to each other because neither will give way, and if we get a mutual step back, the need for the present level of armaments ceases.
With the greatest respect to my right hon. Friend, I have little faith in disarmament agreements. I believe that we have to remove the cause for which people seek arms, and then they will put the arms away themselves. We have seen a measure of that happening in the last year or two. If we get withdrawal over this area, I believe the cause, the need of confrontation, will become much less. We shall get the lowering of our armaments we all desire and the increasing wealth of the Russians. Remember that Communism is a highly satisfactory policy for a country whose problem is existence, but once it passes that stage, once the problem is not to live but to make living worth while, then Communism ceases to be an adequate faith.
This Russian situation will have resolved itself if we get away from the tensions, and I believe that all argument and reason is on the side of this disengagement policy, and I only pray that we can bring it off.

5.42 p.m.

Mr. Gilbert Longden: The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) will forgive me if I do not enter into an undignified wrangle with him about the motives of the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow. I shall leave that point by saying that I utterly disagree with the hon. and learned Gentleman's assumption about those motives and that I have no faith in his judgment. That he will at least appreciate. With the rest of his speech I find myself in a great deal of sympathy, but I have to recognise with sadness that he speaks practically only for himself.
Sir Gordon, I am grateful that I have caught your eye this evening, because it is very long since I was in a position to do so. I will ask the indulgence of the Committee now, because soon after I have sat down I shall have to leave it. When we thought we were to debate some other subject this evening, I entered into a commitment which I must honour, and I intend no discourtesy to the House in so doing.
The questions we are discussing this evening were not raised at the Thirteenth Session of the United Nations from which I have just returned. Of course Germany is not a member of the United Nations, and there is also Article 33 which enjoins upon Member States the duty of trying to solve their differences by negotiation. The question would have been raised in New York if Mr. Khrushchev had not gone back on his own proposal that there should be a summit meeting under the aegis of the Security Council. I think it is a pity he went back on it, because that is the place for the meeting, and until this takes place somewhere we shall never solve the two problems we are discussing.
The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) made the interesting suggestion that we should hand over the Western sector of Berlin to the Federal Republic, but I do not think that would meet the case. If all their Allies left them they would be an enclave in a hostile country, and in any event it would be only a temporary solution. The most urgent of the problems is that of Berlin, and the reason why it is the most urgent is because the Soviet proposals of 27th November last are in the nature of an ultimatum. The Note states:
If this proposal is not acceptable to the Government of Great Britain then there remains no subject for talks between the former Occupying Powers on the Berlin question.
That is an ultimatum, and it is due to expire on 27th May. So it is the more urgent of the two problems. It is not a German problem, it is essentially a Russian problem. With Soviet co-operation, the problem could be solved tomorrow. As the Leader of the Opposition said, it will not be solved satisfactorily until we can solve the second of the two problems, the reunification of Germany. Berlin is one of the main reasons, or so I have always hoped, why we regard


the reunification of Germany as "an essential element in European stability", to quote my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary. But perhaps because the Soviets are not ready for that, or because they want to engage our attention upon Europe so that we are blind, or blinder, to what may be happening elsewhere, as the Leader of the Opposition said—say in Persia or Finland—the Kremlin threatened unilaterally to abrogate the lawful rights of the Allies unless we agree to their proposals. Let us at least be clear about one thing. If hostilities should break out. which God forbid, as a result of our insisting upon our rights of communication with West Berlin, it will not be we who are the aggressors, it will not be we who drag the world into war over Berlin.

Mr. Zilliacus: Yes, it will.

Mr. Longden: I thought I would hear that intervention. There are very few causes of war which cannot be made by the pusillanimous and the specious to appear trivial. No doubt we will hear this cry, is Berlin worth a war? It means that those who shout it have forgotten the 'thirties.

Mr. Zilliacus: May I interrupt the hon. Gentleman? Does he acknowledge the obligation of the Charter which prohibits resort to force to support our own view of our rights in a dispute, and will he accept the idea of referring any dispute on this matter to the Security Council and refraining from the use of force?

Mr. Longden: It may be that the hon. Gentleman has just entered the Chamber, said at the beginning of my remarks that it may yet come to the United Nations. It has not yet come there for the reasons I gave, but it may well have to do so. It will be vetoed in the Security Council no doubt, and then it will have to come before the General Assembly by way of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, but at any rate we and our Allies have stated our position clearly:
The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States once more reaffirmed the determination of their Governments to maintain their position and their rights with respect to Berlin, including the right of free access.
That has been ratified by the whole of the N.A.T.O. Council.

Mr. S. Silverman: May I intervene? The hon. Gentleman posed the question and said that it might be put in this form, whether Berlin was worth a war. But let us suppose that it is not quite the question, let us suppose the question is that of access to West Berlin, free, uninhibited, unlimited—except in so far as it is limited now by physical conditions. Supposing it is the price of dealing with East German officials or officials who were resident in East Germany rather than dealing with Soviet officials. Would the difference between those two propositions be worth a war whose results the hon. Gentleman appreciates, I am sure, as well as anybody else?

Mr. Longden: In my view, for what it is worth, that is another question.

Mr. Silverman: It is the only question.

Mr. Longden: No, it is not the only question. The question whether Berlin is worth a war has already been asked in this Chamber this afternoon by the hon. Gentleman behind the hon. Member, and will no doubt be asked again. The question now is whether, being faced, as we are, with a further ultimatum by the Soviet Union, do we force our way through? It is not merely a question of which people on the frontier will take the tickets; but that we shall be shot down.

Mr. Silverman: If I concede to the hon. Gentleman that, for the purposes of clarity and argument, the question I have put to him is a new question, will he now give us a new answer? Will he answer the question I have asked him? Would he go to war for that difference?

Mr. Longden: If the hon. Gentleman will excuse me, I should prefer to be allowed to make my own speech in my own way. I may come to his point later.

Mr. Silverman: The hon. Gentleman has only to say "Yes" or "No".

Mr. Longden: In any case, what value is my opinion to the hon. Gentleman?

Mr. Silverman: I would not have asked for it if I did not value it.

Mr. Longden: I am much obliged. I give the hon. Gentleman the answer now. It is "No".
I hope that the determination shown by the right hon. Gentleman opposite up


to now will be endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the people of this country. I greatly welcome what the right hon. Gentleman said, because I believe that it would be unparalleled perfidy for us to allow the gallant Herr Willi Brandt and his fellow citizens to be smothered by the Iron Curtain. I also believe that it would be the beginning of the end of free Europe. We should not be fighting for Berlin and the Germans, but for Europe and the Europeans.
There can be no solution of the Berlin problem, as the Leader of the Opposition said, until Germany is reunited, and the next question is how that can best be done. The West have suggested free elections, but, as the Leader of the Opposition has reminded the House, Mr. Dulles has recently made another speech. I should like to echo what the right hon. Gentleman said about the American Secretary of State. I echo entirely what he said. Though we may not always have agreed with all his policies, I do not think anybody can withhold admiration from a man whose steadfastness and courage have triumphed so constantly over every physical disability.
The Leader of the Opposition gave part of what Mr. Dulles said the other day, but I should like to be allowed to quote the whole of it:
If there is any other way to bring about reunification"—
that is, other than free elections—
we will be glad to explore it; but before we give up a way which is a good way, and the agreed way"—
a reference to Geneva, 1955—
—we would like to see what the alternative is, and so far we have not found one.
Certainly, the Soviet suggestion of a confederation between a Communist and a capitalist State is not a likely solution, for the reasons clearly given by my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Mr. F. M. Bennett). Even if Germany would contemplate it, the Opposition parties in West Germany would not. It would merely perpetuate the division, and, as the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Bonn wrote the other day, it would set up a Korea in Europe.
I am therefore glad to read in the composite Motion on the Order Paper this reference to free elections, and also the reference to effective international control of disarmament. This Motion is

obviously one which calls for careful study, and I am quite sure that my right hon. and learned Friend will give it that, but what of the advice that we should agree upon the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces of all kinds from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary? What of the advice about the withdrawal of the countries in that area from N.A.T.O. and from the Warsaw Pact. Dr. Adenauer has said that we must give no concessions without counter-concessions, and, certainly, there would be counter-concessions if these proposals were carried out, assuming—and it is a big assumption—that the Kremlin will agree to them.
But would they be enough? Is it really fair to equate Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary with the whole of a reunited Germany? Why should Germany, whether neutral or not, leave N.A.T.O.? Why should she? Why should the great German nation be allowed to be neutral in this struggle? Why should she not play her part with others in the defence of the Western civilisation to which she herself has contributed so much? How can Germany be kept neutral, even if it were desirable? How can we treat a nation of 70 million like a nation of 8 million people? If Germany were to leave N.A.T.O., and if the remaining N.A.T.O. forces were to come back on this side of the Rhine, I believe that it would mean that the Americans and ourselves would leave the Continent of Europe, and that, I believe, would mean the break up of N.A.T.O.
Why do I believe that? I believe it because of what General Norstad has said, what Field Marshal Lord Montgomery has said, what every other soldier I know on this or the other side of the Atlantic has said, and also what M. Paul Spaak has said. They have said that there would then be insufficient depth in which to make the shield of N.A.T.O. efficient. At any rate, as my right hon. Friend the Minister of State said, it is a risk, and are we justified in taking that risk? Indeed, are we ready to take it? Would we be justified in deliberately jeopardising the security of the one part of the world, and that the most important part, where our Western policy has triumphantly succeeded?
If I am accused of being only destructive, I should like now tentatively to


advance an alternative. Firstly, I believe that there should be free elections, followed by a united, independent sovereign Germany. Secondly, I would advocate most strongly that such a Germany should renounce for all time all claims to territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Thirdly, I believe that such a Germany, ex hypothesi, should be free to choose her own policy, and, if she chose to remain allied to the West, then, fourthly, she and she alone would be responsible for the defence of Germany. All foreign troops would be withdrawn from the United German soil and all Soviet troops from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. After all, they have no right whatever to be there. Finally, by all means, let there be a nuclear-free zone in Europe, though whether that would be such a safeguard as it would once have been seems to me to be doubtful. Certainly, there is no harm in having one, and I would agree to fetter a united, independent sovereign Germany to that extent.
I believe that the Soviet fears of a reunited, armed Germany are genuine, but I believe that it is impracticable, even were it desirable to keep a great nation like Germany disarmed forever. I believe that it would be better in the circumstances to rope her into the Western defensive alliance. The Soviet Note to which I have already made reference, asks this question:
Can the inspirers of the present policy of the Western Powers on Germany themselves guarantee that the German militarism which they nurture will not again turn against its present partners.
The answer is, "No, we cannot guarantee it". It is impossible to do so. It is impossible to guarantee such a thing, but that is surely the best insurance we have against it happening, and the Soviet Note itself goes on to talk about how peace-loving the inhabitants of the Eastern Sector now are.

ROYAL ASSENT

6.0 p.m.

Whereupon, The GENTLEMAN-USHER OF THE BLACK ROD being come with a Message, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair.

Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair.

Message to attend the Lords Com missioners:

The House went:— and, having returned;

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Navy, Army and Air Force Reserves Act, 1959.
2. European Monetary Agreement Act, 1959.
3. Agriculture (Small Farmers) Act, 1959.
4. Marriage (Secretaries of Synagogues) Act, 1959.
5. Malta (Letters Patent) Act, 1959.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): On a point of order. Before you leave the Chair, Mr. Speaker, I should like your indulgence to inform the House that the Prime Minister hopes to make a statement on Cyprus at 7 o'clock.

SUPPLY

Again considered in Committee.

[Major Sir WILLIAM ANSTRUTHER-GRAY in the Chair]

Question again proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £1,272,018,000, be granted to Her Majesty, on account, for or towards defraying the charges for the following Civil and Revenue Departments and for the Ministry of Defence for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1960.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

6.12 p.m.

Mr. Longden: I wish to add only a few more sentences to what I have said. First, I should like to wish my two right hon. Friends the best of success in their mission to Moscow, the object of which might be described, in the vernacular, as being to find out how Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues tick. In much humbler circumstances I have found that to be a rewarding process elsewhere.

6.13 p.m.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: The hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) made a sincere and intelligent contribution to our debate, as he usually does. I hope that he will forgive me if I do not attempt to take up or debate with him those parts of his speech with which I disagree, because I want to make some points of my own and I do not want to occupy a greater portion of the time than I should. He is almost the last person I should have expected to fall into an error that is rapidly becoming accepted almost as common form.
It is the suggestion that if, in the circumstances in which the world finds itself today, we were to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union—and by "we" I mean not only our own country but all those who are allied and associated with us and have been so associated in the controversies with the Soviet Union and their associates since the end of the war —at the price of accepting a unified Germany whose arms were limited and controlled and who was prevented by treaty, to which she freely consented, from integrating those arms either with the group of Western Powers in N.A.T.O. or the group of Eastern powers in the Warsaw Pact, we should then have been guilty of a dishonourable peace, of a sacrifice of principle, of yielding to force what ought to be denied to justice and, in short, of repeating the tragic pusillanimity of the 'thirties.
We all see history through the eyes of our own experience and possible prejudices, but I should have thought that that proposition was the exact opposite of the truth.

Mr. Longden: The hon. Gentleman has misquoted me. I am sure that he did so unintentionally and that it was my fault. I did not say anything about that. I said that if we were to be forced at pistol point out of Berlin, where we have rights and responsibilities, we should be guilty of repeating our mistakes of the 'thirties. I did not say that I objected in principle to that suggestion on Germany. I said that I thought that it would be unwise at the moment.

Mr. Silverman: If the hon. Member did not say that, I am wrongly attributing to him what is certainly the opinion of a

great many of his hon. and right hon. Friends, and something that the Minister of State expressly said in his speech, which I mistakenly thought the hon. Member was supporting. I am glad that he does not make that proposition himself. Nevertheless, it was worth while my saying what I did, because the hon. Member will probably concede that many people agree with it.
I will say why I think it is such a complete distortion of history. Hitler never openly declared that he wanted a war. He sold himself to the German people as an apostle of peace and reunification, and as the protagonist of the building up of a strong and self-respecting Germany— powerful, independent, taking of itself the leadership of Europe not out of any selfish German interest, but because Germany, under his leadership, would be the last bastion of Western civilisation against the influx of the barbarous hordes from the Soviet Union.
Not only did he succeed in imposing himself upon the German people in that way, but he persuaded many other people that those were his motives. The hon. Member was not then in the House, but I was. Hitler persuaded not only the late Lord Simon, Baldwin and, above all, Neville Chamberlain that it was true, but he persuaded other people, for whom I had more affection. He sold that picture of Hitler Germany to the right hon. David Lloyd George, and sold it to our dear old friend George Lansbury. For that reason, we granted to Hitler Germany all the claims we had persistently denied to the Weimar Republic and German democracy. We allowed conscription to come back. We allowed arms, we allowed forcible reintegration into Germany of the Rhineland without agreement, and the Saar. We broke our treaty with France. I hope we all remember the responsibilities we then undertook in order to allow, not the German Democratic Republic, not the Weimar Republic, but Hitler, to build under the Anglo-German Naval Treaty the submarines that nearly brought us to our knees during the Second World War.
Because we accepted that picture, that a strong Germany was necessary for this purpose, in 1938 we made the Munich Agreement rather than bring in the Soviet Union of those days—not Khrushchev, not Molotov, but other Soviet Foreign


Ministers who had been at the very centre of the whole system of collective security. We refused to talk to them, we refused to bring them into our negotiations. We warned the Czechoslovaks that if they resisted Hitler with only Soviet assistance they would lose the whole sympathy of the world because then the world would regard it as an ideological war.
When Sir Neville Henderson came back from Berlin after the outbreak of war and wrote his memoirs, do hon. Members remember what he entitled the book? He called the book. Failure of a Mission. What was the mission? What would have happened if that mission had succeeded? The mission was to build up a European four-Power pact of the Fascist Power, the Nazi Power and the two democratic Powers in a concentration that would have not merely sacrificed all our ideas of freedom but which indeed sacrificed Czechoslovakia to the notion that we must treat Germany as so much the inevitable bulwark of Western civilisation that Western civilisation could not survive without it. So far from this policy that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition pressed in a speech of such lucidity and persuasiveness this afternoon being a repetition of the errors of the 1930's, the rejection of those ideas would repeat the errors of the 1930's with the same tragic consequences as we experienced as a result of those errors then.
Let us look for a moment at what are the issues with which we are dealing. It is very tempting in these debates to put our hands into the old rag-bag of ideas and proposals, arguments, charges and counter-charges that have filled the diplomatic history of the world since 1945, and stand by the policy of this Foreign Secretary or that Foreign Secretary, to call in the aid of our opponent whenever we are most doubtful about the wisdom of the proposals we are defending and to turn the debate this afternoon into a rather schoolboyish debating society exchange of all the old notions and all the old slogans and old shibboleths. Let us not do that. Let us see where we are now, in 1959.
What are the stakes? Some people have doubts whether a kind of summit conference is any good or not, or whether we ought not to do it some other way, or what the Prime Minister's motives

might be in going at this time rather than at some other time. The situation is that we now have these two enormous associations of Powers, each suspicious and fearful of the other, each with enough power to destroy mankind, deadlocked. What is the use of saying that we will leave the negotiations to reach some kind of agreement at lower levels? It is because all the efforts to reach agreement at lower levels have failed that, as a last desperate remedy, it is proposed that those who share the greatest responsibility on all sides should meet and see whether they can break the deadlock in which the negotiations by others have already landed the world.
Suppose we do not break the deadlock. Someone asked whether the Communist Powers have given up the idea that war with the capitalist world was inevitable. I do not think they ever had such an idea, but suppose they had, they too are asking in their turn whether what they call the Imperialist or capitalist Powers—what, if it is preferred, we might call the bourgeois democratic Powers—have given up the idea many leaders of the Western world adopted that inevitably a clash would occur.
What I am asking the Committee to consider against the background of the Prime Minister's projected visit is, suppose the deadlock is not broken, is it not then clear that if we do not agree the present insecure, unstable status quo cannot endure? Either you agree or you fight -perhaps not now, perhaps not next month or next year, but there is no middle way between reaching an agreement and a war whose consequences, I think, are well recognised but which, so far as this country is concerned, were well summed up in an answer given me the other day by the Minister of Defence. I asked him:
whether it is still the Government's policy that, in the event of war, defence activities against enemy air attack must be confined to the protection of military airfields and air bases".
The right hon. Gentleman said, in effect, that that is what the White Paper said in 1957 and that it was still valid. I pressed him further and asked;
Does that reply mean … in specific terms which the people of this country can understand, that in the event of nuclear war there would be no possibility whatever of defending the civil population of this country?


I asked the Minister of Defence more, but I will be content with that. I will not read the whole of the Minister's answer, but if anyone would like me to read what I leave out I am ready to do so. I quote only what is strictly necessary to my point:
… although our defences could no doubt deal with a very high proportion of any enemy bomber aircraft attacking this country—probably a higher proportion than during the last war—nonetheless, with the tremendous explosive power of modern weapons, if even a few were to get through it would be sufficient to create widespread devastation".
Then there came this sentence, and here are the stakes:
Therefore we could not honestly say to the people of this country that in the present state of scientific knowledge there is any effective means of defending the country as a whole."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 1173–4.]
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his complete frankness. Let no one be in any doubt about what it means. If war broke out, these weapons would be used. If these weapons were used, I do not know who would survive. This country would not, and that is what the Minister of Defence told me. Therefore, let us not be too anxious to press our debating points. Let us not be too insistent on small doubts, points of criticism and ambiguities in this plan, or the other plan, or any other plan that may be advanced. No plan, no agreement. No agreement, no peace. No peace, no survival.
In those circumstances, what is being proposed? It is in the Motion which a number of my right hon. and hon. Friends have joined with me now in putting on the Order Paper. A number of us who did not entirely see eye to eye on points that are incidental to the main programme have thought it wise-and I am sure no one will doubt our wisdom—not to press the incidental points which may or may not be, according to our different views, logical, inherent or implicit in one plan or the other, but to combine on the general programme Which was unanimously adopted at our Conference at Scarborough last year and which was so brilliantly explained and advocated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell) this afternoon.
It is said that there are dangers. Whoever said that there were not? It is said

that we need the agreement of America for it. Whoever said that we did not? It is said that it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union and their friends would accept it. Whoever said that it was certain? We are not offering a panacea. It is not a cure-all pill that we are offering to the world and saying, "Swallow it whole and your ailments will come to an end." We are offering it as a practical constructive suggestion which this country could put into the pool of international negotiation in the hope of breaking this fatal deadlock and producing some kind of agreement which would enable us all to live together in our one planet, in order to ensure, if we can, that life will not become extinct on this plane while we are using all our energies to find a way to another.
Let us look at it, then, as a practical proposal. I do not expect the Prime Minister to lay his cards on the table. It is a pity that he could not be here. It is also a pity that the Foreign Secretary could not be here. Not that I would have expected either of them necessarily to take part in the discussion or, If they did take part in it, to be very specific about what they are going to say. I fully understand why neither of them can be here. I am not complaining of it. I merely say that it is a pity that they should not have been able to be present and to hear the points of view that are advanced from one side of the Committee or the other so that they will be able, if they are going to take information to Moscow as well as to get information in Moscow, to let the Russians know the kind of ideas that are acceptable, not merely to the Prime Minister and his friends, but to my right hon. Friend and his friends and all the rest of us, because any time now they may change their places on the Front Benches.
It is not certain. I am not making party points about this. We know that this Parliament must shortly come to an end. No one can exclude the possibility that there might be a new Government and that it might be the business of a new Government to continue the new negotiations started by the last Government. That is what happened in 1945 at Potsdam. It could happen again. It is worth while to understand what are the proposals that commend themselves


to us. They, as well as any other proposals, should be understood in Moscow.
What are they? There has been talk about the reunification of Germany. When the Prime Minister goes to Moscow, is he to be tied to a Western position which is plainly becoming untenable, if one wants progress to be made? I am not arguing merits, though I do not say that the merits are unimportant. If we proceed in these negotiations from the point of view that we want to advance, that we want to break the deadlock and make discussion more elastic and less rigid so that some progress can be made, then surely we must make it clear, even if we do not say what exactly we put in its place, that we no longer stand rigidly by a programme which would mean that we could make no advance at all.
I could not follow the speech of the Minister of State. I know his difficulties. It is necessary for the Government to have a spokesman. The Foreign Secretary cannot be here. It is necessary that the spokesman should not commit the Foreign Secretary too far and it would have been necessary, if the Foreign Secretary had been here, that he should not commit himself too far.
The Minister of State did commit himself too far in what many of us found a most depressing speech. In parts it was an unintelligible speech. He mentioned three conditions with which, he said, my right hon. Friend had previously agreed in regard to a policy of disengagement. What was the first? He reiterated, and we must assume that he wishes to stand by it, that in any disengagement agreement it was paramount that the position of the two sides should not be disadvantaged. He was careful to say that that principle applied to both sides. He did not say what the Foreign Secretary said to me in a Written Answer a few days ago, that the principle was that the position must not change to the disadvantage of the West. At least the Minister of State was more realistic than that. He said, and obviously it is axiomatic, that the positon must not result in changing the relative strengths of the two sides, the relative military positions and all the rest of it We must assume that he means that.
Then he insisted that a reunited Germany must be free, for other reasons

which he gave, to join N.A.T.O. How in the world does he reconcile those two propositions? They are not reconcilable. If we put forward at the same time and in the same speech two conditions, each of which is a negation of the other, we must not complain if the people with whom we are dealing on the other side of the table either refuse to take us seriously at all or regard us as double-dealing.
If a united Germany were to join N.A.T.O., clearly the relative positions of the two sides would have been changed to the disadvantage of the other side, and clearly we would not expect the other side to accept it. What is the good of putting both statements into the same speech as part of the same negotiation? My right hon. Friend talked about a disengagement which had recommended itself in some German quarters, a zone from the western gates of Berlin to the Federal Republic. This would be an offence against the right hon. Gentleman's principle of not altering the boundaries to the disadvantage of either side because that would not remove from one side a very important area.
Then what? Surely it is not a very heavy price to pay if what we get for the price is a real opportunity to avoid an unprecedented world disaster. It is not a very heavy price to pay for that, is it, to say that we shall have in Europe an area which shall not be lined up with one side or the other? Surely the prestige of the German Government is not worth more than the whole future of the human race. Suppose that an arrangement which kept Germany out of N.A.T.O. were in some kind of way unfair to her and a limitation of her sovereignty. Should we really believe that an assuagement of that feeling is more important than preserving the future of the human race on this planet? That indeed would be appeasement.
In fact, there is nothing in the point. Switzerland has never regarded it as a derogation of its sovereignty but rather as an additional security of its freedom, that it should remain permanently neutral. I put it to my right hon. Friend that every nation that signed the Charter of the United Nations accepted the obligations of that Charter and voluntarily imposed upon itself limitations on its freedom of action in the international


sphere. Of course it did. Partial surrender of sovereignty of some kind to an international authority is the very sine qua nonof any settled order or peace in the world. Germany, under such an arrangement, would not be asked to do more than to keep out of the regional groups.
Do we get anything in return? True, we must lose West Germany out of N.A.T.O. It is a lot to lose. Do we get anything in return? The Warsaw Pact loses not merely East Germany, on our proposals, but Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. Is it not a deal, an equitable arrangement? [An HON. MEMBER: "NO."] Why not? Are we to go to the Soviet Union at this time of day to ask for unconditional surrender? Some would. Do they think they would gain anything out of it? The very people most opposed to these ideas now and most insistent upon preserving the ultimate extreme sovereign rights of an independent Germany are the people who attacked my right hon. Friend and myself so bitterly year after year during the war because they said, "There must be unconditional surrender of Germany". We said, "Nothing of the kind". A strange transformation of opinion has taken place on that side, while we are where we were then.
There is certainly a free, sovereign, independent Germany, but a democratic one, and in such a situation by reason of its international treaties that it can no longer be regarded as a danger by one side or the other, and able in that way to make its contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world.
Whatever the history of this controversy has been, whatever positions may have been taken up on one side or the other and however those positions may have been attacked and defended, I beg the Government to remember that we have tried out quite a lot of things in recent years, and have brought ourselves to a situation which is pregnant with danger not merely to one side or the other but to the whole human race. Let us start thinking afresh and anew. Let us see if we can get some advance out of the darkness. The situation is dark indeed.
We talk of Berlin. It is all very well to talk about our rights and obligations in West Berlin; of course, we have them

and of course we must honour them. But does any hon. Member in this Committee, in his heart and conscience, believe that this absurd, anomalous situation of a divided city in a divided country can go on for ever? Half of a city, 200 miles from the frontier of the country to which it is sought to attach it; maintained in a position of prosperity by constant subsidies. Half a city, not merely with different associations, but with a division so bleak and bitter that one cannot telephone from East Berlin to West Berlin. The police cannot co-operate in the prevention of ordinary crimes. A different currency. A frontier and a border. Imagine a guard across Piccadilly.

Mr. Bernard Braine: And who made it so?

Mr. Silverman: I do not wish to debate with the hon. Gentleman who has made it so. If it eases his mind in any way, let us say it was all the other fellow's fault. I have been a Member of Parliament long enough to know that whenever this country is involved in trouble with anybody else, it is always the other fellow's fault. I have given the hon. Gentleman his point, so that he does not now need to interrupt me. Suppose it is their fault and not ours—

Mr. Braine: rose—

Mr. Silverman: No. If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will not give way. The question the hon. Gentleman asked was, who brought it about, or whose fault was it—

Mr. Braine: I was thinking of the two million Berliners who, in a free vote in their half of the City, decided to opt for the West. Is the hon. Gentleman going to throw them to the wolves?

Mr. Silverman: I knew I should not have given way. Let us get back to the point.
No one believes that this situation can go on for ever, whose-ever is the fault. It may be entirely the Russians' fault that the situation was brought about. Two million citizens of West Berlin are affected, as the hon. Gentleman says, and may be entitled to our sympathy.

Mr. Braine: And support.

Mr. Silverman: And support, if the hon. Gentleman wishes. I do not wish


to quarrel with him on a point of that kind. I only ask him, as I ask everyone else, to consider, is it conceivable that such a situation can go on for ever? He must know that it is not. Therefore, at some time or other, we have to consider what we shall do about it. The great mistake we have made here is that we have let the thing slide; we have let it run. We have made no proposals, hoping that everybody would keep quiet; knowing in our hearts that at some time the position would become acute and that we should have to deal with it. Then we complain because we have to deal with it under duress.
That is not only true of Berlin, it is true of all those other problems to which reference was made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. How long shall we leave the China situation to remain as it is? Obviously that, too, cannot last for ever. There is a clanger that the Middle East may take the place of Germany as the critical area of the world. When are we going to be ready with some proposals about that? Surely, we ought now to be working out positive and constructive programmes, and throwing them into the international pool of discussion, and discussing them honestly, reasonably, and with a desire to reach agreement; instead of sitting back and waiting, and stumbling from crisis to crisis, and coming out of each crisis to face a situation worse than that which obtained when we entered the crisis.
I hope that all those considerations will be borne in mind by the Committee and by the Prime Minister in all the talks which he has in Moscow.

6.55 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Kershaw: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is expected to enter the Chamber in a few minutes so I must ask the Committee to bear with me in patience until he arrives.
If my right hon. Friend finds himself so extremely busy that he is unable to undertake the journey to Moscow, I feel that he could, with profit, spend a short time in the company of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). The hon. Gentleman would quite easily be able to illuminate to him the processes in the minds of the Russian rulers in the Kremlin, without my right hon. Friend having the necessity of going all the way

to Russia to find that out. The hon. Gentleman, to whose speeches I always listen with respect for the clarity of their argument, said, among other things, that either we agree or we fight. As a gesture in the war of nerves, undoubtedly, it is quite a strong pronouncement. But the choice is not that. It does not dispose of the question, because the question is: to what does one agree?
The tenor of the hon. Gentleman's speech was that we should, at all costs, agree straight away, to avert a desperate catastrophe. But if we agree to the Russian proposals, so far as we know them, do not we leave ourselves in the position that we have lost without even a battle having taken place? The hon. Gentleman said that in the years before the war Hitler was represented in the House of Commons as being an apostle of peace. There are those who represent Russia as being an apostle of peace nowadays.
Hon. Members on this side of the Committee see little difference between the posture which Russia takes up now and the posture which Nazi Germany adopted before the war. The only difference is that now we are armed and prepared, both morally and with some weapons, whereas, before the war, we were neither ready with weapons nor in moral determination. I suppose that one could say that the difference between the approach to the international situation today by hon. Members on this side of the Committee, and the exposition to which we have just listened from the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, is that we are not prepared to throw ourselves on the mercy of the Soviet Government without guarantees, and he, I think, is prepared so to do.

Mr. S. Silverman: The hon. Gentleman paid me the compliment of saying that he always listens to my speeches. With respect, he has proved that he does not listen to them at all. I did not say a single word which would justify such a remark from him. I made, and supported, a series of definite and constructive proposals. I should like to hear from the hon. Gentleman whether or not he agrees with them.

Mr. Kershaw: My clear impression of the hon. Gentleman's speech was that he wished us never to make concessions without concessions in return. I realise that the hon. Gentleman says that we


must take something in return, but what he asks us to buy is not valuable enough.
We all wish my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister well in the journey he is about to make to Russia. It is particularly unfortunate that during the last two days, since the invitation was issued and accepted, Mr. Khrushchev has made some offensive remarks about this country. Because of that I am very glad my right hon. Friend is not going to Moscow to obtain some agreement, but merely to explain the attitude of Her Majesty's Government and the British people to the questions of international importance which confront them.
I hope that when my right hon. Friend makes that explanation, he will make perfectly certain that the Russian rulers understand that the type of outburst to which Mr. Khrushchev gave vent the other day is not the sort of thing which frightens the British people. It reminds us disagreeably of the sort of pronouncements which Herr Hitler used to make— usually on Saturday afternoons—before the beginning of the last war.
In the negotiations about the City of Berlin which will subsequently take place I feel that it is absolutely essential that we make perfectly clear that we are in Berlin as of right; that we propose to stay there and that in no circumstances shall we give way to blackmail which may result in the loss of Berlin without compensating advantages. We ought to know, and I am sure that we do know at this period in our history, that we shall not earn our own safety by selling the freedom of our friends. If we seize the opportunity afforded by the Berlin negotiations to achieve some larger settlement in relation to Germany, that is the best thing we can do and that is the way, I am sure, we would wish the matter to be handled.
There are things which we can give to the Russians in return for an agreement over Berlin. I do not think that it is possible for us to give them anything of political value, partly because we think that we cannot afford to give way too far and certainly because I believe that the Russians cannot possibly afford to go back one step in Eastern Europe. If they get out of the satellite countries, the satellite countries will instantly collapse so far as the Russian regimes there are concerned.
It is idle to suppose that the Russians will come to any political agreement today on Berlin or anything else which will not bolster up the regime in the German Democratic Republic or that they will allow it to be eroded in any way. We need not expect that that could possibly happen. We must make absolutely certain, therefore, that any political advantage that we give shall be compensated by a real political advantage given by the other side.
Militarily speaking, it is quite possible for Russia to meet us quite a long way. She has two reasons why she can give us some military advantage and we have an advantage that we can give to her in return. The two reasons why Russia can afford to give us some military concessions are, first, that any military concession given by Russia would be of good propaganda value to her, and, secondly, she can afford to retire a great deal further from the Iron Curtain than we can afford to retire on our side.
It makes very little difference these days with the powerful weapons at our disposal and at the disposal of the Russians as well, that the Russian forces should be crammed up against the frontier. The Russian forces in the satellite States are not there to fight us; they are there to keep the satellite States quiet. If she takes her forces back even as far as her own frontier she could quickly deploy them again and from the security of her own frontier use the powerful weapons at her disposal. She can make a gesture for propaganda purposes by giving us military concessions, but I do not believe that at the same time she can afford to clear out of the satellite States and give us political concessions.
We on our side can, I think, afford to have some measure of disarmament in the middle of Europe, such as has been proposed before by Sir Anthony Eden and by others since then. It is quite within the realm of possibility, provided parity of disarmament is obtained, for there to be in the centre of Europe some form of disarmament.
We cannot possiby go so far as neutralisation, because that is a political matter which is not acceptable either to us or, more important, to the German people. The hon. Gentleman the Member


for Nelson and Colne skated over this difficulty, because it is impossible to insist that Germany shall be neutral if Germany does not want to be neutral. It is no good pretending that we can deliver the goods, so to speak, to Russia and ensure that Germany is neutral, because we cannot do that any more than Russia can do it.
So, from the neutral point of view, we cannot go so far as to denude Germany entirely of her own troops or, perhaps, even of our troops. From the military point of view it is quite possible, I suppose, for the forces to be gradually reduced and even for atomic weapons, which at the moment are very much in the minds of Eastern Europe and of Russia, to be eliminated.
At one time it was extremely important that these weapons should be there. Now, with the growth of range of missiles, it is not so important that atomic weapons should be so close up against the Western German frontier. I put before the Committee the proposition that some measure of disarmament in Western Germany is feasible, that negotiations could take place about it and, therefore, that we have something to offer Russia in return for an agreement about Berlin and the status of Germany.
We cannot possibly have reunification under Russian terms. We have to look that horse very carefully in the mouth because, as I have said, the political things that Russia has to offer us cannot be relied upon and we have offers to make to her which will go a long way to make the security of central Europe better than it is at present.
I hope that in his forthcoming journey my right hon. Friend the Prime Miinster will be able to put forward some of the ideas which, I am afraid, I have been able, a little incoherently on this occasion, to put before the Committee.

CYPRUS (AGREEMENT)

7.7 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I think that the Committee would wish me to give, at this, the first possible moment for me, the latest position about Cyprus. I am glad to inform the House that in the Cyprus Conference agreement has now been reached between the three Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and the representatives of the two main communities in the island.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

The Prime Minister: The conclusions of the Conference, which comprise some long and detailed documents, will be published in a White Paper.
The Conference arose immediately from the negotiations which have been taking place between the Greek and Turkish Governments since the end of last year. Her Majesty's Government were, at an early stage, informed of these negotiations at a meeting in Paris in December between my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey.
From the outset, Her Majesty's Government gave their full support to this initiative. We made clear to the other two Governments that, provided our military requirements were met, in a manner which could not be challenged, by the retention of bases under British sovereignty, together with the provision of the necessary rights and facilities for their operation, we were prepared to consider the transfer of sovereignty by Her Majesty's Government over the rest of the island.
Negotiations between Greece and Turkey continued against the background of this statement of Her Majesty's Government's position. They culminated in the agreements reached between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers at Zurich on 11th February of this year. We have arranged with our Greek and Turkish Allies that the text of the documents agreed at the Conference and signed today will not be released for publication until they have had time to return to their capitals and report to their colleagues.
I am sure that the House will understand that the Greek and Turkish Parliaments also have the right to be informed


at first hand of these important agreements. The documents, therefore, including the agreements reached between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers at Zurich, will be laid before the House in the form of a White Paper on Monday next. They will also be published in Nicosia by the Governor. I shall only say at this stage that the agreements reached at Zurich take full account of the rights of the people of Cyprus and represent a fair and honourable compromise between the interests of Greece and Turkey. They re-establish the friendship and alliance between these two countries which are so essential to the security of us all.
Our Greek and Turkish friends took as the starting point of their discussions the premise that the United Kingdom would retain under British sovereignty such areas, together with the necessary rights and facilities, as are required to enable her to fulfil her strategic obligations in the area. They have also agreed to guarantee our continued enjoyment of these facilities.
As soon as the two Prime Ministers had reached agreement on this basis last week, the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey came to London. They brought with them the Zurich agreements for discussion with Her Majesty's Government. They made it clear to us that, while they had throughout their own negotiations accepted the British requirements, they had made no attempt to provide for them in detail. This was left for us to state. At the same time, they made it clear that they had every confidence that our requirements could be met in a manner fully acceptable to us.
We discussed the position fully with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and made enough progress for us to feel justified in convening a Conference, which began on 17th February with the participation not only of the three Governments, who were represented by their Foreign Ministers, but also of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, who were represented by Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk, respectively. At the opening of the Conference, my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, made a declaration of Her Majesty's Government's position. This declaration was to the effect that, subject to the acceptance of their

stated requirements, Her Majesty's Government accepted the documents approved by the heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.
Our requirements were that two areas should be retained under full British sovereignty, together with such rights as were necessary to ensure those areas being used effectively as military bases, and that satisfactory guarantees should be given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of those areas and for our use and enjoyment of the necessary rights.
The declaration also stipulated that provision should be made for the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus, for the protection of the interests of members of the public services, for the resolving of questions of nationality of persons affected by the settlement and for the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate obligations of the present Cyprus Government, including the settlement of claims.
The declaration made it clear that Her Majesty's Government welcomed the draft treaty of alliance and would cooperate in the common defence of Cyprus. Finally, we declared that the constitution of the Republic should come into force and the necessary instruments be formally signed at the earliest practicable date and that sovereignty would then be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.
This declaration was formally accepted by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in the names of their Governments as providing, together with the documents approved by the heads of the Greek and Turkish Governments at Zurich, the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios, as the representative of the Greek-Cypriot community, and Dr. Kutchuk, as the representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community, have also accepted the declaration and the Zurich documents on the same basis. Our requirements have thus been fully met.
The mutual acceptance by the parties to the Conference of the position formally made known constitutes the firm and agreed foundation on which the final settlement will be built. The instruments


recording these arrangements were initialled at Lancaster House today.
At this point, I would like to say how much the successful solution of this baffling problem is due to the determination and perseverance of my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary and my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary. In all this, they have borne a heavy burden of responsibility for a long time with the greatest skill and patience. All parties to the Conference firmly endorse the aim of bringing the constitution and the treaties into full effect as soon as practicable. A number of practical arrangements have been made for this purpose, the details of which will be announced very shortly.
The question has been raised of the possibility of Cyprus remaining in some form of association with the Commonwealth. This is a matter on which, of course, the people of Cyprus themselves should have an opportunity of expressing their views when they have the constitutional means of doing so. It is also a question which must concern other Commonwealth Governments. If in due course the Government of Cyprus declare that they desire to remain associated with the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom Government, in consultation with other members of the Commonwealth will consider sympathetically how that desire can most appropriately be satisfied. I hope—indeed, I trust —that all hon. Members, on all sides of the Committee, will welcome this agreement. I believe that we have closed a chapter of bitterness and strife in the history of Cyprus and that we are now embarking, with our Greek and Turkish Allies and the people of Cyprus themselves, on a new approach where partnership and co-operation take the place of strife and dissension. The missing factor which has so long eluded us was the agreement of Greece and Turkey on the terms of the settlement. This has now been achieved and the restored friendship of Greece and Turkey, which carries with it a reconciliation between the two main communities in the island, is the all-important feature of the new arrangements.
Her Majesty's Government believe that the agreements arrived at in Zurich and London will result in the return of peace to Cyprus. Our purpose is to bring the

state of emergency to an end as soon as possible. This will involve the release of detainees, the terms of an amnesty for those convicted and arrangements for the return of those exiled.
Throughout the period of the emergency, which has lasted nearly four years, men and women in the security forces and the public service in Cyprus have persevered with courage in the face of danger in the performance of often thankless but essential tasks. I am sure that the Committee will wish to pay tribute to them and to the devotion to duty of the Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, and his predecessor, Lord Harding. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]
I must add a further word about the public service. It is essential to maintain its continuity and its efficiency. To this end, every encouragement will be given to members of the public service to continue to serve in the island. The interests of officers who leave, as well as of those who stay, will be carefully looked after, as they have been elsewhere when the countries they were serving became independent.
The House of Commons 'has on many occasions recognised the role of the Services and of the security forces in Cyprus during recent years. Their patience, their courage and their devotion to duty has bean beyond praise. Valuable lives have been lost—of Service men and of civilians. These can never be replaced, but I hope that all who mourn their loss will realise that they have not died in vain, for their sacrifice has prevented the widening of conflict and strife, with all its attendant dangers.
I regard this Agreement as a victory for reason and co-operation. No party to it has suffered defeat. It is a victory for all. By removing a source of bitterness and division it will enable us and our Allies and the people of Cyprus to concentrate on working together for peace and freedom.

7.21 p.m.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: We on this side of the Committee have heard with great satisfaction and relief the announcement just made by the Prime Minister. It was a long statement and there is still much detail to be filled in before we can get a completely clear picture of exactly what has been agreed.
I would, therefore, wish to put only one major question to the Prime Minister in the hope that he can enlighten us a little further.
I am not clear, from what the right hon. Gentleman said, exactly what the next steps are. Are 'there to be any further negotiations, and, if so, between whom, on detailed points that still remain to be settled? One such point, presumably, is the date on which the change-over is to take place. I wonder whether the Prime Minister could help us on that.
I think that it is particularly satisfactory to us on this side of the Committee that, at least, the possibility remains open that Cyprus will remain in the Commonwealth, although, there again, I am not entirely clear as to when the decision on that matter is likely to be taken.
I desire to associate my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself with the very well-deserved tribute paid by the Prime Minister to our Armed Forces and to the civilian members of the public service in Cyprus who have had to endure so much during the last years, and also to the Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, and his predecessor. I think that, however one looks at the Agreement, perhaps the most credit must go to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, who, during what was a dangerous moment in the relations between their two countries, managed to sit down together and reach agreement.
In view of the very large number of mistakes made over the past few years by Her Majesty's Government, I feel inclined also to offer my congratulations to them for at last having realised that they had to reach a solution based on friendship between Greece and Turkey, and that to do this all talk of our retaining sovereignty over the island as a whole must be given up. I think that they deserve particular credit for eating so many words and even inviting Archbishop Makarios to the Conference. Therefore, despite our criticisms of the Government, and very well-deserved criticisms, in the past, I am sure that it is extremely satisfactory that at long last they have seen the light.

The Prime Minister: I am grateful for the generous expressions of the right hon. Gentleman. They were of the tone and temper that I expected from the narrow-

ness of his outlook. He never has been, and never will be, able to rise to the level of great events.
I will now try to answer the two questions which the right hon. Gentleman put to me. With regard to the Commonwealth, I think that the right hon. Gentleman would agree that it must be a matter for the elected Government of Cyprus, which it must take a little time to bring into being, to take the first step. I think that it must be left to the elected representatives or Government to express their views. I have expressed our hopes and desires.
On the question of the next step, I do not think that there ought to be any new negotiations when these documents are published. I must apologise to the Committee for the fact that they cannot be published tonight or tomorrow, but I thought it right to accede to the wishes of the other Governments and that they should have the opportunity of publishing them at the same time. I think that when the documents are published they will be found to be pretty full and will include a document which sets out how we are to set about the next stage, to bring into being what we have agreed upon. That will be a process of practical arrangement for working out the next practical steps. I have been particularly asked not to go into any details on that tonight, but to allow our colleagues, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, to explain them to their own Parliaments.
Perhaps I may be allowed to add, although in answer to a question, that the final agreement of the three Prime Ministers was signed by us all, and I am happy to say that the Prime Minister of Turkey was sufficiently recovered for Mr. Karamanlis and myself to go to the hospital in which he is, where the final signatures took place.

7.28 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: May I also say how glad I am, as I am sure are all hon. Members, that there is some prospect of ending the trouble in Cyprus?
I should like to ask two questions about the Prime Minister's announcement. First, is it clear that the representatives of both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots have accepted the agreement in toto, or are further negotiations to go on? There


have been in the Press some very odd announcements about what are believed to have been the Greek and Turkish demands. Is not the Prime Minister going to give the Committee any explanation as to why the Government have now abandoned their oft-repeated plea that they could not under any circumstances abandon the sovereignty of Cyprus? What is it in the Agreement which has made them feel so confident that they can now give up this, which was stated to be the foundation of our policy?

The Prime Minister: When the Agreements are published I think that the hon. Gentleman will find them to be fairly comprehensive. They have been accepted completely by Archbishop Makarios, the representative of the Greek-Cypriots, and by Dr. Kutchuk, the representative of the Turkish-Cypriots. It only remains now, therefore, not to negotiate, but to work out the practical steps for bringing this to a conclusion.
With regard to the hon. Gentleman's second question, no doubt this matter will be debated more fully, but we have always maintained—and that, to my mind, has been the whole problem—that we would never settle this question except by a Turkish, Greek, British, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot agreement. In the White Paper, which was, I think, published in May, we set out our plans for a short-term agreement. They have not been altogether without some value. We also added, at the end, that we would be prepared to consider the surrender of sovereignty with regard to a long-term agreement. What has now happily taken place is that we have been able to make the long-term agreement more rapidly than we expected.

Mr. Patrick Maitland: May I ask my right hon. Friend, first, with regard to the transfer of sovereignty which now replaces the sharing of sovereignty, outlined in the White Paper as the objective, whether we begin by applying the Statute of Westminster to the island of Cyprus, or whether we proceed in some other way to get the new Republic of Cyprus started?
Secondly, may I ask whether, in furtherance of the White Paper's objective of establishing partnership with Greece and Turkey, he will use this Agreement as an endeavour to bring Greece and Turkey

closer to the Commonwealth rather than as a farewell to Cyprus by the Commonwealth?
Thirdly, may I ask whether there is any provision, or there is intended to be any provision, for dual nationality and citizenship in the new arrangement, as suggested in point five of the plan outlined in the White Paper, which would both assist the economic viability of the island and provide some answer to the aspirations for Hellenic unity?

The Prime Minister: If I may take the first question, procedural methods will be found, when the papers are published, on how we propose to set about it, or rather the first stages. There will, no doubt, be quite difficult legal questions to be resolved by the experts before we can achieve the result which we have in mind.
As to the last question, on nationalities, it is one which, I think, has been in the minds of hon. Members quite naturally, because it is a very important one, affecting the lives and interests of a very great number of British citizens, or those who are now British citizens. That is why we made special provision in our declaration that that matter must be accommodated in a fair and honourable way. With regard to the future Commonwealth arrangements—first with Cyprus— as I tried to explain, we look with the greatest sympathy ourselves—we have other Commonwealth Governments to consider—on any such possible arrangement, but, having said that, we must probably let that spring from the time when a constitutional Government of Cyprus comes into being.
I regard this settlement as one which, in my hon. Friend's words, does bind the people of Greece and Turkey and Cyprus much closer together for the future. It is upon their separation and their quarrels that no one except our enemies has rejoiced, and it is upon their coming together that all their friends will be happy.

Mr. Kenneth Robinson (St. Pancras, North): May I join in the welcome and the sense of relief with which the Committee has greeted this Agreement? Is it not clear that concessions have been made all round, not least on the part of the Government in conniving at the burial of the Macmillan Plan? In that


lies the full credit which probably can be accorded to Her Majesty's Government for this Agreement. Does not the signature this afternoon also vindicate the good faith of Archbishop Makarios, who has been so often impugned on the benches opposite, including the Government Front Bench? Is it not a tragedy that Her Majesty's Government did not take up the offer of Archbishop Makarios, six months ago, of a solution based on independence—six months during which 50 more lives have been lost in Cyprus?

The Prime Minister: I do not wish to debate this at length, but I think that the hon. Member has made rather too simple what are very difficult problems. We have had all along this difficult problem of all the different interests concerned. Independence, as stated then, had perhaps one meaning. What we have tried to do, and we have succeeded, has been to get Greeks and Turks, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, and Her Majesty's Government all agreeing.
As the hon. Member said, that means, of course, concessions all round, but if we are to look to friendship and the making of this Agreement fruitful, we had better not try to measure the degree of our concessions and try to set one against the other. From this day on— and certainly, this was the spirit of the last Conference at Lancaster House—we have to get together and make a success of what we have all made considerable concessions to make possible.

Mr. Nigel Fisher: I hope that this is not too much a matter of detail, but may I ask whether there is any future right of re-entry to us in the event, which we hope will not happen, of civil disturbance in the island which might be prejudicial to our bases? Secondly, may I ask whether there is to be any form of tripartite control by ourselves, Greece and Turkey, over the foreign and defence policies of the island to prevent their going Communist in future, if such occasion arose?

The Prime Minister: I think that on both those matters the broad mutual guarantees which each of these four Governments—the three Governments and the fourth, when it comes into being —give to each other and build into their

treaties will cover most of the points which my hon. Friend has in mind.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: In view of the very handsome tribute which the Prime Minister paid to the Foreign Secretary, was it not a little ungracious to forget the remarkable role of the Colonial Secretary in these negotiations, particularly since, having stood, year in and year out, for British sovereignty on the island, for having Cyprus as a base and not a base on Cyprus, he has abandoned every single one of these declarations and agreed to what for him must have been a concession of everything that he has stood for?

The Prime Minister: If the hon. Member had listened—and I am sorry if I have a heavy cold and did not speak quite as strongly as I usually try to do—he would have heard me pay tribute to the work of the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary.
As to the second part of the hon. Member's remarks, I am not at all surprised that the hon. Gentleman should be sorry when everything goes well.

Mr. John Biggs-Davison: May I ask my right hon. Friend—and this is not a point of detail—whether, during these negotiations, full and just consideration has been given to the rights, interests and future of Cypriots living outside Cyprus and also of citizens from the United Kingdom who have made their home in Cyprus and have much to contribute to the life of the island?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. I think that was covered in the second point of our declaration. I will read it again. It will be found in detail when the documents are published. I have tried to summarise. The declaration stipulated that provision should be made for the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus—because there are other communities, as my hon. Friend knows—and for the resolving of questions of nationality of persons affected by the settlement. All that will arise in the rather detailed discussions which will have to take place.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: May I ask a direct question about Archbishop Makarios? Is the Prime Minister satisfied that Archbishop Makarios now fully and properly represents the Greek-Cypriot people, and, if so, how long, in his opinion, has that been the case?

The Prime Minister: We always said that when the proper time came we would deal with Archbishop Makarios as the representative of the Greek-Cypriot people. What I am satisfied about is that this Agreement, in which he, too, has made concessions, of course, has been fully accepted by him both in the letter and in the spirit. I am convinced of that by the discussion which took place today, and I hope that we shall none of us try to say that there are reservations either by this Government or by that Government, or by this leader or by that leader.

Mr. R. T. Paget: May we take it from the Prime Minister's observations that everybody has agreed with everything, and has agreed that it is to the benefit of everybody that Her Majesty's Government should get out of Cyprus? In the light of their dithering incompetence in the last three years, must we not agree that everybody is about right? May we further ask—and it is humiliating—whether Colonel Grivas is to be the next commander-in-chief there?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I always enjoy the hon. and learned Gentleman's interventions, but I never know whether they are epigrams or paradoxes.

Mrs. Barbara Castle: The whole Committee would agree that we welcome the reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish Governments, and note with delight their growing friendship, but would not the right hon. Gentleman, if he himself is to rise to the spirit of this occasion, agree that the foundations for this reconciliation were laid when Archbishop Makarios volunteered to give up Enosis with Greece in exchange for independence? And if there is now to be, as we all hope there will be, a growing friendship between this country and Cyprus that will lead it to choose to remain within the British Commonwealth, should the right hon. Gentleman not now lay the foundations of that friendship by paying credit where it is due?

The Prime Minister: As I have said, in any settlement, if it is to be a satisfactory one, sacrifices are made by all sides. The claim to Enosis has been abandoned. That is a big sacrifice. The claim to partition has been abandoned. That is a big sacrifice. We have aban-

doned our sovereignty except over those bases which are necessary for our military needs, with the rights and facilities which are necessary to make them effective. Therefore, if we call it sacrifice, it is a sacrifice all round. It is upon that basis that I think we can look hopefully to the future.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

7.41 p.m.

Mr. John Hynd: Perhaps I may now ask the Committee to return to the subject we were debating before this interlude, namely, Germany. It has at least this much similarity to the issue we have just been discussing: it presents a problem which, until now, has appeared from many points of view to be insoluble, possibly because of irreconcilable, or apparently irreconcilable, elements and arguments on both sides, but which it has now been found possible to resolve.
I should like to make this further point on comparison with the Cyprus situation, a point made clear by the Prime Minister's announcement, that this is a decision between the three Governments representing the Powers who are primarily interested in Cyprus from a strategic or other point of view, but which, as the Prime Minister said, is essentially dependent upon an agreement between them and the people of Cyprus. Unfortunately, in the general debate we have been having so far I heard mention of the people of Germany being interested parties on only one occasion, and that was on the occasion of the last speech from the opposite benches. It may be that the Germans were mentioned before, but there is no doubt that the general tenor of the debate has been to discuss only the interest of Great Britain, America and Russia in a German peace settlement and of a settlement of the tension in Europe.
Proposals have been put forward from one point of view or another for the neutralisation of Germany, for Germany withdrawing from or remaining in N.A.T.O., for Germany being part of a disengagement belt, and so on; never, however, with any direct reference to the question of the consent of the German people, except that my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell), in his remarkably fine opening


speech, referred to the willing consent of the German people, to a reunited Germany or to temporarily two Germanys, or to whatever arrangements might be reached.
I will therefore begin my few remarks on this point, because there might be, and I have a suspicion that there is in certain quarters, a tendency to say, "Well, in the context of this great issue, the German people do not matter or, if they matter, they do not matter a great deal. After all, we have had two great wars with Germany." But, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) reminded the Committee, even during the darkest days of the war there were hon. Members on both sides who thought differently. Great words were uttered by Sir Winston Churchill, who was Prime Minister at the time, when he reminded the country and the world that there were in the Germany we were fighting millions of people who stood aside from this conflict, and who in their hearts were with the Allies in the struggle against the Nazi elements which were in control of their country.
That has been the spirit which has animated many of us in trying to find a solution of the German problem,' both during and since the war. We are sometimes inclined to forget that one of the main issues in the question of the settlement of the German or the European problem is the issue of how far we shall be able to contribute by any settlement to the final destruction of those elements in Germany which the four great Powers united during the war to oppose, and to assist those elements in Germany to whom the Prime Minister of the Coalition Government of those days referred, and who were in the minds of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne and those of us who, during the war, spoke strongly in the House against the policy of unconditional surrender. I refer to the assistance and encouragement of those elements in Germany to maintain their position and build a solid democratic constitution in which the dangers which existed before could no longer survive.
We hear a lot about the revival of Nazism in Germany. I do not want to go into that question except to say that it is a pity that, when we hear of instances where there seem to be a manifestation of the old Nazi influences in Germany,

we see very little in our Press about the trials that are going on day by day, week by week and month by month in German courts all over West Germany of people who were responsible for war crimes as Nazis, members of the S.S. and the rest, and which are receiving tremendous attention in Germany.
We hear a lot about the revival of anti-Semitism and there is no doubt that there have been manifestations of it in Western Germany recently, as there have been in other countries. Yet again we must not forget the reactions of the mass of the German people to these manifestations. We must not forget that anyone proved guilty in Western Germany today of uttering those terrible statements about the Jews and about gas chambers, and so on, is likely to be hauled up before a court and to receive a very heavy sentence. That is not the case in this country, and it should be remembered that those sentences are being given by German judges in the German courts. Let us also not forget that recently, when there were some offensive markings on Jewish shops in Dusseldorf during the night, on the following day those very shops were packed with shoppers as they had not been before, and that a tribute was paid to the people of Dusseldorf by the spokesman of the Jewish community there for the fine demonstration.
We hear also every day in the House a revival of the enemy Krupp—this terrible menace of another Krupp plot; Krupp building his empire; Krupp not able to sell off his assets in coal and steel. Incidentally, it seems to be an insoluble problem, yet its solution is not difficult if we want to solve it. I have certain sympathy with the difficulties of selling off vast enterprises under forced conditions. Even Her Majesty's Government have had experience of the difficulties of trying to sell nationalised steel and nationalised road haulage under pressure. They found is difficult to get adequate prices.
The solution of the Krupp problem is simply to let Her Majesty's Government, the Treasury, or any block or group of British industrialists or financiers, make a genuine offer to Herr Krupp for his assets. Nobody would be more pleased than the German people themselves to get rid of this problem, and I have no doubt that Herr Krupp would be delighted to be able to sell off his assets


and put his money into electronics or atomic energy, which I personally do not think would be safer than coal and steel, though it seems to be the general desire that he should do something of the kind.
I only mention these various aspects of this constant suspicion that is going on about the development of democracy in Western Germany because I myself, thinking back to the year 1945 and 1946, when the most optimistic of us were trying to cast our minds ahead 10, 15 or 20 years, would never have dared to believe that there would be so little manifestation of this kind of development in a Germany which, for thirteen years had been shut off from the rest of the world. Germany had been subjected to intense propaganda by Nazis, who controlled the Press, publicity, wireless and everything else, and the youngsters brought up in the Nazi schools are now the younger middle-aged people who are the basic element in that country, who are not now yearning to go back to the Nazi days, but who, in fact, in Eastern Germany, an: revolting in the universities against any form of dictatorship, and are being suppressed by the regime there. In West Germany, any public demonstrations there are not about the old political ideas; they are not about Germany, but are primarily about the new European community.
My own view is that what has happened in Germany by the efforts of the democratic elements in the country, whom we enabled to take their places in the control of Government, has been much more encouraging in the intervening period than we might have been entitled to expect. Of course, there remain elements which are undesirable, and it remains desirable and indeed essential that these elements should be kept under control. This is the point which we must bear in mind when discussing the question of a settlement of the German problem.
If these elements are to be kept under control, and if democracy is to be allowed to broaden and flourish in Western Germany, surely the peole of Western Germany, upon whom we depend for the development of that democratic spirit and that co-operation, with the rest of the world, instead of hostility will be enabled to do it only in so far as we give them the necessary confidence in our good faith, in our solidarity with them, and in the encouragement which we are prepared to give them in lighting the very elements

which are their enemies as well as our enemies in Western Germany. But it will do us no good whatever trying, even by implication, constantly to lump the whole German people together with every little manifestation of something unhealthy that there may be in the country. It is just as sensible to suggest that everybody in this country and every Member of this House is responsible for and an enthusiastic supporter of, for instance, the Suez campaign, or many of the other things which have been done by one Government or another here. There are different elements in everything, and it is basic that we should keep that point in mind.
My right hon. Friend, in his opening speech which admirably summed up the general attitude of hon. Members on this side of the Committee, made that quite clear, and it was supplemented in what I considered to be a remarkably fine speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne, although I might have some reservations on the emphasis which he put on certain points. This is the keynote of the policy which we submit for the consideration of the Government, and which we suggest should be thoroughly examined by our partners in the Western alliance, including Western Germany. I would emphasise, however, as I think my right hon. Friend did clearly, that these five points in our Motion on the Order Paper, signed by some 95 or 100 Members on this side of the Committee and supported by every Member on this side, are, nevertheless, five points each of which is part of a combined proposition.
In other words, the Motion does not consist of five separate suggestions, any one of which can be thrown out in the hope that the other party might be prepared to consider one of the other. There are within these five points propositions which are, quite frankly, concessions towards the Russian point of view, concessions which we hope will enable them to accept the other propositions and help to get an agreement which will be generally beneficial to everybody. It must not be thought or suggested that the proposition behind these five points in the policy we submit in any way implies that Members on this side of the Committee are at any time prepared to sell out our own Allies. What I mean by that, is that for example, to say that we are prepared to


exclude Germany from N.A.T.O. as point one, and, if the Russians will accept that, we are prepared, without German agreement, to drop point two, because to do any such thing would be a betrayal of our Allies.
We persuaded Germany to join the N.A.T.O. alliance, and, whatever we may say about her, she has been a loyal member of that alliance. Therefore, what we are suggesting in these five points is not that Germany should be excluded from the N.A.T.O. alliance—my right hon. Friend made that point clear—but that we should be prepared to discuss, first of all, with her and our other Allies, the question whether, within the context of the plan we put forward, which includes reunification, free election, disengagement and all the rest, Germany herself would consider it desirable for her to withdraw from N.A.T.O voluntarily in order to secure the other benefits, and thus play her part in trying to bring all-round agreement.

Mr. Zilliacus: Is it not a fact that, juridically, Western Germany's membership of N.A.T.O. automatically lapses the moment that a new international entity, namely, united Germany, is formed? Therefore, it is not a question of asking Germany whether she wishes to leave N.A.T.O., but whether we are prepared to admit a united Germany to N.A.T.O. Further, is it not a fact that the whole of the Labour Party's policy is based on disengagement, which means that a united Germany shall not be admitted to N.A.T.O.?

Mr. Hynd: I thank my hon. Friend for that speech. Of course, his first presumption is correct, and it is just what I myself said several years ago. If we get a united Germany, there would no longer be a West German Government, and there would no longer be any East German Government. Therefore, the commitments entered into by the separate entities which would no longer exist would have to be re-examined by the new national entity.
It is quite clear that what we are talking about are the conditions upon which we and that part of Germany for which we are responsible now, which is a member of the Western alliance, should be prepared to face such a situation, and, after the end of N.A.T.O. and the

Warsaw Pact, and after the creation of a unified Germany, should consider what it was that we would expect a unified Germany to become. In other words, was it to be a neutral country, a country in a neutral belt or an area of disengagement, or a country which was to be reunited with a central Government or a confederacy or federal states? These are all matters that come after, but, if we are to consider the kind of peace treaty which we are prepared to accept with other parties, we must also have in mind what kind of a situation we should be creating thereafter. That is why consulting with our West German Allies, on this point as well as others, is vital.
I feel that if it were to be accepted abroad that the interpretation of any proposals of the kind we were making for a Four-Power Conference implied that we were prepared, irrespective of what our West German partners thought, to offer them as a kind of counter in the negotiations, without consulting them or without their agreement, we could be risking further diplomatic reverses. We should certainly be contributing to that disillusionment of those elements in Western Germany, and in the whole of Germany, which it should be our basic consideration to try to encourage and inspire with more confidence in our good faith.

Mr. S. Silverman: My hon. Friend may be interested to know—I do not think that I am betraying a confidence—that some of us who had conversations with Herr Ulbricht in East Berlin during this week-end heard him make it perfectly clear that if he had a situation in which West Germany was outside the N.A.T.O. alliance and East Germany outside the Warsaw alliance and there was controlled disarmament on both sides, things consistent with the Motion which my hon. Friend and I signed, from his point of view there would be no objection whatever to free elections in both parts of the country.

Mr. Hynd: I was not aware of that, but I am very glad to hear it. Of course, if that were the case, if West Germany were impressed with the advantages to be obtained from such a situation—I am certain that she would be—there would seem to be a very little difficulty about that or about free elections.
All I am trying to show is that whatever we do we must remember that we have to carry with us the confidence of the German people who have placed their confidence in us. Persuade them, yes, try to persuade them of the advantages, yes, but compel them, no. Otherwise, we should be in an impossible position at any peace conference. If we said to West Germany that whatever her views we proposed that she should be compelled to leave N.A.T.O. and not allowed to join any defensive alliance—

Mr. Zilliacus: That is our party's policy.

Mr. Hynd: No, it is not. It is not our policy to compel. It is our policy to persuade. If we took the attitude I have described and West Germany did not accept it, what would happen at a peace conference? Would we be prepared to arrange conditions with the Russians, Americans and others, and then present West Germany with an ultimatum? If so, what would happen if West Germany refused to accept that ultimatum? Should we, who have been her Allies and persuaded her into N.A.T.O., then start taking measures against her to force her to do what we wanted? Or are we to go to the Russians and the others and say that because West Germany refused to accept our demands, we must refuse to ratify the very peace treaty which we had just signed?
It is obvious that such a course is impossible. As in Cyprus and in other cases of negotiation about the settlement of any situation, it is not only the big fellows in control of the territory who have to be consulted, but the people who will be the subject of any agreement which might be reached. In fact, however, I do not think that there is a great deal of difficulty about that.
On this issue, my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne tended to oversimplify the matter when he was asking what was the objection to demanding that Germany should be excluded from defensive alliances. He asked whether it was not worth doing that to avoid a third word war with hydrogen bombs and so on.
If it were as simple as that, many of us would no doubt be prepared to go to great lengths to bring it about, but there

is no assurance, whatever agreement we get on this or any other issue in the world, with the Russians, Americans, or anyone else, that that will be the end of all international trouble. We know from our experience, that that would not be the case.
Another argument which has been used about the question of defensive alliances and free elections is that Russia will never agree. We can never be sure that Russia will never agree to anything. I have vivid recollections of the arguments used against me in 1945 when we discussed the level of German peacetime industry. My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne and other hon. Members will remember that this country insisted on a minimum level for peacetime purposes of 11·1 million tons of steel a year for the whole of Germany. Russia demanded a level of between 4½ million and 5 million tons, America a level of 5 million to 7 million tons, and France an even lower level.
We were told that it was no good insisting on the level we wanted and that the Russians would never agree to it. However, we stuck to the point. We said that any lower level would be madness. The negotiations broke down and the Russians withdrew, but within a week they were back not only agreeing with the 11·1 million tons, but demanding 12 million tons for Germany, and proclaiming throughout that country that they were the friends of the German people and that it was the Western Allies who were trying to depress standards. It was a complete change of front and it was very useful for Russia's propaganda purposes.
There is also the case of Austria. We had the Palais Rose discussions on Austria which went on and on for many years. We made concession after concession, but no agreement was reached. Experts in practically every country, certainly in this country, were unanimously agreed that there was no point in continuing the negotiations because the Russians would obviously never leave Austria until there was an agreement on Germany, since Austria was Russia's line of communication with Germany.
America accepted that view and it was thought that getting the Russians out of Austria and getting a separate Austrian peace-treaty was out of the question


However, it was held that we might as well continue the negotiations, and suddenly the Russians changed their minds, and out they went.
There is always a possibility that Russia will agree to a proposal of this sort, provided that she is satisfied with the other points. We ought not to give up our own principles, certainly on this matter of free elections. In any international negotiations, this country of all countries should never discard free elections, because even if we think that there are other ways of approaching free elections, in the end we must stand firmly on the principle that at some stage the people of Germany, Cyprus, or whatever country it may be, must have the right to decide their own form of government and the composition of that government. That is a vitally important issue. Whatever we do in this context, there must be no question of unconditional surrender on our part. We must go forward with good will trying to get common agreement over the whole field.
It may well be that the Russian Notes and the opportunity given for the Prime Minister to visit Moscow and discuss matters informally with the Russian leaders are signs that the Russians want some relaxation of tension for their own purposes. As I have often said, Russia, too, has an economy to consider in these matters. Russia, too, has to divert many consumer goods from the standard of living of her people into vast armies, vast armaments, vast scientific experiments, and so on.
Russia, too, is subject to pressures, even though they do not express themselves in the way that ours do, at the ballot box. They express themselves in minor explosions here and there, in little revolts at this or that university, or this or that factory, or simply in the murmurs of intellectuals, writers, teachers, or whatever it may be. It may well be that Russia is having to give a little under these pressures.
There is one point in the proposals put forward by my right hon. Friend about which I have some hesitation. Having in mind that no proposals can be 100 per cent. watertight, there is one point about which I am not very happy, although I should be prepared to

have it examined within the context of the other proposals. That is the complete withdrawal of the main forces from Germany. I agree with disengagement and favour the revised Rapacki Plan, specifically because it does not provide for that.
My right hon. Friend was not quite exact when he said that this was not the only frontier in the world where there are difficulties and where the Americans and Russians are not there to keep the peace. It is the only frontier where there is a country divided directly be-between a Communist régime and a non-Communist régime and where there is tremendous pressure for reunification backed by the great Powers. It is the only country of that kind, but there is another frontier, somewhat similar, the Arab-Israel frontier. There are no Americans or Russians on that frontier.
The conditions on that frontier over the last ten or twelve years have been very different from those on the frontiers of Germany. I am bringing this point in only to show that none of the solutions is necessarily completely watertight, and that they must all be examined very carefully. That is why I would rather have the Rapacki Plan than the proposition for complete disengagement. I fear that if there were a withdrawal of even the token occupation forces and the tremendous tensions in Berlin were left, it might create a very dangerous situation for the Russians as well as for ourselves, and it might even be more dangerous for the Russians, because it is in those conditions that another 17th June might occur, and be more dangerous than it was on the last occasion.
Whatever we agree to in this context must be carefully examined beforehand and balanced with every other consideration. We must be prepared to listen to any counter propositions that are put forward, in the hope that the pressures which I have mentioned may persuade the Russians to be more reasonable and ready to compromise.
The Prime Minister is now going to Moscow—even if he is going only for informal discussions and not formal negotiations—and I hope that the Government will realise that this visit is regarded throughout the world as an opportunity from which can emerge a new atmosphere, with new possibilities of agreement. If


the Prime Minister comes back with nothing to offer, because of his inability to put forward or accept any constructive suggestions, there will be tremendous disillusionment, not only in the House of Commons and this country but throughout the world, and the subsequent conditions will be worse than the existing ones. We can only hope that the Prime Minister has a successful journey, and that out of it will come something constructive and helpful to the future peace of the world.

8.12 p.m.

Sir Alexander Spearman: So much has happened in the last hour, and we have had such magnificent news, that the speech of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) seems to have taken place a long time ago. I want to return to it, because it is only his speech that has caused me to rise. I had no intention of taking up the time of the Committee until the hon. Member spoke. He made a dramatic, forceful and a clear speech. He has the talents which enable him to produce a speech with those qualities whenever he chooses, but his speech tonight did not, in my opinion, contribute to the cause of peace, which I know he has most sincerely at heart.
I know that the hon. Member never has any hesitation in correcting hon. Members, and he will do so on this occasion if I have misunderstood his argument, but I thought the gist of his speech was, first, that no peace meant no survival.

Mr. S. Silverman: I said that war meant no survival.

Sir A. Spearman: Yes—no peace, no survival. He put the question whether what might happen in Berlin and Western Germany was worth war.

Mr. Silverman: The hon. Member is over-simplifying what was already an over-simplified speech. In a short speech one cannot go into all the ramifications and possibilities. I was not putting the argument that he suggests. I was asking whether, in view of the calamitous and irremediable nature of the consequences of failure, it was not worth while to consider constructive proposals on their merits without being too inhibited by what had previously been said or done.

Sir A. Spearman: I accept that correction, but I would remind the hon. Mem-

ber that he asked whether Berlin was worth a war.

Mr. Silverman: No, I did not. The hon. Member for Hertfordshire, Southwest (Mr. Longden), said that in his opinion Berlin might be worth a war, in circumstances which he described, whereupon I said, "Suppose that that was not the question, but that the question was merely whether we should agree to consult East German officials instead of Russian officials when we went to West Berlin. Would it be worth a war?" The hon. Member said "No", and I agree with him.

Sir A. Spearman: I will make another attempt to interpret what I thought the hon. Member said. I am trying to do it in a few sentences, and am not pretending to give a complete resume of his speech.

Mr. Silverman: The hon. Member can read it tomorrow morning.

Sir A. Spearman: The hon. Member would probably agree that he was saying that certain actions on our part were worth while because they might save a war. I claim that the alternatives are different from those he suggested. I believe that if we were to give way on the assurances that we have given—and by "we"I mean the Allies and the West in general—it would be the surest way of bringing about a war.
The course suggested by the hon. Member would jeopardise the very existence of N.A.T.O., and if N.A.T.O. disappeared it would be an immeasurable disaster for us. It would either put us at the mercy of the Communists, or entail our starting a suicidal war to defend ourselves. It might well mean both, because if we gave way to Communism while the United States did not, and she still retained her nuclear weapons, we might well become a Communist base for missiles directed against America. If we once submitted to Communism here we might also have war.
The disappearance of N.A.T.O. would be an immeasurable triumph for the Communists, because it would give them every prospect of the world domination that they have repeatedly said they intend to get.

Mr. Silverman: They have never said that.

Mr. Zilliacus: Can the hon. Member produce a single example?

Sir A. Spearman: I will remind the hon. Member of the White Paper published about a year ago—

Mr. Zilliacus: By the Soviet Government?

Sir A. Spearman: —which interpreted the effect of Russian statements at the conference in Moscow as being, "We are intent on world domination by subversion if possible, by violence if necessary."

Mr. Silverman: Who said that, and when?

Sir A. Spearman: It was said in Moscow, the November before last.

Mr. Silverman: Can the hon. Member prove it?

Sir A. Spearman: I did not come prepared for that, because I made that remark in reply to the hon. Member.

Mr. Silverman: The hon. Member really must not—

The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Gordon Touche): I hope that the hon. Member will not intervene too often, because other hon. Members want to speak.

Mr. Silverman: That is quite right, Sir Gordon, but a direct reference was made to me. I shall not interrupt again, but the hon. Member must not try to ride away like that. There are two questions here. The first concerns what the Russians might or might not believe, and the second is what the hon. Member infers from their acts and what they say. He said that they have repeatedly said that they are intent on world domination, and I challenge him to produce one quotation showing that they have ever said any such thing.

Sir A. Spearman: I quoted the White Paper. I have not the detailed reference in my mind, but I will give it to the hon. Member afterwards. If he really believes in his heart of hearts that the Communists are not out for world domination, I think that he would believe anything.
I hope that the hon. Member will not think it too unflattering if I tell him that sometimes when I hear him speak on the lines on which he was speaking today I am reminded of the childish fable

of the fox and the duck. The fox went to Mrs. Duck and said to her, "I know you want to go off shopping and do not like leaving your little ducklings. I will look after them while you go off." Gaily and happily she went off, but, when she came back, there were no little ducklings.
I have not very much faith that if we left ourselves denuded of our defences in the hope that the Communists would treat us very kindly, we should not be deceived. Mr. Khrushchev was reported yesterday as making a rather unhelpful and unfriendly speech. We need not bother too much about that. I do not see that we need be very delighted when he is in a beguiling mood or very disturbed when he is in a threatening mood, because, whereas we use words to convey our intentions, they use words to conceal their intentions, and so often their words seem to have no bearing on their future actions.
After all, it was not so very long ago that Turkey was threatened with appalling disaster if she dared to join N.A.T.O., but no sooner had she done so than she was treated far more reasonably than ever before. I believe that the prevention of war— and I claim to be as opposed to war as any hon. Member— in the immediate future depends on the strength of our defences. I thought that there was a lot in what was said by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), that in the long run he was optimistic. He said that he was optimistic because getting rich was a mellowing influence. I think that it was Dr. Johnson who said:
Man is seldom so harmlessly employed as in making money.
I rejoice in the Russians making money. I do not at all want to see the Russians getting poorer. I want to see them getting richer and richer, because I am sure that will have a mellowing influence.
As to the Prime Minister's visit to Russia, about which so much has been said, I believe that he will make a big contribution to peace if he makes it really clear to his hosts that there is no possibility of us in the West agreeing to any concession that could undermine our defences and if he makes it so clear that there is no possibility of them starting a war through any miscalculation of what we would do.
That is one side of it, but the other side—more congenial to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne—is what he might do in making closer contacts with the Russian people, in encouraging them to come here and enabling us to go there, because, while I in no way depart from what I said, that peace in the immediate future depends upon the deterrent, there can be no lasting security for us in that. The lasting security must be in closer contacts and better relations and it may be that the Prime Minister will start them to no small extent.

8.25 p.m.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: The hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Sir A. Spearman) repeated what I may perhaps call the stock Conservative view of the nature of the Communist challenge. Conservatives interpret it as a military threat. They seem to imagine that the Soviet Government are spending their time thinking up ways of invading other countries to impose Communism on them by force of arms, whereas their position is quite different.

Sir A. Spearman: They have done it fairly often, have they not?

Mr. Zilliacus: When?

Sir A. Spearman: In the last instance in Hungary, and in East Germany and other satellite countries. Those countries are not Communist by their own choice, but because the Russians have put the Red Army there.

Mr. S. Silverman: How does the hon. Member know that?

Mr. Zilliacus: That, again, is a typically Conservative view. In Hungary, the Russians were already there as part of the peace settlement. They were called in by the Government. I condemned that on 19th December, 1956, in the House, but after all, the hon. Member's own Prime Minister produced exactly the same doctrine as a reason for going into Jordan at the request of that Government.

Sir A. Spearman: We have come out of Jordan, but they have not come out of Hungary.

Mr. Zilliacus: They have offered to come out, and offered it as part of a general settlement by disengagement. If the policy advocated by the Opposition

were applied, the Russians would come out of Hungary, whereas we shall never get them out with hydrogen bombs; and I do not think that the Hungarians would thank us for trying.
Although the Soviet Government, like any great Power, will resort to power politics to defend their own national security interests, they are not pursuing an ideological foreign policy in the sense of believing that the armed might of the Soviet Union is the instrument to use for spreading Communism. What they say —I think they are wrong, but they say it—is that the social and economic success of their system in raising the standards of living of their people will attract the workers of the world and in each country the workers will turn to Communism.
The reason I believe that that is not so is, first, that it gravely underrates the actual social achievements of our capitalist democracies, in which we are still on a higher standard of living, and, secondly, it gravely undervalues the efficiency of democracy as a system of Government through which we can make any changes we want in our social system. Thirdly, it does not understand the value of democracy as an end in itself, as a way of life in the eyes of those people who have enjoyed it. Nevertheless, that is their position. It is what they believe.
The whole trouble is that on our side we keep on challenging them to a competition in a field where they can beat us, namely, in the field of material achievements, particularly military might. We decline the competition they are offering us in the field where we are stronger, namely, the ideological field. The result of a policy of disengagement would be to strengthen the demand for more political freedom and democracy among the Communist countries: it certainly would not increase the popularity of Communism on this side. But that policy and disarmament would create an economic need for more public ownership and planning in our economic system. That is the nigger in the woodpile. That is where the rub comes in from the Conservative point of view.
I hope, as everyone in the Committee hopes, that the Prime Minister's mission will render a service to peace. If it does, he will get a good deal of credit out of it, and he will very much deserve that


credit. But as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said, in his powerful and cogently argued speech, there is no hope whatever of arriving at even a basis of negotiation with the Soviet Union unless we are prepared to abandon the condition that united Germany must be free to enter N.A.T.O. There must be some form of disengagement, as a compromise between the extreme positions on the two sides.
I am not quarrelling with our refusal to accept the Soviet Government's word for it that, if we withdraw our troops from West Berlin, the free city's status will be respected. But then, it is not reasonable to expect the Russians to accept our unsupported assurance that, if they withdraw their forces from Eastern Germany and raise no objection to reunited Germany joining N.A.T.O., Eastern Germany will remain demilitarised, at least so far as Anglo-American-French forces are concerned. We say nothing about West German forces.
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot treat the Russians as cads whose word cannot be accepted and expect them to treat us as gentlemen who must be trusted on our bare say-so. It does not make sense. The only middle ground is some form of disengagement.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made the point very strongly that there is already considerable support in the United States for this kind of policy. He mentioned particularly Senator Mansfield, the Deputy Leader of the Democratic Party, and Senator Fulbright, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. In his last speech, Mr. Khrushchev also referred to Senator Mansfield's views and said, "With people like that we can talk sense and come to terms. These are people with whom we can reach agreement." That is indirect, but fairly conclusive, evidence that a policy of disengagement such as that proposed by the Opposition would provide a basis of negotiation on which we could come to terms with the Soviet Union. That is a not unimportant consideration.
The point is made that it is unfair to the Germans. I cannot for the life of me see why. We are, in effect, saying to Germany, "You were beaten in the last war, which you started. As a result, you

are divided. You have foreign forces on your soil on both sides. We are offering you unification on certain conditions. You can either reject the conditions and remain disunited or accept the conditions and become unified". The conditions are that united Germany should take part in an all-European treaty and in the United Nations, but should not be a member of either of the rival alliances.
I agree fully that that is only a temporary position. I support the five points of the Motion on the Order Paper, tabled by a number of my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself. I am one of the sponsors of it. The Motion only repeats an extract from the National Executive's Foreign Policy Report, adopted unanimously by the Annual Conference at Scarborough. It is a Motion which is the official policy on which the whole Labour Party is agreed. There may be a handful of dissentients to right or left, but the overwhelming majority of the party is solidly united on this policy.
That policy is only meant as a basis of negotiation, as a first step which will lead to further consequences. The Minister of State said that he accepted that German unification must take place within a framework to be agreed and guaranteed by the four Powers—Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no framework on which it is possible to reach agreement except a form of disengagement on the lines that we have proposed.
That position is, from Germany's point of view, unequal. Therefore, I believe, as part of the negotiation of a settlement of that kind, it would have to be made clear that Germany would recover equality within the organised European community; not through the process of being free to join military alliances, but through the process of the military alliances being progressively wound up and replaced by the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations.
This policy of disengagement is much more than a policy of just withdrawing forces geographically. That is the first step and an important one, and must be done, as has been stated frequently by the Minister of State and by my right hon. Friend, on lines that do not diminish the balance of security on either side. This "balance of security", so-called, is the balance of power and is really a


balance of insecurity. The longer that we go on with the balance of power and the arms race the unsafer we shall be. Our real task is how to lighten and diminish the weight of fear on both sides of the scales in this balance. Therefore, the policy of disengagement is not merely a policy of military withdrawal. It is also a policy of political co-operation. One of our five points speaks of a collective guarantee by the four Powers, which they can only exercise in their capacity of permanent members of the Security Council.
Furthermore, I believe that a policy of military disengagement must be followed by a policy of economic engagement. ft would be very useful if the Prime Minister, when in Moscow, would investigate the possibility of expanding trade relationships, using the machinery of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe. In April, 1956, the Soviet Government put forward far-reaching proposals at the Commission and they were adopted for purposes of study. They called for cooperation in matters of trade, investment, credit, banking, transport, cultural exchanges, exchanges of technical information, and so forth. We have the machinery there, and there is acute need of expanding our trade with these countries, which are already responsible for one-third of the world's industrial production and will be responsible for half of it within the next few years. They are tremendous potential sources of raw materials and they can plan their economies to meet our needs if we will plan ours to meet their needs, and so on. We can do a great deal more than has been done hitherto and we can use this machinery for the purpose.
It is vitally necessary that when the Prime Minister goes to Moscow he should be prepared to consider making a new start. We have heard this evening that he has made a tremendous success of switching over to a policy of disengagement in Cyprus, as it were, and I believe that he would score an even greater success if he could switch over to a policy of disengagement in Germany and Central Europe.
But there is a previous question, and that is the question of access to Berlin. On this issue, the Minister of State was categoric where he should have been vague and vague where he should have been categoric in his speech this after-

noon. He was categoric about rejecting any form of disengagement which, to say the least, was very unwise because he was locking the door on any possibility of agreement.
The right hon. Gentleman was vague on whether or not the Government were seriously contemplating the use of force to break through to Berlin, if and when the functions of Soviet officials on the lines of communication and at the frontiers were handed over to East German officials, instead of using the original Dulles formula, which was recommended by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, namely, that we should work with these officials as Soviet agents —which does not imply even de facto recognition. It is important to get that position cleared up. Frankly, it does not pay to try to run a bluff on the Russians in such a matter. They are not people who give way under that kind of treatment. They merely get tough about it.
It is deplorable that the Russians are taking unilateral action over Berlin. But we have been standing pat for years on an intolerable status quo and in the end the Russians got into the mood of a mule driver with a balky mule who finally, in desperation, lights a bonfire under the animal to make it move. I only hope that in this case the "mule" will not sit down on the fire instead of moving towards serious negotiations. If the people of this country could bring themselves to believe that we are seriously contemplating the use of force to uphold our view of our rights of access, instead of adopting some kind of modus vivendi, like that of de facto, or less than de facto, recognition of East German officials; and that we are not prepared to take these things to the United Nations Security Council and obey the obligations of the Charter concerning refraining from the use of force to settle our disputes, there will be an explosion.
If the Government are really trying to do that, the result will be either that they will receive a resounding diplomatic rebuff, or they will jeopardise the survival of the human race. That would be a tragic outcome of the journey to Moscow, when instead it might accomplish so much good for a world which, heaven knows, is looking for a lead in the direction of peace from somewhere.
I therefore beg the Committee to give the Prime Minister a mandate to go to


Moscow with an open mind and a readiness to change his basic positions, if necessary, in order to reach agreement. I ask hon. Members particularly to bear in mind that not only a united Opposition, but a large section of opinion outside the ranks of Labour, represented by the Manchester Guardian and the Observer, is in favour of a policy of disengagement; that the evidence is that that policy would be acceptable to powerful sections of American opinion and that it would be accepted by the Soviet Government as a basis for negotiation. What is wanted now is a British lead.

8.42 p.m.

Mr. Ronald Russell: The hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) is asking for a British lead. Recently, on the question of the use of force, he asked my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to give an assurance that on no account would force be used—

Mr. Zilliacus: Hear, hear.

Mr. Russell: The hon. Member is asking a great deal, and doing a great disservice to the country by expecting the Prime Minister to answer such a question in the affirmative. I am not suggesting that anyone should say that force should be used, but it is wrong to think that anyone should expect the Prime Minister to say that it would not be used—

Mr. Zilliacus: All I want is that the Government should give a categorical undertaking that they will not resort to force in violation of the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations. The Government did that in the case of Suez, with disastrous results, and I do not want to see that tried again over Berlin—

Mr. Russell: That is another story. That was not the question which the hon. Gentleman had on the Order Paper.

Mr. Zilliacus: —'instead of working with the East German officials.

Mr. Russell: I sincerely hope that we shall not have to use force at all, but it is wrong for the Prime Minister to be asked to say that in no circumstances should it be used.

Mr. Paget: Suppose we sent a convoy to gain access to Berlin by the proper

route, as we have a right to do, and someone stopped the convoy, who would be using force, and who would be violating the Charter?

Mr. Russell: Whoever stopped the convoy—and I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for his interruption.
So far as I understand, the defence of Western Europe depends on two factors: one is the deterrent and the other is what the Supreme Commander called a "shield force". I think that that is apt to be overlooked by hon. Members opposite who insist on a policy of disengagement in any circumstances. Just before Christmas, in common with other hon. Members, I attended a meeting of the Assembly of the Western European Union, in Paris. On that occasion, as on previous occasions, we had an address from the Supreme Commander, General Norstad.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Who elected the representatives?

Mr. Russell: They were appointed, but I am not dealing with the question of who elected the representatives. I am merely stating that I, in company with other hon. Members, went there, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not pursue that matter, as it is hardly relevant.
The point that I am making is that we heard an address from General Norstad, and in discussing the value of a shield force be said:
Failure to have such a force deployed in the forward line would, we believe, invite a series of incidents and would leave us with no warning and no response which was adequate to the event.
In other words, the Supreme Commander expressed himself very clearly against leaving a vacuum in which there would be no major troops on our side right up to the front line. That is a point of view that ought to be borne in mind.
General Norstad went even further when, at question time, after the end of his address, he was asked by Herr Altmaier—one of the delegates of the German Social Democratic Party, not a Right-wing German, not a Christian Democratic—if he would be able to perform his military task if a demilitarised zone should come into being in Central Europe on the lines of the Rapacki Plan. General Norstad said:


If you are now speaking in the context, as I now must speak, of the general military and political context existing at this time, the answer is categorically "No". Perhaps I would do best to leave it there.
General Norstad seemed to express himself again very clearly against any form of disengagement or of having a demilitarised zone.

Mr. Paget: Surely the Rapacki Plan was not for a demilitarised zone. It was for a withdrawal of atomic weapons. For us to withdraw our atomic weapons when we are geared to them is one thing, but if the proposal is that we should withdraw about nine divisions a matter of at most 100 miles while the Russians withdraw about 30 divisions for 300 miles, I should have thought that the military advantage was rather obviously to us.

Mr. Russell: I agree. The answer given by General Norstad was the answer to the question: if a demilitarised zone—the Rapacki Plan or whatever else it might be—came into being. I think that that is a clear answer against a demilitarised zone. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] That is how the question was worded—if a demilitarised zone came into being. I think that the views of the Supreme Commander, who, after all, has to carry out the defence of Western Europe, should be taken into consideration in a matter like this.

Mr. Paget: Surely it must depend on what he is applying his mind to. If he is applying it to disengagement with the Russians going back to Russia when we are only going to France and the Low Countries, the military advantage is obviously with us. General Norstad was not applying his mind to that at all.

Mr. Russell: I think that he was. Surely the hon. and learned Gentleman will accept this next point. I do not profess to be anything of an expert on defence, but surely room for manoeuvre of forces of the West confined to the Low Countries and France is far less than room for manoeuvre by the Russians, even if they are driven back into Russia?
The great danger is—and even the Leader of the Opposition, in his speech, seemed to appreciate some views expressed on this—that there would not be room for these troops there. We may

have to bring ours back to this country and the Americans may take theirs back to the United States. That would be a disaster, as I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman would agree. That is what we have to reckon with in considering disengagement. That, surely, is one of the conditions in which we must not give way on the question of disengagement.

Mr. Paget: We are dealing, however, with the withdrawal of a force, of the Americans and ourselves, of about nine divisions. That is the size of force that we had in the Anzio beachhead. It is ludricrous to say that we cannot put those forces into France and the Low Countries.

Mr. Russell: I do not profess to be an expert, but, surely, the warning system and the infrastructure must be considered, also. At the moment, presumably, the infrastructure leads right up to the East-West line, as does the warning system. If, however, we leave a vacuum or an area of disengagement, if it covers the whole of Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia also, our warning system then moves back to the frontier of Western Germany and the amount of warning we get is correspondingly less.

Mr. Paget: The Germans can operate that.

Mr. Russell: Surely the object of the disengagement plan, at least according to a number of hon. Members opposite, is that in the event of disengagement. Western Germany, if not necessarily compelled to be outside N.A.T.O., should not be a member of N.A.T.O. In other words, she should be completely neutral. In that case, would we be entitled to have a warning system from Germany, or would the Germans, if they had their own warning system, be entitled to connect with ours and pass on the information? That is a tricky and dangerous situation. I would prefer to have the warning system, as now, right up to the Iron Curtain frontier rather than have it brought back to the frontier of the Low Countries and of France, leaving a colossal vacuum in between.
There is the other danger that if we had to withdraw our troops completely, if we brought them back to this country and the Americans also went back, the disadvantage would be completely with


ourselves. That is something which, I hope, we shall not envisage in any circumstances.
A great deal has been talked about tension in Western Europe. I agree that since the ultimatum, if such we can call it, concerning West Berlin was given in November, there has been an increase of tension. I suggest, however, that before that threat was made by the Russians, there was not as much tension on that frontier as one might imagine from reading about it.
Like probably many other hon. Members, I have crossed that frontier several times in the last few years, not only by air, but by road and rail. In crossing it last April, on Good Friday, in company with my hon. Friend the Member for Armagh (Mr. Armstrong), after we had attended a meeting of the Cultural Committee of the Council of Europe in Berlin, I was much surprised. It was just like crossing any ordinary frontier, except that the East German Customs and passport officials came into the motor coach in which we were travelling took away every passport and made sure that nobody was travelling without a passport or that no passport was without an owner. The passports were taken away and stamped. On crossing an ordinary frontier, however, the passengers would no doubt get out of the bus, but nobody would search the vehicle to ensure that there were no unauthorised passengers.
But apart from that there was complete courtesy and no sense of tension of any kind. The same thing occurred on a previous journey which I made in 1956. But I have a feeling that there is not quite the tension, or was not until the Berlin issue, between the two sides of the Iron Curtain which we are sometimes led to believe. Rather than give way and yield in any negotiations with the Russians, something that would weaken our security completely, a continuation of the system as it is at the moment, leaving out the Berlin issue, is surelv better than yielding to something to which we ought not to yield.
I would, therefore, prefer to see a continuation of the cold war of the last ten years since the Berlin crisis of 1948–49 rather than give way, weaken the whole of our defensive system and put ourselves at a complete disadvantage in relation to the Russians.

8.56 p.m.

Mr. Christopher Boyd: It seems to me that it is exceedingly difficult to achieve exactly the right balance of firmness with conciliatory behaviour to keep the peace in the sort of tense situation which has been developing. For a start, none of us knows quite how dangerous, if dangerous at all, is the situation developing round Berlin. It is, therefore, perhaps easier for hon. Members who are not in responsible positions to speculate more freely about possible events, and it is perhaps useful for us to discuss what might happen and what we ought to do.
The first thing that is in prospect is simply that the Russians will withdraw their troops from the eastern sector of Berlin just a short distance, which is a very small event, and that they will also withdraw their sentries from the routes between Berlin and Western Germany and hand over those jobs to officials of the Pankow-German Republic. If that is all that happens, then we are, of course, making a great crisis out of very little.
If it is true that the East German officials, or the authorities ordering them, who take over these jobs have no intention of interrupting communications between West Berlin and Western Germany, even in the event of the British, American and French troops remaining in West Berlin, then, of course, the crisis is not a crisis at all. We must hope that that is how it will turn out. There is fairly wide agreement that it would be wrong simply because we are told by Russia that our troops ought to leave West Berlin that they should therefore go. We should consider specially what are likely to be the wishes of the population of West Berlin in deciding that question, and it seems fairly clear that they have expressed the opinion, through their freely elected representatives, that they desire the Western forces to remain in West Berlin and that they do not think their freedom would be as safe even as it is at present if the Western forces left. As a first step, we have a clear obligation to take the opinion of the population of West Berlin into account.
The next step is to try to sustain communications with the minimum trouble. This obviously involves dealing with the officials of the East German Government,


and if we save face by calling them agents of Russia I cannot see what harm there is in that. I should have thought that it is a small gain if the Russian officials have left some of these jobs, even though Communist Germans or officials of the Communist German Government may have taken over. It is, perhaps, diminishing the Russians' influence a little bit, which might be considered to be a small beginning to the disengagement which we on these benches have been advocating. I know that it is difficult for the West German Government, but even in Germany the idea of enlarging contact between West and East has been growing in the political parties. It began among the Free Democrats. It is growing among the Social Democrats, and even some Christian Democrats are growing more flexible in this respect.
I should not have thought that we would be letting the Russians have anything very terrific if we negotiated with the officials of the Pankow Republic, but I think that we would be giving away too much if we took our Western forces out of Berlin under Russian threats. Then, of course, there is the possibility, which we can discuss, that there might be later, at some stage, a serious effort to renew the old blockade of Berlin and stop the movement of traffic, as Mr. Khrushchev seemed to be implying in his speech yesterday. He appeared to be implying that traffic between West Berlin and Germany would be stopped by the Pankow Republic officials and that if we resorted to an airlift the aircraft would be shot down.

Mr. S. Silverman: That surely is a complete misconception. What Mr. Khrushchev was saying, as I understood, was that if we, in order to avoid recognising East German officials, were to enforce an airlift, they would resist. That is a different thing.

Mr. Boyd: My hon. Friend may be right in that interpretation. I certainly do not rule out that possibility, and we should not rule it out until we have been actually stopped from sending supplies through in the normal way.
As many people think that there is an intention to have another blockade it is useful to consider what we would do if necessary, hoping that it will not be necessary and thereby perhaps making it less likely to happen. It is probably true that

in the Suez crisis we quite overestimated the likelihood of an intention to block our trade through the canal. It may be that we overestimate the danger of an attempt to block trade and traffic going through between West Berlin and West Germany, but it is useful to consider what would happen if the anticipated danger took place.
In this connection I would comment about the altercation that took place on the question of a lorry being stopped at a gate and who was using force. If the gate is closed and the sentry is standing by and the lorry is stopped, it seems that the man who has closed the gate has used a degree of force illegally in stopping the lorry going through. If the lorry driver drives through the gate and smashes it and in the process knocks the sentry down and proceeds on his course, greater force would have been used by the lorry driver. But if the sentry succeeded in shooting the driver, greater and more serious force would have been used by the sentry.
It seems to me, therefore, that there is no simple answer to that question. Probably that is the sort of asessment that would be made if the matter came before the United Nations Assembly as a last resort. It might also take the view that the sentry was wrong to stop the driver, that the driver was more wrong who had forcibly smashed the gate—

Mr. Russell: Would not the hon. Member agree that the person who first uses force is the one who is guilty of it?

Mr. Boyd: That does not necessarily and automatically follow, and it does not necessarily excuse the further action leading to further violence by the next person. If the gate has been illegally closed, the matter should be taken to the International Court or there should be negotiations between the higher authorities, rather than a greater amount of force being used. Once we step up the scales of force there is no clear indication where to stop before getting to a nuclear war, unless one has the idea that rather than keep on stepping up the degree of force used, there should be negotiation going up if necessary through higher levels and ultimately to the General Assembly of the United Nations. So it seems clear to me that we do not want anybody on the Western side to take the contest to a higher level of force, to smash through the gate rather than pursue the matter by


negotiation. Because of this I would prefer to try the air-lift in the hope that there will not be attempts to shoot down aircraft—that is, if the gate is actually closed.
I also hope that food supplies are being built up, as I think Willi Brandt suggested, to enable Berlin to carry on for some time and to allow time for negotiation, rather than wait and be left with a very short time before the lack of supplies became serious. I hope, therefore, that we shall be prepared to increase the road, rail and air services early, to stock supplies, and perhaps also to remove West out of Berlin all those wanting to go West from farther East, and anybody else who would be glad to leave Berlin and has no special need to stay there at present. All this would help to diminish the food supply problem if things become difficult, which we hope they will not.
I suggest that we do not want to give way unjustifiably. We want to stand our ground, but to do so in the most conciliatory and least violent way possible. If we keep to such a course continuously we shall have the maximum chance of peace both in the immediate crisis and in future ones. In the end if we cannot get settlement by negotiation at lower levels, we shall have to take the matter to the United Nations, the Security Council and the Assembly, abide by their decision, and put our weight, influence, authority and force, if necessary, behind the enforcement of a United Nations decision.

9.8 p.m.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: I will begin with two preliminary observations. I believe that the whole Committee will wish to join with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in expressing to Mr. Dulles our warm regard, our recognition of his great devotion to his task and of the services he has rendered to us all, and our ardent hopes for his recovery.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Cyprus we shall be debating when the Prime Minister returns from Moscow. I only say now that a load of anxiety and grief has been lifted from the hearts of many people, not least from the mothers of our soldiers and from the mothers in Cyprus, too.
Our debate this afternoon has shown that hon. Members on both sides of the

Committee, certainly all hon. Members on this side, are glad that the Prime Minister is going to Moscow and we wish him well. He has called his visit a reconnaissance and has warned us against expecting any spectacular results. I have heard it said by people who think they know the Kremlin that the Soviet leaders expect to do serious business with the Prime Minister on only two subjects, trade and cultural relations. I came back from Moscow the other day thinking that there was much of real importance to be done on both. It is only when we have talked with the Soviet leaders that we can understand their passionate enthusiasm for their seven-year and fifteen-year economic plans.
Of course, they are proud of what they have done in the last forty years. They found Russia, after their revolution, in a catastrophic condition, prostrate from the war, still torn by civil strife, her transport system smashed, millions of people dying from hunger and millions more from epidemic disease. When the great Norwegian statesman Nansen was repatriating prisoners of war for the League of Nations he once called Russia the country of the dead. They have made it, in forty years, one of the leading industrial nations of the world, but they think, as Sir John Cockcroft said only the other day, that the development of science and technology is only just beginning to bring its results, that it is a solid foundation for a rapidly expanding economic system, and that they are on the threshold now of achievements far greater than anything they accomplished in the past.
When, with my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker), we saw Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Mikoyan, in December, they told us again and again that, whatever happened about the cold war or about international trade, they would, by their own efforts and with their own resources, fulfil and over-fulfil the targets of their economic plans, and bring about by 1965 a massive increase in the living standards of their people. They know very well that an expanded international trade could make an immense contribution to the fulfilment of their aims.
Mr. Khrushchev told the 21st Congress of the Communist Party that the Soviet Union had trebled its trade with the capitalist countries of Europe and


America since 1950, and that, thanks to the seven-year plan, they should double it again by 1965. I came away with the conviction that this passionate concentration on internal economic and social advance might be a powerful factor on the side of peace, that these men know that the arms race, and still more a nuclear war, will be fatal to their hopes, would destroy their system, and that it is our overwhelming interest to sweep away whatever trade restrictions still remain, and to build up with them whatever trade exchanges and co-operation will benefit both them and us.
Culture is a word from which the British instinctively recoil. I remember Lord Balfour once saying to the League of Nations that the six Commonwealth delegations had never voted together except against what was then called intellectual co-operation. Visit a Russian university or school, or music or ballet schools, or picture galleries, theatres or concerts, or even the Pioneers, and one cannot resist the feeling that culture and the arts are very important in the Soviet scheme of things.
I was fortunate enough to be present in Leningrad, with Her Majesty's Ambassador, when the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre Company from Stratford gave their first performance of "Romeo and Juliet" there. Admittedly, it was a performance of outstanding power and beauty, the masterpiece, perhaps, of that great producer, Mr. Byam Shaw, but that does not explain the fact that its reception, and the reception of all the other plays, was a triumph far beyond anything that I have ever seen in any other theatre in the world. The enthusiasm of the public, the speeches that were called for almost every night, the Press publicity, made this a mass demonstration not for Shakespeare only, but for Anglo-Russian friendship, and, I would even add, for international peace as well.
I believe that it is of very real importance that Mr. Khrushchev should not only allow all this to happen, but gives it his full support, and I am sure that he will urge on the Prime Minister that it should be expanded still further. I left Leningrad and Moscow with a conviction that a man who says and does so much for a programme such as this must be genuinely trying to break down

the barriers which, for over four long decades, have been between his people and the outside world. I hope that the Prime Minister may be able to do real business under that heading, too. Our Committee of the British Council whose chairman is my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew), has done very much on which they deserve our congratulations. I hope that when he gets back, the Prime Minister will give that Committee more resources still.
Mr. Khrushchev's speech, reported this morning, means that he intends to talk to the Prime Minister of other things, besides culture and trade. He has put Berlin back as No. 1 on the agenda. Some hon. Members think that his language was very rough. To me, the most significant sentence of his speech was:
One cannot settle international issues now by force of arms
I genuinely believe, after long discussions, that Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues are desperately anxious for a settlement of the whole German question, and that they want to talk and not to fight, and that if we had had the Summit Conference, for which they have so often asked, we should not have had the Berlin Note three months ago.
There are two things which make the Berlin question acute and urgent for the Kremlin. The first is the tide of refugees who leave East Germany for the West, 2 million out of 17 million in the last nine years, half of them in their early twenties, and thousands of the best specialists, engineers, doctors, chemists, university teachers, without whose services the country must be extraordinarily difficult to run. This is much more than a problem of prestige. It is a menace to the working of the Government's whole administrative and economic machine.
The second is the arming of West Germany, which is now going on. Of course, we know that the Russians first rearmed East Germany, violating, as we believe, the Potsdam principles. To look at recent events from their point of view —and I try to put this with as little provocation as I can—eight miles from the centre of Leningrad there still stand the earthworks at which the Nazi armies were held at bay. From that distance.
Leningrad was under siege for 500 days, for just as long as Hitler's armies were in front of Moscow launching attack after attack. In Warsaw, I saw Nazi films showing Hitler's troops, before their final retreat, dynamiting and setting fire to every building that remained. They did the same in Russia, and only fifteen years ago.
I remember what kind of disarmament we were proposing to Russia in 1957 and what kind of things are happening in Germany today. The Prime Minister will forgive me if I elaborate the point. It will be ever present in the minds of his Kremlin hosts. Until May, 1955, the Western Governments were urging the Soviets to accept the drastic plan of an all-round armament reduction, a reduction to 1 million or, at most, 1½ million men for their army, navy and air force, including their security police and other forces. That was a reduction of up to 80 per cent. and there were to be a corresponding reduction of conventional arms, total abolition of all nuclear weapons, including stocks, abolition of other weapons of mass destruction, budgetary limitation, and inspection and control.
In May, 1955, the Soviet delegate suddenly accepted most of the major points, but we withdrew our proposals —I shall not argue about this; we can do so on another occasion—before serious negotiations could begin. In the subcommittee of the United Nations, in 1957. Mr. Stassen was saying that his Government no longer believed that large armaments reductions would help the cause of peace. He was saying that they had come to think that the extreme form of inspection and control which they had previously favoured was not practical, feasible or attainable, and when Russia still proposed total nuclear disarmament, including the abolition of existing stocks —knowing, as everybody knows, that American stocks are now sufficient to blow up the world two or three times over —Mr. Stassen replied that a substantial part of those stocks must be retained.
Mr. Stassen said that America must be free to make new nuclear weapons from existing stocks of fissile materials and must be free to refabricate her stocks into new and more efficient weapons, to introduce and maintain nuclear weapons in the territories of her Allies—that is, in

Germany—to train the forces of her Allies in the use of nuclear weapons, and increasingly to equip those Allies with the means of delivering such weapons.
Are hon. Members surprised that the Russians argued that this was not disarmament at all, but simply a widespread preparation for nuclear war? Are they surprised that the Russians were not reassured by the thought that the Americans would keep control of the nuclear warheads? The Russians know as well as we do that if we do not obtain all-round disarmament the Germans will be able to make their own warheads before long.
Let hon. Members remember something that looms large—I believe that it looms much too large, although it is not unimportant—in Russian minds. Yesterday, we had some Questions about the firm of Krupps. Hon. Members may have forgotten the record of the Krupp family. Before the First World War they were proved, in the German Reichstag, to have bribed German officials, to have financed armaments propaganda and to have done everything in their power to increase the expansion of the German forces and their readiness for instant war. They did a great deal that could be called most dangerous war propaganda.
Between the wars, they created the Hugenberg Konzern, bought up a great part of the German Press, the German broadcasting stations, advertising agencies and UFA films, and threw the whole weight of this enormous machine behind the Nazi movement. With other armament firms they gave direct subsidies to Hitler, thus enabling him to pay the storm troops which destroyed the democratic Weimar Constitution and brought Hitler into power.
The Press reported the other day that Krupps are now associated with Messerschmitt, Dornier and other famous firms in plans to build up an aircraft industry on German soil. Perhaps the Russians have exaggerated, and perhaps their fears about great trusts are no longer as justified as they were in years gone by. No one can believe more firmly than I in the peaceful aspirations of the post-war German generation, but I understand the feelings of the Russians when they read such news as this. It is this problem of growing armaments— and, above all, of nuclear armaments— in Central Europe that we have to solve.
The Berlin crisis is only a symptom of a malignant and spreading disease— a disease of fear and suspicion that is growing greater and not less. I told Mr. Khrushchev very plainly that the Labour Party did not believe that his proposals could ever solve the Berlin problem. I told him that we could never abandon the people of West Berlin, and I reminded him of the results of the Berlin elections in 1946 and in December of last year. In 1946, the Social Democrats had 48·7 per cent. of the votes, and in 1958 they 52·6 per cent., which was a clear overall majority. In 1946, the Christian Democrats had 22·2 per cent. of the votes, and last year they had 37·7 per cent. In 1946, the Communists had 19·8 per cent. of the votes, and last year they had 1·95 per cent.
We cannot abandon the people of Berlin, but I cannot help thinking that in this situation it is madness for anyone to speak of allowing things to drift into a resort to war. If Mr. Khrushchev says that "international issues cannot now be settled by force, "if Mr. Eisenhower says, as he said yesterday, that "the Western Powers are searching for a just peace, "it is surely time to give up sabre rattling on either side.
Surely, as my right hon. Friends have said this afternoon, there is an opportunity for Britain to give a lead. As they have argued, Berlin can be satisfactorily dealt with only within the context of the whole German problem. We believe that, in dealing with the German problem, disengagement is the opening gambit which holds out by far the greatest hope. Only disengagement, leading to the early creation of a controlled disarmament zone, touches what I have tried to show is the real root of the present troubles. It may have to come by stages and perhaps, as my right hon. Friend explained, the first stage could be the Schultz Plan, of which he spoke. Or it may be that a more ambitious and swifter programme would be more likely to succeed.
Of course, it will not be lasting unless it leads on to the reunification of Germany at an early date. Nothing could be more certain in the politics of Europe than that Germany will not remain divided for good and all. Let the Kremlin and the men in Warsaw ponder on the true significance of that vast flow

of migrants to the West. The division of Germany is a danger to Germany, a danger to Europe and, above all, to Poland and Russia; and it is a danger which grows greater with the passing years. I believe the difficulties of reunification may be less than they appear. I do not believe that acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier will be among those difficulties, and I believe most firmly it ought not to be.
The problem of the land and industries which have been nationalised in Eastern Germany is often spoken of. In my submission, it is no problem at all. The stage at which the technique of free elections must be used is much more complex, but, as my right hon. Friend has said, both Mr. Dulles and Mr. Khrushchev have shown some welcome signs of flexibility on this vital point. On the starting point of disengagement, if the Prime Minister gave it his strong support there might be in the Kremlin something approaching a meeting of minds.
My right hon. Friend spoke of the speeches of the two American senators within the last few days. Mr. Khrushchev told me that the Soviet Government strongly favour the Rapacki Plan. Mr. Rapacki told me that it is not a cut and dried proposal which we must take or leave. Every point is open to discussion and negotiation. We believe that the plan of action outlined by my right hon. Friend this afternoon holds out the best hope for real advance, but I was not much encouraged by the Minister of State or much impressed by the arguments he used. We think it grotesque to suggest that our plan would make Germany a pariah State, or that there is any analogy with what happened between the wars. It could in no way break up the newfound friendship and co-operation between France and Germany. The Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, the Common Market and the rest are there to stay.
If I understood the Minister of State aright, perhaps in his view there is to be a permanent division between Russia and the West, a gulf in military, social and economic matters which nothing will ever bridge. We shrink from any such prospect. We look forward, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) so rightly said, to a European


security agreement in which all nations of East and West shall be embraced. We will not achieve it, and no zone of controlled disarmament will long endure, unless we get a treaty of all-round disarmament for Europe and the world.
The Minister of State spoke about what happened between the wars. What really happened? The victorious Allies disarmed Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. The great majority of the German people accepted that policy, believing the Western pledges that all other nations would similarly disarm. In the end, the other nations, including the leading Western nations, wanted to honour the pledges they had made. They put forward disarmament proposals which would have brought us peace, but they had hedged and hesitated for too long. Hitler was in power. The Disarmament Conference broke up in disarray and a series of consequential blunders led us to a Second World War. I am afraid that that grim story of drift and indecision may be repeated now.
The Russian leaders have not forgotten what happened in 1955. They said to me, not once but many times, that they do not believe that Western Governments want disarmament at all. They note that, whenever Mr. Khrushchev proposes, as he has done four times within the last two years, the total abolition of all nuclear weapons, and of all missiles, our leaders say not one word in reply. I hope that we may debate these matters fairly soon. In the meantime, I hope that the Prime Minister will read the foreign policy passage in Mr. Khrushchev's latest speech and will try to sound his mind on what is, in truth, the gravest of all the issues for the future of mankind.
I heard with much agreement the peroration of the speech of the Minister of State. I believe, with him, that the present Soviet leaders understand that the continuance of the arms race and the risk of nuclear war imperil their economic plans and may destroy their system and themselves. I sat for many years in the United Nations beside their predecessors, who are now out of power. The present leaders have made many changes in the foreign policy which the Soviet Union has pursued. I believe that they are developing a new attitude of mind. We shall do well to grasp

whatever chance of progress fate may give us, before it is again too late.

9.34 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I should like to apologise to the Committee for the absence of the Foreign Secretary and myself during the greater part of the debate. I am very grateful for the kind references to the reasons for that absence, which were made, I am informed, by the Leader of the Opposition when he opened the debate. We also regret the absence of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), who, we hope, will make a speedy recovery. I have had reports of the debate, so far as it has been possible, and I should like to thank the Leader of the Opposition for what he said about me and the Foreign Secretary and for his good wishes for the journey which we are to undertake.
This is the kind of debate in which most valuable speeches are made from all sides, and they require careful study. Although we have not been so fortunate as to hear them because of our other commitments, we shall certainly study them most carefully. With other periodicals I thought I would take HANSARD with me in the aeroplane on my journey.
Of course, these questions are very difficult and complicated. It is no good anybody trying to pretend that there is an easy, simple, obvious solution, and so I was glad that, with very few exceptions, that has not been the mood of this debate. This has been a serious attempt from all sides of the Committee to face a very difficult situation, indeed perhaps a dangerous situation, which we must grasp if we are to avoid disaster.
I want to get the thing a little into perspective in reference to our own visit. The purpose of the visit was described by the British Ambassador in Moscow as "a voyage of discovery". I think I used the word "reconnaissance". I am grateful, as I say, for the friendly things that have been said about our purpose and for the hopes expressed about the degree of success that we may have, but I want 'to make it clear that, so far as these larger issues are concerned, our purpose is not to negotiate. It is our purpose—to use the phrase employed by the Leader of the Opposition—to break the ice and to get some feeling of the


general situation before the next stages have to be taken up.
The next stages must be visits to Paris, to Bonn, and perhaps to Washington, with a view to the formulation of Western allied policy. It is when that policy comes to be formulated that the great decisions have to be taken. All this is preliminary to working out what is the right line for us all together to take. It is a great mistake to believe that we can find new friends by abandoning old ones. It is absolutely necessary that the Western alliance should stand firmly together and not allow itself to be divided or disunited.
In reference to the possible visit we may have to pay to Washington, I am sure that the whole Committee will have listened with sympathy and approval to the kind observations, by the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) about the American Secretary of State. Mr. Dulles is a figure whose very bigness is hardly realised until we are threatened with its absence. He is one of those men whose devotion to duty and strength of purpose have made him a great, important and vital figure in the life of the world. I trust, like the right hon. Gentleman, that Mr. Dulles may make a recovery to health.
Apart from the larger issues, there are other questions which I hope we can usefully debate, including culture. The right hon. Gentleman properly said that "culture" was a horrible word, but I have had something to do with culture in one way and another, as bookseller and publisher, for quite a long time, and even as a student and scholar. What we really mean is, can we begin to know a little more about each other by trying to understand the contributions which the different countries have to make to what the world has to give?
I think we can do something by contact and by trying to bring our people closer together. But I think that there again—we may as well face some of the difficulties—some movement must come from both sides. Great phrases and formulae are not sufficient. Action has to be taken, and if we really want to get closer together, we have, perhaps on both sides, to remove the obstacles—they are great obstacles—which stand in the way.
On trade, too, I hope that we can have some useful talks. Here again we

must not exaggerate. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, as a trained economist, knows very well what is the actual trading situation, the amounts which can be increased and the difficulties on both sides. Here also I feel that something can be done—not one of those wild, spectacular things which are sometimes suggested, but a steady improvement, so that both our countries can gain from the increases in wealth that we hope to see both of us enjoy. In other words, we should break down the old fallacy that we can gain from somebody else's poverty and realise that we all gain by each other's wealth.
To return, however, to the larger and most immediate issues. After discussions with our Western Allies, with our N.A.T.O. Allies and after full consultation with our Commonwealth friends we shall have—not immediately, but within the next period—to face the supreme test of direct negotiations with the Soviet Government. It is for that—and it is a grim prospect as well as an inspiring one —that we have to fit ourselves.
Something has been said, I think, about the timing of our visit. I have heard suggestions that it had something to do with an election. It has nothing to do with that, except that I thought it just as well to get it in before the election. Free travel is very attractive—and one never knows! The truth is that for some time I have been making really quite strenuous efforts to get to the summit, but it has seemed to be a very difficult and disappointing journey. Sometimes we have had a long exchange of Notes, written in the most tremendous detail, and I tried to break through that by writing much shorter replies, which I have been told afterwards were regarded as somewhat discourteous—length, apparently, being a sign of grace.
Then, last summer, I really thought for a short period that we had achieved it when there seemed a possibility that Mr. Khrushchev would come to New York to join in our consultations there. That, for some reason or other, did not take place. Therefore I thought this was the time, for two reasons, why we might venture to make this proposal. I wish to make it clear that we proposed ourselves; we took the risk of being refused. We have been accepted as guests, I took this decision on my own responsibility, which I thought it right to do


First, I thought it was right to take up this long-standing invitation, other methods of meeting having failed, and, secondly—and I must be quite frank— because the situation in Berlin and Germany, and the Russian attitude towards it, is threatening and even dangerous. I felt that one could not leave that without making some effort to get closer to grips to see really how we stood.
A great number of views have been expressed today on the details of all kinds of possible agreements that may be made. There are a great number of plans under all kinds of different names, and there are a great many variations of them. In fact, one's dossier is almost too full of them, and they have to be studied very carefully. Some have been put forward today.
It is quite difficult to formulate these schemes. If I may say so, I hope without offence—and I do not mean it in any offensive way—even the Opposition, who do not have to carry the immediate responsibilities, had to make I think two or three shots before an appropriate resolution could finally be agreed, and even then there were some dissentients. I am not complaining of this, but it does show how easy it is to have a sort of general idea that there ought to be something done about it, but when it comes to formulating particular plans there are, of course, great difficulties.
Nevertheless—and this is, after all, what the House of Commons exists for— discussions like this in public, where there must be, of course, far greater freedom for everyone except the Government of the day, are valuable and useful, and I am sure that the Committee will understand the reticence of the Government in committing themselves to this or that proposition. For every word I speak or every foolish word that I might let out might have really disastrous effects in one place or another.
All I can say is that we will study them, as we have studied them. We reject nothing so long as we maintain certain definite principles. These are— and I must repeat them—that the balance of military security must not be changed to the disadvantage of either side—we have no right to risk that—and that any proposals must be consistent with the

survival as a defensive organisation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and that means quite a lot when we come to study some of these proposals. Nothing must be done which would result, whether in logic or in fact, in a withdrawal of the American and Canadian Forces from the Continent of Europe. Within that, we must say, nothing ought to be excluded.
We must be firm but we must be flexible. I will not—and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman who wound up the debate will excuse me—go into the details of his account of the story of the disarmament discussions. I cannot accept his account of them, and he knows it well. It is a very one-sided and partial account, the main basis of which is to take everything that is said by the other side at almost face value and to read every kind of mistake into what is said by the Western Allies.
The test—and I hope to take up this discussion in Moscow—whether it is the question of the nuclear tests or anything else, the test is control. We will agree to almost any scheme if there is effective control, but we will not agree to give away our strength and security except in exchange for control of an effective kind.
As I said, it is not really very difficult to think out variations of schemes. From what I have heard—and I will read it carefully—the Leader of the Opposition made a very moderate and very helpful speech showing all the different types of schemes that might be useful, perhaps small to begin with but growing in their efficacy and finally very much more ambitious, to bring back a sense of security, happiness and confidence between the peoples of the whole of Europe, East and West.
I am bound to say—I hope that he and the Committee will forgive me; perhaps they are the meditations of the results of experience—that it is not really very difficult in life to think out all sorts of schemes to get agreement. The really difficult thing is to get the will to agree. If people want to agree it is not difficult to form a precise plan. It is the same in business, the same in ordinary private relations—if people want to agree they trust each other and all that stuff written by the lawyers into the agreement no


one ever bothers with because they trust each other. Look at this country where the great mass of our business relationships are done on a word, on the telephone, on a letter written, on the confidence of one with another.
It is not merely thinking out the scheme that is difficult. The problem that we face, and we know it in our hearts, is to break the ice. Can this terrible division between the two groups be broken into? Can we make a start? If we can make a start, I do not think there will be much difficulty in finding some technical scheme which translates into an undertaking that new sense of confidence. It is the will to agree that matters.
There are great disappointments. There are sometimes alarming attitudes and threatening speeches made by the Soviet leaders. We must accept those. We must not be thrown off our guard, but we must be not unduly disturbed by words. Deeds are what matter. We must, therefore, if we can, be firm but imaginative.
I cannot help feeling that a visit of this kind can do no harm. I trust it may do some good. From what I have heard of my friends, the heads of the allied Governments, I am encouraged to believe that they feel the same. After returning, we will take counsel with Parliament and with the allied Governments and with our friends in the Commonwealth and in N.A.T.O. Meanwhile, we will do what we can to make a contribution to the work of the alliance and we shall be encouraged and fortified by the gracious and friendly attitude which has been expressed on all sides of the Committee today.

9.53 p.m.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: During his speech, the Prime Minister made some remarks about what my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) had been saying about the course of the disarmament negotaitions in 1955 and subsequently, very reminiscent of what the Foreign Secretary said in the House on a previous occasion. My right hon. Friend made it plain that this debate was not the occasion for going in detail into the course of those negotiations or into the attitude of Her Majesty's Government. I had hoped that while the Prime Minister was dealing with the point, my right hon. Friend might

have risen to his feet and questioned him about it.
I hope that, on reflection, the Prime Minister will reconsider what he has said and that in due course we shall get an explanation from him and from the Foreign Secretary of the attacks that they have made. It is well known in the House of Commons that my right hon. Friend has spent many years studying questions of disarmament and world peace. It is well known that some months ago he published a book dealing with this subject, which was singled out for attack shortly afterwards by the Foreign Secretary.
That attack by the Foreign Secretary led to correspondence with him in which the details of his allegations were gone into and in which a reply was made to the points that he had made in the House. When, however, permission was subsequently asked of the Foreign Secretary to publish that correspondence, he refused on what I considered to be rather flimsy grounds. If the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister continue to repeat in the House allegations which, we believe, they cannot substantiate about the arguments put forward by my right hon. Friend in his recent book, can we at least have from the Foreign Secretary the courtesy of a public discussion of these issues and can the relevant documents be published?
If the Secretary of State proposes to seek safety behind the allegedly confidention nature of correspondence of this kind, we must press him to tell us how we can discuss these issues in public. If he will not allow us to discuss these issues in public, we call on him to withdraw the harmful, disparaging and inaccurate things that he and the Prime Minister have been saying.

9.55 p.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart: I should like to take up one remark made by the Prime Minister. He used the phrase, "We reject nothing." He appeared to apply that to the very powerfully presented, constructive proposals of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. The Prime Minister enunciated certain principles that ought to be observed which none of us could accept. The question at issue was whether my right hon. Friend's proposals were consonant with those proposals or not.
The Prime Minister appeared to regard that as an open question. Of plans and schemes, he said, "We reject nothing". But I think that that argument misinterpreted the Minister of State, because it was clear that the burden of his speech was to reject altogether the propositions put forward by my right hon. Friend, and many of us were left with the impression, at the end of that speech, that, while the Government were very skilful in finding arguments against anything put forward from this side of the Committee, they had a sad dearth of invention, thought or imagination when it came to devising any proposals of their own.

The Prime Minister: I should not allow this to pass. We reject nothing consonant with these criteria, but how these criteria, which are vital, are applied must be discussed between us and agreed between us and the Western Alliance.

Mr. Stewart: Most certainly. But the question still at issue is whether the proposals put forward by my right hon. Friend could properly be urged upon our Western Allies. I think that they are consonant with the principles which the Prime Minister put forward. Our view was that the job of the Government should be to try to persuade our Western Allies to take a similar view. What worries us about the Government's point of view is that they do not appear to be prepared to persuade anybody to do anything, and, if they do, what they propose to persuade anybody about has not emerged from Government spokesmen during the debate.
The Prime Minister suggested that if two parties have the will to agree it is easy enough to devise schemes. I do not think that the matter can be dismissed quite as easily as that. Nobody could be so optimistic as to suppose that if we discuss with the Soviet Union we would in any brief, or even lengthy, period of time establish such a degree of mutual confidence as might exist between two fellow citizens of this country engaged in the same line of business. What we have to face is that we may be able to create an atmosphere in which the Western Allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its friends, on the other, are prepared to trust each other to a limited extent.
We may be able to reach agreement in a limited field, and any agreement, however limited, has the advantage that it makes the further growth of trust a little more likely. But in an atmosphere such as that surely the nature of the proposals matter rather more than the Prime Minister suggested in his speech.
That is why I feel that the carefully-thought-out proposals put forward from this side of the Committee merited more serious consideration than they have had from the Government during the debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That a sum, not exceeding £1,272,018,000, be granted to Her Majesty, on account, for or towards defraying the charges for the following Civil and Revenue Departments and for the Ministry of Defence for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1960.

Resolution to be reported.

Report to be received Tomorrow; Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Bryan.]

10.0 p.m.

Mr. Maurice Edelman: The Prime Minister, in the course of his speech, made reference to the possibility that during his visit to Moscow he might make arrangements to expand trade between this country and the Soviet Union. I hope that, if he does so, he will bear in mind the interest of the machine tool industry which for long has had very close associations with the Soviet Union. Indeed, before the war it was the principal beneficiary of the credit of £10 million, and for a long time it has sought to expand its trade with the Soviet Union. It has not been able to do so because of certain embargoes that existed, although now many of them have been lifted.
I certainly hope that the Prime Minister will bear the interest of the machine tool industry very much in mind, because in raising this matter tonight I am referring to one of our principal industries— principal in importance though not necessarily in size—which has recently been suffering very greatly.
The machine tool industry is a barometer of the country's industrial wealth. In increasing redundancy and in shrinkage of orders it has seen certain storm signals to which we would do well to pay close attention. I am raising this matter not only because it closely affects my own constituency, where two of the country's biggest machine tool companies are situated, but also because the industry is one of great national importance. The prosperity of Britain marches hand in hand with the industry's properity.
The machine tool industry has been the first casualty of a policy of restriction, a casualty which such an industry always becomes. Although my major charge against the Government is that their restrictionist policy has led to the decline of the machine tool industry, it is, fortunately, the case that a simple adjustment towards a policy of expansion could rehabilitate the present declining fortunes of the industry.
I do not want to give the Minister of State, Board of Trade, large numbers of statistics, because I am sure that he has them all at his finger tips, but I venture to offer him a few as an indication of the decline in the industry recently. At the end of August, 1957, 121,000 men were employed on the manufacture of machine tools and engineers' small tools. By August, 1958, the number had fallen to 114,000, while the number of unemployed had risen by over 1,000.
Since that time, it is quite certain that the number of unemployed has been steadily rising. I know that it has risen in my constituency, where one of the oldest and most eminent firms of machine tool manufacturers, which has never had a redundancy before, has lately had to sack a considerable number of men. Only two days ago a mother came to see me to complain that her son, an apprentice, was being stood off for two days a week —and it is upon apprentices that the whole future of the industry depends.
There is another statistic which illustrates the decline in the industry. The industry's order books show that the value of orders in hand has fallen between July, 1947, and October, 1958, by £30 million.
These are serious figures which show a most unhappy state of affairs for an industry which has had a long and proud history since the nineteenth century when,
by its emergence and development, it led Britain into the forefront of the industrial countries of the world. Today the industry, taken as a whole, has preserved something of its nineteenth century structure. Although in one sense that is of great value, because it means that its traditions have been preserved— those traditions which were so notable in the nineteenth and early twentieth century—it is, as is acknowledged, old-fashioned. About half the output of the 350 firms which constitute its major part is in the hands of 20 firms, and the remaining output is divided between the remaining 330 firms.
Whilst it is true that at the time of the Korean war the industry was capable of, and in fact achieved, a rapid and considerable expansion, this was achieved in what I have described as traditional terms. In other words, the industry was engaged in producing the types of machines it had been producing for many years. Unfortunately, although this produced a boom in the industry, it did not produce a boom of such a nature that Great Britain has been able to keep up in the van of the machine tool producing countries.
We were in competition with the Germans, and the Germans had a considerable advantage in that after the war, as a result of the policy of dismantling, a large part of their old machinery, equipment and machine tools were swept away. So in 1946 and 1947 the Germans more or less started from scratch. They had kept their teams of designers together and the result was that towards the end of the 'forties and in the early 'fifties they were making perhaps the most up-to-date machine tools in the world.
I find it a melancholy experience when sometimes I walk round Coventry factories to see the large number of extremely up-to-date German machines that have been imported into the City of Coventry, which today has unemployment in its own machine tool industry. I am sure the Minister of State would say, and I agree, that this is an international industry and that there has been a great deal of specialisation, with the result that in order to take a balanced view of the industry one has to see it in its international ramifications, and no single firm is capable of producing the


whole range of designs that may be required by producers.
Nevertheless, having said that, I draw the attention of the House to the major concern which I had in raising this matter on the Adjournment, apart from the question of redundancy and of continuing unemployment in the industry. This is what I regard as the most obnoxious practice on the part of certain machine tool manufacturers of acting as agents for foreign firms and themselves, in a sense, importing unemployment into this country by importing machines from abroad which could very well and quite as easily be made in this country. I understand that in the machine tool trade this practice is a conventional one. It is taken for granted that manufacturers should act as agents for foreign firms in importing machines.
If one were to translate that into terms of, say, the motor industry. I ask the Minister what he would say if, in Coventry, for instance, the Standard Motor Company were to start acting as agents for Volkswagen and was to import German motor cars at a time when workers at the Standard Motor Company were being stood off. One only has to express it in those terms to see the contradiction which exists between the patriotic function of a firm in acting as producer or, in times of stress like these through which we are passing, in acting merely as agents.
It is clear that in times of difficulty a firm may well prefer to act as agents and take whatever commission there is— 10 per cent. or 15 per cent.—when profit margins are small, rather than to manufacture and go to the trouble of designing and producing and having the responsibility of its own labour force.
I submit to the hon. Gentleman, and perhaps he will deal with this point, that this is a pernicious practice, and that its spread will not only enlarge the area of unemployment, but, in addition to that, it will strike a blow at the function of the machine tool industry in acting as a pilot for British industry as a whole. I wish to quote from a journal of the machine tool industry, The Machinery Market of 15th January this year, which said:
It must rile every patriot to have to import a foreign machine in order to make a profit, whilst being aware that the order could well be filled by a British firm who is at this time standing off workmen.

I want to raise one or two other matters connected with what I personally regard as the present recession in the machine tool industry, and one is the fact that many of the designers in the aircraft industry are being dispersed, and our research resources, which are already extremely limited in comparison with those of the United States and Germany, and certainly of Russia, are being still further constricted. There can be no doubt that there are no adequate facilities for research. It is true that there are Government grants to engineering research associations, amounting, I understand, to £200,000, but this is really derisively small, as compared with the Soviet Union, where, I am told, the Experimental and Scientific Research Institute for the machine tool industry alone has over 2,500 staff, and with the United States where the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has substantial Government subsidies running into many millions of dollars.
The hon. Gentleman will, of course, refer to the work of the machine tools productivity team, which declared that it was desirable—
to reduce considerably the number of independent manufacturing companies in the industry by absorption. amalgamation or any such means that will allow of greater standardisation and concentration.
I believe that the real reason why the team reported in this way was that research and design, in particular, have been too widely distributed, and that the smaller firms have not got the resources with which to engage in the kind of research which is necessary in the competitive machine tool world, and, consequently, not only would rationalisation produce greater standardisation, but it would concentrate the resources for research.
I want to allow the hon. Gentleman as much time as possible in which to reply, but I want to suggest that there are three problems facing the machine tool industry. There are some which the industry can solve of its own resources by carrying out the internal rationalisation that was recommended in the report which I have quoted, but there are others which lie outside the industry, but. which do lie within the province of the Government.
It is a fact that no firm will lay down new plant in a period of great


restriction. No firm will lay down new plant if it believes that the Government's policy is deflation. The Government have, in fact, embarked upon a policy of deflation, and it is true of them, if I may quote a Russian proverb—to be topical—that it is easier to embrace a bear than to get rid of it. That is the situation of the Government today. I do not believe that anything less than a total change in Government policy from restriction to expansion can solve the problems of the machine tool industry and restore full employment.
I have raised this matter tonight in order to declare my dissatisfaction with the Government's policy, to place the blame for the industry's decline where that blame lies, and to point the way to a restoration of its fortunes by whomsoever that restoration may be achieved. I know that many of the matters I have mentioned lie beyond the scope of the Minister of State's responsibility, but I hope that he will deal with the specific problems which I have raised and which can be met at any rate with a palliative in the difficult situation which the machine tool industry faces today.

10.15 p.m.

The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. J. K. Vaughan-Morgan): There were a few remarks made by the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) with which he will not expect me to agree, but I congratulate him on having raised this matter and on having treated it from the point of view of an industry of great national importance and not as a constituency matter which, to him, it must primarily be.
I have noted all that he said tonight. I hope that he will forgive me if I think about one or two of his remarks and perhaps reply to them in due course. He quoted a few statistics and I shall quote a few, and I hope that between us we can survey all the many aspects of the industry. I accept the spirit in which he raised the matter generally, and I hope that we can discuss the revelant issues. I have not only listened to what he said tonight, but I have read with great interest the various matters he has raised in Questions, and that has given me an indication of the line he would take in the debate.
I think that I can summarise the hon. Member correctly by saying that there are three aspects of the industry with which he is concerned. He feels, first, that it occupies so important a position in the economy, that any deterioration in the industry calls for special remedial action by the Government. Secondly, he feels that the level of imports is so high that it depresses employment and domestic production. Lastly, he is not satisfied with the industry's work on research and development.
The hon. Member described the industry as old-fashioned, but I do not know that I agree with that. It is a very specialised industry, and I think that he was a little unfair when he said that when he went round factories he saw machines of German make. If he goes round German factories, or American factories, he will see machines of British make. It is not quite fair to denigrate so important a domestic industry in that way. He is not satisfied with the industry's work on research and development, and I will try to deal later with that point.
First, on the question of the worsening in the prospects and performance of the industry, I have had some very interesting research done into this question of statistics, and I give the hon. Member full credit for having drawn my attention to this matter. I have statistics only for the first eleven months of 1958. There has been a fall in the volume of new orders amounting to 17·9 per cent. below the level of new orders for the comparable period in 1957. Similarly, there has been a fall in deliveries amounting to 13·6 per cent. and a fall in outstanding orders of 28·2 per cent. between the first eleven months of 1958 and the first eleven months of 1957.
I agree that that is a serious decline and the most significant figure is the decline in new orders. That is because machine tools are usually made to order and not, as with many other industries, for stock. But we have to consider the particular products of the industry. It is an industry with many diverse products and one cannot generalise about it, because it is so specialised. Each firm has its range of specialities.
The decline in the demand for machine tools has been uneven as between the different sections of the industry. For example, the manufacturers of the


heavier or special purpose machine tools still have substantial orders and, in the main, are employing the same number of workers as they were in 1956 and 1957.
As it happens, the difficulties are concentrated around the makers of the more standard or general purpose machines. Firms in that sector are suffering very much from short-time working, and the redundancies are still increasing. But it must be remembered that the demand for machine tools is what we might call a "derived" demand. It depends essentially on the demand for the types of consumer and capital goods which require machine tools in their production. In that sense, machine tools are comparable with primary products. I accept that the best method of stimulating demand is to ensure that the overall level of demand for the end products with which they are concerned is maintained at as high a level as possible.
I now turn to the hon. Member's fear that the level of imports is affecting domestic production and employment. This is an international industry. The United Kingdom is, by very long tradition, a major importer as well as producer and exporter of machine tools. So, incidentally, are the United States of America and Western Germany. The machine tool manufacturers in the United Kingdom have publicly stated that overall efficiency in production is best served by giving British industries access to the machine tools which suit the users' products, or their tastes, irrespective of the country of origin of the machines, and that is to our interest as an exporting nation.
This does not mean that imports are particularly favoured at the expense of domestic production. Between 1950 and 1957—the last year for which complete figures are available—the industry achieved a "real" increase in production of about 50 per cent. In 1958, imports of machine tools fell proportionately more than the deliveries of British manufacturers to the home market. In the period from January to November, 1958; imports were 17 per cent. less than in the comparable eleven months of the previous year. In the same period, the deliveries of British manufacturers to the home market fell by 12·4 per cent. Those are very important figures.
The hon. Member claimed that imports are inflated because certain leading United Kingdom manufacturers act as import agents for foreign machine tool manufacturers. They want to do this so as to be able to offer a complete line to their customers. I am sure there is no evidence that this practice is increasing or that, on balance, it tends to improve the competitive position of imports. Manufacturers are not, in fact, the major channel of imports.
The hon. Member went on to ask me what I would have thought of a motor car manufacturer who imported foreign models. I was not sure that that was a very happy analogy for a Member representing a Coventry division, because this country's best overseas market for cars is now the United States of America, and Fords, of America, import English models from Fords in this country. We hope that they will continue to do so. I do not think that the hon. Member's approach is the right one.
The hon. Member will be well aware that the British machine tool industry exports a considerable part of its output. During the last three years exports have accounted for 25 per cent. or more of its total output. Even though exports, in 1958, fell by £3·9 million below the 1957 level, they were, nevertheless, the second highest on record. The fall in our exports compared with 1957 was mainly to North America, the U.S.S.R. and some continental markets. In the United States of America the machine tool industry has suffered a far more serious recession than our own, and that accounts for the fact that our exports to that market in 1958 were less than half what they were in 1957.
The hon. Member also mentioned Russia. Our exports to that country fell from more than £1 million in 1957 to a negligible amount in 1958. Soviet demand is notoriously volatile. The absence of a trade agreement does not prevent the Soviet authorities from purchasing in the United Kingdom any machine tools they may wish to import from the West. I share with the hon. Member the hope that the Prime Minister's visit may produce more orders from the Soviet Union.
Of course, much is blamed on the existing strategic controls. These have been substantially reduced and that


list is kept under constant review. The changes last August removed an important range of machine tools from export control and, incidentally, that reduction in the control included very many items of particular interest in Coventry such as thread grinders, capstan and turret lathes, multi-spindle automatics, and other things. There is no reason why, if the Soviet Union wishes, she should not place very much larger orders in this country.
If time allowed, I should like to say a word or two about the work of the Export Credits Guarantee Department. That is very important to this country. I do not think that time will allow me to say much, but we have made certain proposals which, I hope, will help the industry. In Spain, for example, we have met the terms of German exporters who lengthened their credit terms, and I think that that will be of great help to the industry. I understand that the Machine Tool Trade Association has recently sent a delegation to Spain to follow up this action and I very much hope that increased business will result from that visit.
Wherever the British machine tool manufacturers can provide firm evidence that competitors are giving longer credit terms than have hitherto been judged appropriate the E.C.G.D. will always give very sympathetic consideration to giving our exporters similar terms subject only to the five-year maximum which we will continue to observe as long as it is observed by credit insurers in other countries.
I turn to the question of research and development. I have left myself very little time to deal with all the points raised by the hon. Member. I think that he was a little unfair and I am not sure that he was really comparing like with like. The industry is quite confident that the amount of development work it is doing will stand comparison with that of any other country. The M.T.T.A. took a

leading part in the formation of the Production Engineering Research Association, which conducts research into problems common to production engineering, the field in which this industry operates. It is to be congratulated on the scheme it has recently announced for the financing of scholarships.
The Government play their part. The D.S.I.R. maintains the Mechanical Engineering Research Laboratory, which conducts basic research into engineering problems. The Department also makes a grant to the Production Engineering Research Association. I have not left myself as much time as I should like to deal with these details, but I hope I have said enough to show the House that the Government are very much concerned about deterioration in this industry and are doing what they can to help.
I should mention, in passing, that the Parliamentary Secretary announced, on 10th February, that the Ministry of Supply has withdrawn from the sales planned for this month and next certain machine tools which might otherwise have formed part of the surplus disposals programme. We shall always consult with the industry at any time to minimise any difficulties which might otherwise cause them embarrassment. We shall do all that lies in our power to assist this industry to maintain its remarkable export performance. I certainly do not think that it would be wise, right or expedient to impose any restrictions on imports.
I have every confidence in the future of the industry, tied as it is to the future of British industry generally. I do not share the pessimism of the hon. Member. I am quite certain that as the level of economic activity increases—and it will—the machine tool industry will surmount successfully its present difficulties.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at half-past Ten o'clock.